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Afghanistan has become a country synonymous with danger.  Discourses of narcotics, 
terrorism, and narcoterrorism have come to define the country and the current conflict.    
However, despite the prevalence of these dangers globally, they are seldom treated as 
political representations. This project theorizes danger as a political representation by 
deconstructing and problematizing contemporary discourses of (narco)terrorism in 
Afghanistan.  Despite the globalisation of these two discourses of danger, 
(narco)terrorism remains largely under-theorised, with the focus placed on how to 
overcome this problem rather than critically analysing it as a representation.  The 
argument being made here is that (narco)terrorism is not some ‘new’ existential danger, 
but rather reflects the hegemonic and counterhegemonic use of danger to establish 
authority over the collective identity. Using the case study of Afghanistan, this project 
critically analyses representations of danger emerging from the Afghan government and 
the Taliban.  While many studies have looked at terrorism and narcotics as security 
concerns, there has not been a critical analysis of these two dangers as a political 
representation in the Afghan context.  Therefore, this study will be of great benefit to 
scholars and practitioners of security as it presents a unique look on how identity is shaped 
through representations of danger in Afghanistan.  Through applying Critical Discourse 
Analysis to contemporary representations in Afghanistan, this study provides new insight 
into the aims and objectives of both the Government of the Islamic Republic of 
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At the time of writing, Afghanistan remains wracked by conflict.  The Taliban are said to 
have an ‘active presence’ in 70% of Afghanistan’s 398 districts, with 30 of those 
completely under the group’s control (Sharifi and Adamou 2018).1  The War on Terror, 
declared in the wake of the 9/11 terror attacks, has entered its 17th year with no end in 
sight.  Similarly, the War on Drugs, the United States-led global prohibition campaign 
against illicit drugs (both trafficking and consumption), which began during the Vietnam 
War, is nearing its 5th decade.  These wars have fuelled a globalised conflict, the brunt of 
which has been disproportionately borne by non-Western states like Afghanistan.  Indeed, 
in the history of both the War on Terror and the War on Drugs, Afghanistan holds the 
unique position of embodying the convergence of these two dangers.2  However, the sheer 
span of these conflicts and the durability of their corresponding security narratives raises 
many important questions about these dangers.  Indeed, many scholars and experts within 
the field of International Relations, and the sub-field of (International) Security Studies, 
have conducted seminal research addressing (narco)terrorism and its effect on 
Afghanistan (see Shanty 2011; Mansfield 2016).  However, the imposition of these two 
dangers on Afghanistan points to a larger process by which discourses of danger have 
been deployed as a means to constituting and securing the Afghan collective identity.  
This study critically approaches terrorism and narcotics as political representations in 
Afghanistan and seeks to uncover how, and ultimately why, these representations are 
deployed.  The motivation for this study is not one of problem solving, but one of inquiry.  
In applying a critical lens to terrorism and narcotics in Afghanistan, the goal is not to 
reveal an innovative new strategy that will defeat the Taliban and bring peace to the 
country; rather, the contribution of this work is in its critical analysis of representations 
of danger to uncover how the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 
(GIRoA) and the Taliban use danger in establishing their vision of Afghan society. 
                                                 
1 See also Liveuamap Afghanistan for a regularly updated source monitoring Taliban and other non-state 
actors’ presence in Afghanistan https://afghanistan.liveuamap.com/.  




The focus of this thesis is premised on the core assumption that danger is a discourse.  
Rather than approaching danger as an objective condition or an unproblematic label, this 
study recognises it is a discourse that constitutes, and is constitutive of, power structures 
and social identities (Campbell 1998).  Critical scholarship has shown that the knowledge, 
discourses, and representations surrounding danger are informed by the political3 and 
form the basis of authority (Dillon 1996; Bigo and Tsoukala 2008); thus, in seeking to 
reveal the motivations behind representations of (narco)terrorism, this study builds on 
earlier critical scholarship on danger and approaches it as a discourse.  In this regard, the 
thesis is quite different form the majority of literature conducted on Afghan security.  The 
dominance of positivism in mainstream scholarship serves only to confirm this discourse 
and fail to approach it from a critical perspective (see Peters 2009ab; Felbab-Brown 2010; 
Shanty 2011).  While these studies are useful for practitioners of security and government 
officials, they fail to address the operationalisation of danger by political actors.  By 
approaching (narco)terrorism as a discourse, the objective here is to shed new light on the 
endless conflict in Afghanistan and to provide a further outlet for critical approaches to 
danger.      
This thesis also hopes to illustrate that danger is not the sole prerogative of hegemonic 
forces and is utilised by counterhegemonic actors such as the Taliban.  While this was not 
the intended contribution of the thesis, at the time of writing there has yet to be a critical 
study on the Taliban’s engagement with discourses of danger.  There has been some 
recent scholarship looking at Taliban communications, political propaganda, and 
narratives (see Strick van Linschoten and Kuehn 2012b, 2018; Aggarwal 2016; Johnson 
2017), however, these studies have not addressed the Taliban’s use of danger as a 
counterhegemonic strategy.  Moreover, the continued silencing of terrorist and criminal 
groups in security literature largely deprives those represented as danger of political 
agency.  By looking beyond the (narco)terror rhetoric, this study hopes to illustrate the 
role counterhegemonic discourses play in shaping the identity of the endangered society. 
 
                                                 
3 The thesis understands ‘the political’ to refer to the distinction between friend and enemy outlined by 




Thus, the focus of this thesis can be narrowed down to two research questions.  The 
primary research question is: what are the motivations behind hegemonic and 
counterhegemonic representations of danger in Afghanistan?  However, rather than 
approaching this question from a purely theoretical perspective, this thesis critically 
analyses representations of (narco)terrorism and situates discourses of danger in a 
particular political context. This is reflective of both Foucault’s theorising of discourse as 
located within a specific context (Foucault 1978), and Fairclough’s method of Critical 
Discourse Analysis (1992, 1995), which requires an intertextual reading of the discourse.  
In analysing both GIRoA and Taliban representations of danger, the hope is to illustrate 
the instrumentalization of the danger by both hegemonic and counterhegemonic actors. 
This focus is premised on the well-established claim within Critical Security Studies that 
discourses of danger are constitutive of political order and identity (see, for example, 
Campbell 1998; Jackson 2005; Herschinger 2011).  However, prior to analysing the 
discourse, this perspective must be theorised and justified, which forms the basis of the 
discussion in Chapter I.  Indeed, the goal here is not to rehash old arguments, but rather 
to provide substantial conceptual discussion prior to the project’s empirical analysis. 
The primary research question inevitably leads to an additional research question as to 
how representations of danger are deployed in Afghanistan.  Indeed, this builds on the 
primary research question by analysing the modes of communication used by the GIRoA 
and the Taliban in disseminating their representations of danger.  Through applying CDA 
to both hegemonic and counterhegemonic representations of danger, and situating the 
discourse in the context of contemporary Afghanistan, the particular methods and 
techniques used by both the GIRoA and the Taliban reveal the desired meaning of their 
representations.  Moreover, comparing GIRoA and Taliban communications reveals the 
asymmetry of power existing between the two parties.  For instance, the GIRoA hold the 
authoritative status of the state and are therefore able to utilise formal speech acts in 
communicating to society.  Contrastingly, the Taliban, whose political motivations are 
largely delegitimised through the application of the (narco)terrorist label, are prohibited 
from adopting similar means and are confined to using local cultural mediums.  However, 
what is so interesting about this comparison is that despite the differences in how the 
GIRoA and the Taliban represent danger, both share the same motivations in using danger 
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to constitute their vision of Afghan society.  The rationale behind this question is to 
demonstrate the political use of danger and the importance of creating and securing 
identity in contemporary Afghanistan.  By analysing the modes of communication and 
the linguistic techniques deployed in representations of danger, the meaning, and 
ultimately the identity, at the heart of these representations is revealed.    
 
Research Focus 
There are three areas of focus in the thesis which reflect connections between this work 
and existing subfields.  The primary focus of the thesis should be understood as 
representations of danger in Afghanistan.  As such, this study is primarily a critical 
analysis of discourses of (narco)terrorism in Afghanistan.  Despite variations in the status 
and capabilities of the GIRoA and the Taliban, a series of data sets have been developed 
that reveal the operationalisation of danger by both actors.  For the GIRoA, empirical 
analysis centres on government statements, press releases, speeches, and interviews with 
domestic and foreign news media.  Despite a plethora of potential speakers, this study has 
narrowed its focus down to members of the executive branch of the Afghan government.  
While this approach may conflict with other frameworks utilised in this study (i.e. Paris 
School approaches to elite discourse), it is justified (see Chapter I) in connection to 
hegemonic strategies of state- and identity-building.  Moreover, to approach the GIRoA 
as a unified body is problematic and ignores the deeply localised nature of Afghan politics 
(Schetter 2013).  Instead, this study approaches the executive branch of the Afghan 
government as a weak hegemonic actor that is compelled to deploy representations of 
danger in attempting to secure Afghan society.   
In assessing counterhegemonic representations of danger, this study critically analyses 
Taliban communications across several mediums, ranging from internet publications to 
poetry.  While such a comparison may be deemed problematic given the discrepancy 
between hegemonic and counterhegemonic modes of communication, the findings of this 
study reveal the evocation of danger throughout Taliban communications.  Thus, danger 
serves as a productive counterhegemonic strategy designed to displace the GIRoA’s 
position in Afghanistan.   
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The second focus of this study is on the genealogy of (narco)terrorism as a danger.  While 
such a focus moves away from Afghanistan, it is a necessary step in illustrating how this 
discourse emerged globally and became represented in Afghanistan.  Indeed, what is so 
striking about hegemonic representations of (narco)terrorism in Afghanistan is that 
despite the multiple differences between the Afghan sociopolitical context and, for 
instance, the United States, the meaning of the preferred meaning of the discourse remains 
largely the same.  The findings of the thesis indicate the use of danger by the GIRoA to 
not only secure its vision of the Afghan identity, but also to conform to the global 
hegemonic vision of statehood.  While this was not the intended focus of the thesis, it 
does present important areas for further research on the effects of global hegemonic 
representations of danger on non-Western countries.  Therefore, prior to addressing 
hegemonic and counterhegemonic representations of danger, it is important to first 
inquire into how these discourses have been constituted. 
The third focus of the thesis is to justify the understanding of danger as a discourse and 
to theorise its relation to social identity.  As mentioned above, this is not a new argument 
and should not be taken as the contribution of the thesis.  However, it is problematic to 
move straight into a critical analysis of the discourse without first theorising the subject 
of analysis at the heart of this study.  Therefore, the early focus of the thesis is on 
developing a theoretical framework that illustrates danger’s constitutive role in shaping 
identity.  In this regard, a survey of critical scholarship on danger is provided that draws 
heavily on Campbell (1998), Dillon (1996), Wæver et al. (1993), McSweeney (1996), 
Wæver (1995), Jackson (2005), Weldes et al. (1999), and Herschinger (2011).  While the 
intention here is not to mash together an assortment of critical voices, each author holds 
significant value in theorising danger and connecting it to the constitution of identity 
either as a hegemonic strategy, a cultural production, or a performance of power.  In short, 
earlier critical scholarship on danger has been vital in forming this project’s theoretical 
framework and its research focus. 
The goal of the thesis is to reveal the use of danger by the GIRoA and the Taliban to 
constitute the Afghan identity.  This is not to say that either party has been, or indeed will 
be, successful in imposing a universal identity on Afghanistan.  Such an argument would 
ignore the fluidity of discourse and make claims as to the pre-discursive constitution of 
actors ‘outside’ of society (i.e. the GIRoA and the Taliban).  However, realising the 
discursive constitution of identity does not preclude the use of danger by political actors 
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as a (counter-)hegemonic strategy as the role ascribed to the GIRoA and the Taliban (i.e. 
their political nature) requires the use of danger as a performance of authority over social 
identity.  In short, the goal of this work is to present an alternative vision of security in 
Afghanistan which reflects the importance of representation and identity in the conflict.        
 
Chapter Structure  
The thesis is comprised of five chapters and addresses the three research focuses outlined 
above.  Chapter I provides a discussion on the project’s conceptualisation of danger, its 
theoretical framework, and use of Critical Discourse Analysis.  The chapter begins with 
an overview of the underlying argument that danger is a discourse (Campbell 1998) and 
draws upon previous critical scholarship found in poststructuralist and critical 
constructivist circles.  Having established that danger is a discourse, the conversation 
turns to the connection between danger and identity.  This section theorises the use of 
difference in constituting identity and connects discourses of danger to the securitisation 
of difference.  Thus, the connection between identity and danger reveals the instrumental 
value of representations for political actors in attempting to either establish a collective 
identity for society or discipline alternative identities within the social sphere.  The 
chapter then turns to a discussion of the theoretical framework used in the thesis.  This 
section focuses on describing and justifying the conceptual tools used in this study, which 
include securitisation, genealogy, and power-knowledge.  This section also underlines the 
Gramscian understanding of hegemony used in the thesis and seeks out connections 
between Foucault’s theorising of discourse and Gramsci’s theory of cultural hegemony.  
Lastly, Chapter I provides an extensive discussion on Critical Discourse Analysis 
(Fairclough 1992, 1995ab), which is the main analytical framework used in the thesis.  
This section outlines the nature of CDA and its approach to discourse, Fairclough’s three-
dimensions of analysis, and identifies how CDA will be used in the thesis.  A brief 
description of the sources consulted and the limitations of this study is also provided here. 
Chapter II serves as the literature review for the thesis.  In identifying the particular 
research niche this study hopes to fill, three research areas are identified: critical 
approaches to (in)security and danger; discursive analysis of (narco)terrorism; and 
contemporary security politics of Afghanistan.  These three areas form the structure of 
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the literature review.  Section I surveys existing critical scholarship on danger and 
establishes this thesis as a continuation of works by poststructuralist and critical 
constructivist scholars.  Section II introduces scholarship on (narco)terrorism and reveals 
that, although there is substantial literature that critically analysing terrorism (and less so, 
narcotics), scholarship on narcoterrorism remains largely devoid of such analysis.  This 
reveals a gap in the literature and potential future research on both the application of 
discourses of narcoterrorism in particular countries (e.g. Mexico and Colombia) and the 
deployment of the discourse globally.  Lastly, Section III surveys existing scholarship on 
Afghan security politics, narcoterrorism, and the Taliban.  The literature reveals the 
dominance of positivist approaches to Afghanistan and a lack of engagement with critical 
theories and methods.  Moreover, the continuation of problem-solving approaches (Cox 
1987) fails to challenge representations of (narco)terrorism in Afghanistan and merely 
seeks to confirm or deny the existence of the danger.  In short, there is a real gap in 
applying critical frameworks to contemporary Afghanistan and such a study could 
potentially open up the field to new understandings on the role of identity in the conflict.      
Chapter III introduces narcotics, terrorism, and narcoterrorism and critically analyses 
these discourses using genealogical inquiry.  The discussion begins with a genealogical 
study on the discourses of terrorism, paying particular attention to historical 
understandings of the concept and deconstructing the deployment of the terrorist label.  
In the following section, genealogy is used in a brief study of narcotics, illustrating how 
different labels and metaphors used to characterise the narcotics have contributed to its 
association with political violence and other dangers like terrorism.  A critical 
investigation into the convergence of these two discourses into what is known as 
narcoterrorism follows, in which the political context, intellectual community, and 
sociopolitical identity are revealed to have shaped the discourse.  The underlying 
argument here is that these dangers are part of a larger hegemonic strategy in which a 
succession of security actors have used the ambiguity of danger to fabricate and represent 
new threats.  Shifts in the conceptualisation of these dangers as well as the identities of 
those securitised (i.e. those represented as danger) illustrates how danger is a constructed 
and represented discourse.  Moreover, by deconstructing the labels used to give meaning 
to these dangers and situating them in historical contexts, genealogy reveals the larger 
hegemonic strategy at work.   This chapter provides the reader with a clear understanding 
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of the (narco)terror discourse prior to introducing the discussion on Afghanistan in 
Chapter IV and V. 
Chapter IV introduces the politics of security in Afghanistan by looking at how 
(narco)terror has been represented since 2001.  This chapter applies Critical Discourse 
Analysis to government statements and policies with the goal of revealing how these 
representations are used to establish the role of the government as securer, subjugate 
alternative knowledge of danger, and to control social identity in Afghanistan.  The 
chapter begins with a brief discussion on Afghanistan’s historical and political 
background, revealing the particular sociopolitical context to the reader.  The chapter then 
provides an account of how the United States government and security experts within the 
West constructed and (re)established4 the narcoterrorist danger immediately after the 9/11 
attacks.  The objective of this section is to demonstrate the influence security experts in 
the US have on global discourses of danger and to connect this knowledge to later 
representations of the danger found in Afghanistan.  The chapter will then employ Critical 
Discourse Analysis of representations of (narco)terror by the Afghan government.  In this 
section, the various tropes, metaphors, and assemblages used in representing 
(narco)terror, and more specifically the Taliban, are highlighted in order to demonstrate 
the motivations behind the use of the discourse and to reveal how danger is a 
representation designed for social consumption.  The objective of this chapter is to reveal 
the use of representations of danger by political actors, to apply earlier theoretical 
discussions to a definitive case study, and to illustrate the motivations behind the 
(narco)terror discourse in Afghanistan.   
Chapter V shifts focus toward addressing the agency of the counterhegemonic (i.e. the 
Taliban) in representing danger.  Up to this point, the thesis will have looked exclusively 
at danger as a concept represented by hegemonic actors (such as the GIRoA) as a means 
of maintaining sovereign authority; however, Chapter V reveals that those represented as 
danger also use counter-representations in their communication with society.  The chapter 
begins with a discussion on the challenges characteristic of counterhegemonic 
representations of danger and reveals the distinctive voice of these actors.  Despite 
                                                 
4 Narcoterrorism had already been conceived as a security issue during the 1980s; however, the argument 
being made in Chapter IV is that contemporary narcoterrorism reflects a fundamentally different context 
than earlier representations. 
15 
 
engaging in the same practice of representing danger to affect social identity, the 
counterhegemonic (in this case, the Taliban) are restricted in their methods, requiring 
alternative channels of communication.  These methods of communication ultimately 
effect the scale and content of the message, but also provide alternative ways of 
interacting and communicating with social groups.  The chapter then applies critical 
discourse analysis to Taliban communications, focusing heavily on their efforts to 
represent the government of Afghanistan as the true danger facing society.  The data used 
in this analysis consists of poems, official Taliban statements, night letters, and shadow 
government policy.  The choice of this data highlights the Taliban’s use of vernacular 
modes of communication, their utilisation of cultural referent objects, and their strategy 
of displacing the government’s role as securer.  Through analysis of the Taliban’s 
communications strategy, it becomes clear that the organization is using representations 
of danger to construct a new Afghan social identity.   
The thesis ends with a concluding chapter linking the various arguments together and 
demonstrating how danger is used by the GIRoA and the Taliban to constitute the Afghan 
social identity.  The conclusion also makes a brief argument about the importance of 
approaching danger as a discourse in other internal conflicts as the themes and techniques 
used in Afghanistan can be observed in other contexts such as Mexico. Through this 
analysis an alternative vision of security in Afghanistan will be illustrated that does not 
approach narcotics or political violence as a problem to be solved, but instead approaches 
these discourses critically to reveal that identity plays a vital in shaping hegemonic and 




Chapter I: Theoretical Framework and 
Methodology  
 
The motivation of this project is to uncover how and why danger is represented, 
specifically in the form of (narco)terrorism, in contemporary Afghanistan.  It is directed 
at the functioning of competing discourses of danger and theorizes the role danger plays 
in constituting social identity.  However, danger is a complex and contentious concept 
with multiple readings and conceptualisations found within the (sub-)discipline of Critical 
Security Studies (see Chapter II).  Dependent upon one’s epistemological affinities, 
danger can be approached as existential and objective or discursive and constructed, and 
this has a profound effect on the theoretical framework of such a study and ultimately its 
findings.  Therefore, prior to surveying the existing literature on danger, the genealogy of 
(narco)terror, or a critical appraisal of representations of (narco)terror in contemporary 
Afghanistan, it is crucial to first lay out the theoretical foundations and methods used in 
this project.  This discussion will provide a clear overview of how this project 
conceptualises danger, the theoretical tools being used to analyse (narco)terror and will 
outline the project’s limitations.   
To be clear from the outset, this thesis is primarily an empirical project that presents an 
original contribution to the literature on Afghan security politics and provides another 
empirical outlet to the already robust literature on representations of danger in Critical 
Security Studies (Campbell 1998; Weldes et al. 1999; Jackson 2005).  In this way, it does 
not set out to provide a new framework for theorizing danger, but rather builds on a range 
of earlier conceptualisations and seeks to deploy an inclusive framework in its analysis 
of representations of danger in Afghanistan.  However, despite the empirical contribution, 
the object of study – danger – requires extensive theoretical unpacking due to the plurality 
of conceptualisations in the literature and extensive sub-questions pertaining to the 
political instrumentalization of danger in Afghanistan.  If this study was a positivist 
approach to narcoterrorism in Afghanistan, it would not require such a lengthy theoretical 
discussion as the research question would centre around the extent of ‘narcoterrorism’ 
(i.e. quantitative) or the organizational structure of narcoterrorist groups (i.e. placing an 
organization like the Taliban along the crime-terror continuum).  However, this project’s 
post-positivist approach to (narco)terrorism and its understanding of the phenomenon as 
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a discourse requires a clear theoretical discussion that lays out and justifies the theoretical 
framework.   
Therefore, this chapter is written with the following objectives in mind.  First, it presents 
a clear conceptualisation of danger as a discourse and uses this understanding to segue 
into a discussion on the various theories consulted and utilised in the thesis.  It is important 
to first broadly introduce danger at the beginning of the chapter as it brings structure and 
focus to the following sections on theories, concepts and methods.  A series of additional 
considerations pertaining to the construction of danger, the transmission of 
representations of danger, the results of these representations on identity form a 
substantial part of the thesis as the focus is not only on how danger is represented in 
Afghanistan, but also why. Therefore, the theoretical framework requires careful 
unpacking at this early stage.  The discussion progresses into Section II which highlights 
the conceptual framework for this study.  This section provides clear definitions of 
genealogy (Foucault 1984), power-knowledge (Foucault 1980), field (Bourdieu 1993), 
securitisation (Wæver 1995; Buzan et al. 1998; Balzacq 2005; Browning and McDonald 
2013), and cultural hegemony (Gramsci 1971), which are used throughout the thesis.  This 
section also makes a strong case as to why these frameworks have been used and how 
they contribute to the thesis.  These sections outline the project’s theoretical foundations 
and justifies the analysis of (narco)terrorism found in Chapters III, IV, and V.  
The chapter then turns to an overview of the methods used in the thesis.  Section III 
introduces Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) (Fairclough 1992, 1995ab) and provides 
detail as to how CDA is used in analysing contemporary representations of danger in 
Afghanistan.  This section also outlines the importance and usage of intertextual analysis 
in studying the communications of both the Government of the Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan (GIRoA) and the Taliban.  The focus turns to the data sets consulted for the 
thesis and justifies analysis of various forms of representation.  For instance, when 
analysing government (read hegemonic) representations of danger, speeches, interviews 
and public statements formed the majority of the data sets consulted.  This is largely due 
to the authoritative positioning of the state as the ‘knower’ and ‘speaker’ of security 
(Dillon 1996).  The Taliban, on the other hand, being designated as a (narco)terrorist 
group, are not afforded the same stature as an authoritative ‘speaker’ of security and are 
silenced due to hegemonic representations.  Thus, the data sets consulted for the Taliban 
consist of grassroots and cultural modes such as poetry, night letters (shabnamah), chants 
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(taranas), and web-based communications.  While this could be viewed as a problematic 
comparison, the differences in methods of representation reflect the asymmetry of power 
in communicating to the social audience.  Lastly, the section concludes with a discussion 
on the limitations of this study pertaining to language and lack of accessibility for 
ethnographic field research.   While there are limitations in this study, overall the methods 
used, and the data sets consulted, present original findings that demonstrate the utility of 
applying critical methods to the contemporary security dynamics of Afghanistan.  
Moreover, by applying CDA to contemporary representations of danger, the 
operationalisation of discourses of danger to constitute Afghan society will be 
demonstrated.   
 
Danger as a Discourse 
Danger is a concept that has played an integral role in the discursive formation of the 
nation-state and the norm of sovereignty (see Dillon 1996).  In mainstream scholarship 
circles as well as practitioners of international security, there is an understanding of 
danger as an objective condition – a reflection of the paradoxical relations between the 
contingent life and the certainty of death (Der Derian 2009: 156). A cursory glance at the 
recent history of International Relations and international security politics illustrates the 
dominance of this conceptualisation and the belief that danger is a problem that can be 
overcome through rational choice (Keohane 1989).   
However, this is not the understanding advocated here.  Rather, the post-positivist 
epistemology of this thesis and its focus on representation defines danger as a discourse 
that constitutes the meaning of harm, and subsequently the identity of the endangered.  
This understanding parallels David Campbell’s (1998) earlier work on representations of 
danger in the American context and builds on critical approaches to discourse and power 
(see Foucault 1980; Laclau and Mouffe 2001).  The understanding advocated here is that 
nothing can ‘exist’ outside of discourse.  All objects are constituted through discourse 
and their meaning is premised on representation and difference (Howarth and Stavrakakis 
2000; Campbell 1998).  Indeed, this is one of the major premises of Poststructuralism and 
has been applied to International Relations and International Security Studies elsewhere 
(see Dillon 1996; Campbell 1998; Herschinger 2011; Jackson 2005; Edkins 1999).  The 
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significance here lies in the productive and representative capacity of discourse.  Rather 
than merely creating objects, discourse has the ability to influence how these objects are 
interpreted and the limits of their intelligibility (Butler 1993: 187).  This is a highly 
significant point for the present study as discourse not only materializes a danger such as 
(narco)terrorism, but it also shapes how this danger is interpreted among the endangered.   
Therefore, this study understands danger as a special type of discourse.  While it might 
be viewed as problematic to privilege one discursive construction over another, the 
political nature of representations of danger and its constitutive effects on the political 
order points to its unique nature.  In Politics of Security, Michael Dillon (1996) argues 
that the discourse of danger has evolved from the ‘natural’ to become the very foundation 
upon which political authority rests (25).  Moreover, when taken in conjunction with the 
social construct of the Hobbesian (i.e. sovereign) state, we find that discourses of danger 
are at the very root of the political order. The rationale is that the role assigned to the 
state, that of sovereign protector, is premised on evolving discourses of (in)security.  This 
is not to say that the state exists independent of discourses of danger and insecurity, but 
rather that the discursive construction of the state depends on the discursive construction 
of danger (Dillon 1996).  In the contemporary social and political context, discourses of 
power have established structures in which danger is recognised in the limits of 
sovereignty, simultaneously constituting the state and the corresponding externalised 
danger (Campbell 1998: 68).  Thus, there is a deep connection between the constitution 
of political order and discourses of danger.   
Discourses of danger are not only constitutive of a political community but also of the 
identity that defines that political community and the relationship between the secured 
society and the sovereign protector (Campbell 1998: 48).  This argument is echoed by 
Maria Stern (2006) who points out that, “political communities are shaped by dominant 
political discourses that identify subjects of security and relations between the sovereign 
and the Self” (Stern 2006: 188, emphasis in the original).  While this relationship should 
not be understood as fixed or timeless, it does present a window into contemporary 
political orders such as Afghanistan and the role danger plays in shaping the context.  
Moreover, Stern’s emphasis on ‘dominant’ discourses opens up questions as what 
constitutes a ‘dominant’ discourse and what power structures enable and result from its 
domination.  While these considerations will be addressed below, the connection between 
danger and identity is a crucial element to this project’s approach to (narco)terrorism.  
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This connection, between discourses of danger and the constitution of identity, should be 
understood as the lodestone of this project’s conceptualisation of danger and its 
investigation of Afghan security politics.  In this way, the project echoes the focus of 
earlier scholarship from Campbell (1998), Katzenstein (1996), Weldes (1996), Jackson 
(2005), Stern (2006), and others who have theorized the linkage between (in)security and 
identity.  
Danger, therefore, is not a fixed, objective condition (Campbell 1998: 2), but rather it is 
a discursive representation reflective of contemporary power constellations that construct 
new knowledge(s) of threat and peril.  Where danger influences identity is through the 
representation and signification of difference, which in turn attempts to fix the 
constitution of the ‘self’ identity (see Doty 1996; Neumann 1996).  The ‘self’ is 
ambiguous and can refer to the individual or the collective; however, given that the thesis 
is focused on political representations of (narco)terror in Afghanistan, the emphasis is 
placed more on the collective.  This emphasis reflects Campbell’s focus in Writing 
Security (1998), and while he did not privilege the role of the state in using danger 
instrumentally to define collective identity,5 he did make explicit the use of difference 
(i.e. F/foreign policy)6 in shaping the American identity.  Difference, therefore, becomes 
represented as threatening, effectively securitising one of the foundational principles of 
identity and representation (Neocleous 2008; Campbell 1998; Connolly 1991; Neumann 
1996).  Indeed, meaning and identity are constituted, in part, through representations of 
difference (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000: 3; Connolly 1991; Doty 1996), so by 
securitising difference through representations of danger, a more cohesive collective 
identity can be achieved through a disciplining and silencing of alternatives.  Moreover, 
through negative association, Stern (2006) and others have shown that just as discourses 
of danger identify objects as ‘dangerous’, the interpretation of the discourse constitutes 
                                                 
5 In fact, the ‘Epilogue’ to Campbell’s (1998) revised edition of Writing Security challenges constructivist 
scholarship that emphasizes the agency or instrumentalization of danger.  Such an argument, Campbell 
holds, would undermine the discursive foundations of the state and portray it as an actor who can manipulate 
discourse rather than being constituted by discourse (Campbell 1998: 218).    
6 ‘Foreign policy’ refers to Campbell’s retheorization of the concept to be, “one of the boundary-producing 
practices central to the production and reproduction of the identity in whose name it operates” (Campbell 
1998: 68).  Rather than adhering to the epistemic realist understanding of foreign policy as the interactions 
among states, Campbell argues that foreign policy is integral to representing difference as danger and 
disciplining the identity of the state.   
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the identity of the endangered.  In this way, the multiplicity of identities found in any 
given society are contained through representations of a threatening external Other.7  
Hegemonic representations of terrorism during the early years of the War on Terror, for 
instance, constituted the image of the terrorist as the ‘enemy of freedom’ (Bush 2001; 
Jackson 2005).  This in turn constituted the endangered identity (i.e. the amorphous 
assemblage of allied countries and societies)8 as the champions of ‘freedom’ and 
civilisation.   
While not all dangers are represented in such stark terms, the ability of danger to construct 
the identity of the endangered collective is a vital consideration when studying security 
politics in Afghanistan. There is no doubt that harms occur frequently in Afghan society 
due to political instability, crime, corruption, environmental degradation, health, and 
myriad other factors; however, what is particularly salient about viewing danger as a 
discourse is the processes by which certain dangers come to be privileged over others.  
For instance, of the many issues facing Afghanistan, why is (narco)terrorism considered 
the most pressing?  The argument to be noted here is not only that danger is a discourse, 
but that this discourse also has a clear political purpose (Jackson 2005).  The purpose, 
then, is to use danger to create and border a society of the endangered, a society over 
which either the GIRoA or the Taliban hold authority over identity. 
These constitutive effects of danger are enabled through a system of representations that 
draw upon language, specialisation, imagery, and cultural tropes which present danger in 
ways that are intelligible to the wider social audience.  This understanding of 
representation parallels Stuart Hall’s work in that danger is not only described or depicted 
through language, but also that it comes to symbolise abstract notions of identity and 
otherness (Hall 1997).9  In other words, representations of danger are not limited to 
describing existing events or objects as dangerous, but additionally come to symbolise 
the larger abstract identity of the dangerous Other.  Indeed, this is how individuals in 
                                                 
7 The word ‘Other’ is capitalized here to reflect discursive framings of danger as an existential threatening 
entity.  This understanding reflects Neumann’s (1996) theorization of the Other as the binary opposite 
integral to understanding the Self.   
8 This vague language is meant to denote the somewhat ironic coalition of liberal and authoritarian states 
who fought against terrorist groups in the US-led War on Terror (e.g. Russia, China, Uzbekistan).   
9 Please note that Hall was not discussing representations of danger specifically, but rather was describing 
the two purposes of representation more broadly (see Hall 1997: 16).    
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Afghan society and beyond can ‘know’ the Taliban identity even without having 
experienced a direct encounter.  What this points to is the ability of representations of 
danger to existentialise and manifest the wider discourse in the interpretations of the 
social audience.  Note, this is not to say that representation materialises a fixed and 
universal interpretation of danger, but rather that dominant10 representations constitute 
the discourse in which a preferred meaning is created (Hall 1997: 228).  Thus, there is 
some agency in hegemonic representations11 of danger in constructing a preferred 
meaning for the social audience.  The institutional authority of the state, which is 
understood to have a specialised knowledge about danger and insecurity, holds a unique 
ability to communicate authoritative representations of danger to the secured society.12  
Again, this is not to say that the entirety of the audience will interpret the representation 
in the same way, nor is it to say that the audience will universally adopt the state’s 
preferred meaning.  The plurality of experiences, knowledges, and identities in a given 
audience would prevent the universal acceptance of any representation.  However, the 
power of political representations of danger greatly reduce the variety of interpretations 
and utilises hegemonic power structures to reify the preferred meaning.  
Consequently, hegemonic representations of danger emphasize difference, reflecting the 
understanding that representation is considered strongest when highlighting differences 
(Hall 1997).  Saussure argues that difference creates meaning and the negative binary that 
one holds with an Other has a constitutive effect (although never complete or fixed) on 
the identity of the Self (Neumann 1996).  While difference does play an important role in 
constituting meaning and identity, it should also be noted that binaries are rarely (if ever) 
neat and orderly, and instead can be understood as a process of negotiation (McSweeney 
1999).  Moreover, binaries are also asymmetrical with one pole of the binary holding 
relative power over the other, which pressures both individuals and collectives to conform 
                                                 
10 ‘Dominant’ refers to Foucault’s theorization of power and discourse in which authoritative discursive 
actors hold privileged status to speak and influence the discourse.  This can be observed in the privileging 
of security experts and government spokespersons in ‘speaking’ security over others who are not perceived 
to hold expert status. This point is developed further below in a discussion on Bourdieu’s concept of field.   
11 Hegemonic representations refer to Gramsci’s theorization of Cultural Hegemony (see Gramsci 1971).  
While the present discussion on representation precludes an in-depth discussion of who, or what, constitutes 
a hegemonic actor (or hegemonic discourse), this point will be expanded further in Section II.  For now, 
‘hegemonic’ is meant to denote an assemblage of authoritative speakers who hold a privileged status within 
a social and political context (e.g. the state).   
12 This ability is most clearly observed in the traditional understanding of securitisation outlined by Waever 
(1995).   
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to fixed notions of self and other (Hall 1997; Connolly 1991).  In relation to representing 
danger, this notion of difference and otherness plays a key role in constituting a discourse.  
For a political actor engaging in representing danger, the otherness or foreignness of the 
danger must be highlighted in order to present a clear image of the endangered self.  As 
Campbell argues, “while dependent on specific historical contexts, we can say that for 
the state, identity can be understood as the outcome of exclusionary practices in which 
resistant elements to a secure identity on the ‘inside’ are linked through a discourse of 
‘danger’ with threats identified and located on the ‘outside’” (Campbell 1998: 68).  Thus, 
difference is an important characteristic in representations of danger as it enables 
discursive actors to exclude the other and consequently represent the identity of the 
endangered. 
This process of exclusion is evident in the language deployed in representations of danger.  
While the intention here is not to generalise all representations of danger, the frequent 
deployment of negative labels such as ‘evil’ and ‘barbaric’ indicate the use of language 
to externalise danger from the secured identity.  For instance, the label ‘evil’ is 
predominately used in contemporary representations of terrorist violence (Der Derian 
2005: 26; Bhatia 2005: 15) and indicates the linguistic practice of ‘evilifcation’, which 
refers to a declaration of moral judgement and outcasting of an immoral other (Lazar and 
Lazar 2004).  Representations of narcotics frequently frame the danger as a disease and 
invoke images of a cancer that must be eradicated from the body politic (Campbell 1998: 
83; Weimer 2003; Herschinger 2011).  In Afghanistan, government representations of the 
Taliban draw on both of these labels in an attempt to exclude the organization from 
Afghan society and present it as a foreign entity (see Chapter IV).  This points to the 
deployment of exclusive labels to represent a danger as external to the endangered self.  
In this way, representing danger is as much about giving meaning to a dangerous object 
or identity as it is about signifying the endangered self.  This view echoes Campbell’s 
earlier argument that “the operation of discourses of danger which, by virtue of telling us 
what to fear, have been able to fix who ‘we’ are” (Campbell 1998: 169).   The deployment 
of simplistic and reductive labels renders representations of danger more intelligible to 
the audience.  The effect of these labels essentialises a complex and varied entity (such 
as a terrorist organization) and reduces it to either a metaphorical disease or a cosmic 
immoral other.  
24 
 
Discourses of danger also draw upon a particular assemblage of referent objects that both 
constitute the meaning of a particular danger as well as the corresponding endangered 
identity.  In this regard, Maria Stern’s work on identity and narratives of insecurity in 
Latin America is particularly salient as it demonstrates the active process by which 
referent objects and identities are combined in a representation of danger (Stern 2005, 
2006).  To cite a theme found in contemporary representations of danger in Afghanistan, 
both the government and the Taliban often invoke images of Islam under threat in an 
attempt to frame the other as a foreign danger and present themselves as the righteous 
defenders of Afghan society (see Chapter IV and V).  Part of this is reflective of the 
authority discursive actors hold over representations of danger and the political purposes 
of those representations; however, this also indicates the necessity to represent a danger 
in a way that is intelligible and acceptable to the social audience (McSweeney 1996: 90).  
This illustrates the importance of social context in influencing the discourse and 
highlights that political actors are not free to impose whatever discourse they want on 
society (McSweeney 1999).  Furthermore, this emphasis on the role of the audience 
parallels arguments found in securitisation theory and the Copenhagen School, 
highlighting that for a speech act to be successful, the audience must accept it (see Buzan 
et al. 1998; Balzacq 2005).  While the role of the audience is an important consideration, 
given the focus of this project on how and why (narco)terror is represented, the role of the 
audience is confined to that of a discursive stage in which hegemonic and 
counterhegemonic discourses compete for recognition.  Thus, there is a duality in the use 
of referent objects in discourses of danger.  On the one hand, referent objects such as 
Islam are deployed in representations of danger to define the endangered identity as 
‘Islamic’ (see Chapter IV and V).  On the other hand, the contemporary social and 
political context of Afghanistan requires reference to Islam as part of the Afghan identity, 
and therefore hinders discursive actors from representing a secular identity.  In this way, 
the hope is not to deny the role of discourse in constituting both state and society.  Indeed, 
what makes Afghanistan ‘Islamic’ is the product of historical shifts in the Afghan identity, 
most notably from 1978 to today (Rashid 2010); however, the focus on why 
(narco)terrorism is represented as danger requires the emphasis be placed on the 
instrumental use of referent objects in hegemonic and counterhegemonic representations.   
This focus on the instrumental use of danger reflects a hierarchical understanding of 
knowledge and discourses of danger.  Despite discourses of danger being represented to 
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affect the entirety of a social body, in Afghanistan there are only a handful of actors who 
are able to ‘speak’ about it and be heard.  There is an asymmetry of power in who holds 
discursive authority over danger (see Jackson 2012).  Moreover, historical practices of 
representing danger within the discursive construction of the state has “colonized our 
understanding of ‘the political’” and placed the state as the “source of authorized 
articulations of danger” (Campbell 1998: 199).  Thus, there is a hierarchy in who can 
speak about danger.  This asymmetry is best captured in the privileging of state actors in 
speaking authoritatively about danger, whereas other vernacular speakers are largely 
silenced (see Bubandt 2005; Jarvis 2018; Rowley and Weldes 2012).13 In this regard 
Bourdieu’s concept of field is a useful conceptual tool for understanding how certain 
actors in society are able to ‘speak’ about danger, whereas others are relatively silenced 
(Hansen 2000: 306).  A field is understood as an assemblage of socially powerful actors 
who hold a unique status to create and influence the discourse (see Bourdieu 1993).  This 
concept has been taken up elsewhere in Critical Security Studies (see, for instance, Bigo 
2000, 2002, 2008; Stampnitzky 2013) and is often used to study competition among 
discursive actors in a particular field.  However, for the present study field is used to 
theorise the ability of particular discursive actors (i.e. security experts) to ‘speak’ about 
security and thus represent danger in an authoritative way, whereas other social actors 
(i.e. those who do not hold this status) are largely confined to the audience of these 
representations.  What defines the field of (in)security is a politics of knowledge in which 
particular security actors are understood to possess a unique understanding of danger 
(Jackson 2012).  Part of this is an affirmation of contemporary discourses of statehood 
and sovereignty, but the effect of this field is observed in the top-down nature of 
representations of danger.  The status granted to experts in the field enables them to 
subjugate alternative knowledges and interpretations of danger (Fierke 2007: 101).  In 
other words, despite a plurality of voices and interpretations, the asymmetry of power in 
the discourse grants security actors with the unique ability to subjugate alternative voices 
in the discourse that might challenge a danger’s supposed objectivity (Jackson 2012: 
213).  One of the clearest examples of this is the delegitimization of alternative voices in 
contemporary discourses of terrorism.  The framing of terrorists as barbaric, uncivilised, 
                                                 
13 This is not to say that individuals within a society cannot speak about security and that they should not 
be listened to.  Rather, the argument being made here is that contemporary power relations in Afghanistan 
effectively silence social actors from speaking security as the discourse is largely influenced by government 
actors and the international community.   
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and evil dehumanises the terrorist other and renders counterhegemonic discourse as taboo 
(Zulaika 1995: 220; Zulaika and Douglass 1996: 182; Toros 2008).  Despite the important 
role of the audience in affirming or denying representations of danger, in Afghanistan, 
and particularly with regard to (narco)terrorism, the discourse remains predominately 
state-centric and unidirectional.   
What this means is that discourses of danger are largely dominated by state actors and 
other authorized speakers (security practitioners, academics, media figures)14 and can 
therefore be understood instrumentally.  This is where the argument of this thesis differs 
from that of Campbell (1998: 218) and reflects more a critical constructivist approach 
than poststructuralist.  Epistemologically speaking, this thesis is loyal to the notion that 
nothing ‘exists’ outside of discourse (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000); however, that is 
not to say that discursive constructs, such as the state or terrorist groups, do not use danger 
instrumentally in attempting to construct and secure a society.  The deployment of danger 
to discursively constitute the identity of the endangered, as well as the establishment of 
political authority, indicates the instrumental value of the discourse to hegemonic actors.  
Moreover, as Dillon (1996) has argued, political authority cannot exist without discourses 
of insecurity (Dillon 1996: 14); thus, the instrumental value of danger is found in the 
ability to actualise an endangered society and to maintain a political order premised on 
protection.     
As mentioned above, the discursive construction of the Hobbesian state is founded in 
claims regarding the instinctual fear of the individual (Dillon 1996: 16; Booth and 
Wheeler 2008: 62).  In an earlier survey on discourses of insecurity, James Der Derian 
highlighted the interpretive realist approach to security and the state.  Drawing upon 
Nietzsche, Der Derian argued that security is based on a supposed instinctual fear of the 
unknown, which drives humans to seek security in bordered collectives (Der Derian 
1993).  While the intention is not to present an ‘objective truth’ about human nature, the 
power of this discursive construction cannot be denied in how it influences state-society 
relations.  As a result, the ethos written into the discursively constructed state is to provide 
security and maintain this notion that freedom from danger is a condition that can be 
provided by the sovereign (Dillon 1996: 14; Campbell 1998: 199; Behnke 2000: 92).  
                                                 
14 This conceptualisation of elites reflects the arguments put forth by Paris School scholars such as Didier 
Bigo (2008) and Jef Huysmans (1998). 
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However, the discursive foundations of the sovereign state make understanding danger 
or (in)security as an objective condition problematic (Campbell 1998: 1), revealing that 
to provide total security would be to expose the absence of any pre-discursive foundations 
of the state (Campbell 1998: 12; Burke 2002: 20).  Thus, danger is a vital tool that both 
creates the state and society, and maintains the roles assigned via the Hobbesian construct. 
The consistent endangerment of society evidences another intersection between the state 
and danger – the creation of exception.  For hegemonic actors such as the state, danger 
provides the opportunity to establish and secure its production of the ‘normal’.  This tactic 
is seen as one of the primary modes of governance and control within liberal politics 
(Agamben 2005; Case Collective 2006; Huysmans 2006).  The pluralist foundations of 
liberal society require a politics of security and fear to overcome the relative autonomy 
of society (Williams 2011: 454).  The plurality of identity found in any society illustrates 
its ambiguity in defining what is included and excluded.  Thus, as highlighted by 
Campbell, “the need to discipline and contain the ambiguity and contingency of the 
‘domestic’ realm is a vital source of the externalization and totalization of threats to that 
realm through discourses of danger” (Campbell 1998: 64).  Moreover, the ability of 
discourses of danger to create a society based around an endangered identity is challenged 
due to the plurality of interpretations of the discourse; thus, emergency politics and the 
exception are deployed to problematise notions of liberal autonomy and to exploit the 
underlying structures of the Hobbesian state (Neocleous 2008).  In effect, the ‘normal’ is 
a discursive representation much like ‘security’ in that the emergency politics ushered in 
through discourses of danger construct an ideal type of state-society relations.  In the 
context of post-2001 Afghanistan, itself a product of interactions between the global, 
liberal hegemonic order and the domestic socio-political context of a war-torn multi-
political country, the ‘normal’ would reflect the ideal environment of a centralised state 
and unified society characterised by liberal autonomy.  Therefore, in representing 
omnipresent dangers like (narco)terrorism, normality is used to simultaneously construct 
a notion of the state’s utopian vision while at the same time justifying why such a 
condition remains unrealised.  
While this logic has been connected to the steady erosion of liberal freedoms in the 
contemporary Western political order, there is also a link to be made with the exclusion 
of undesirable elements from the secured society (Bigo 2008b: 109).  The routinization 
of abnormal politics, as evidenced in the series of policies and laws enacted in countries 
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such as the United States and the United Kingdom, indicates the instrumental use of 
discourses of danger to discipline society’s relationship with the state.  There is an 
important link to be made here with how danger is represented and its impact on identity.  
Discursive representations of danger draw upon socially accepted referent objects in an 
attempt to influence the audience’s interpretation.  However, this also shapes how society, 
as a collective, views and encounters the dangerous other and leads to stereotyping, 
prejudice, and other processes of exclusion.  Moreover, the exceptionality of security 
politics not only externalises the other but also renders it as something that must be 
eradicated through state-sanctioned violence.  This presents a politically powerful tool for 
cultivating a loyal identity in the endangered society (Neocleous 2008).  Representations 
of danger and performances of security15 (Aradau 2012: 115) establish political 
boundaries within a society that legitimises the ideal and excludes the dangerous other.  
Moreover, the state of exception renders any communication or negotiation between 
inside and outside to be illegitimate and disloyal, in effect ‘fixing’ (at least momentarily) 
identities reflective of the limits of sovereignty.   
In sum, this thesis theorizes danger as a discourse that is represented by hegemonic and 
counterhegemonic actors to constitute the endangered society.  This theorization parallels 
the earlier arguments of poststructuralist and critical constructivist scholars (for example 
Campbell 1998; Weldes 1996; Jackson 2005; Dillon 1996) who have established the link 
between danger and identity.  The underlying theoretical argument here is that danger is 
used instrumentally by political actors in Afghanistan, who seek to deploy representations 
of danger in order to articulate an endangered Afghan identity.  Whether or not this is 
achieved is not the focus of the thesis; rather, the thesis should be taken as an inquiry into 
how and why danger, specifically (narco)terrorism, is represented in Afghanistan.  
Ultimately, the establishment of danger as a discourse serves as the theoretical foundation 
of this empirical study and continues the important work laid out by earlier scholarship 
in Critical Security Studies.  
      
                                                 
15 Please note that while performativity (Butler 1993) is an important aspect of many of the works cited 
here (Campbell 1998), it is not the focus of the thesis.  Indeed, representing danger can be understood as a 
performance of security and governmentality; however, this project is focused more on the formulation and 




Having outlined this project’s conceptualisation of danger as a discourse, the discussion 
must now turn to the methods used in analysing representations of danger in Afghanistan.  
The scope of this study requires an inclusive theoretical framework given the importance 
of analysing both the structural context of the discourse as well as the particular methods 
and meanings used in contemporary representations.  Thus, this thesis adopts an 
interpretivist approach to representations of danger in Afghanistan.  It incorporates a 
range of analytical concepts from critical theories such as Poststructuralism, the 
Copenhagen School, and Critical Constructivism. However, the unease of limiting this 
study to fit one particular theoretical school should be noted as applying labels in such a 
way produces assumptions and limitations regarding the particular approach used.  In 
short, rather than using this section to justify the application of, say, a Critical 
Constructivist label, the hope is to provide clear definitions and rationales for analytical 
concepts used in the thesis.  Following a discussion of the theoretical framework used in 
the thesis, the chapter turns to a discussion on Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) 
(Fairclough 1992, 1995), which should be understood as the main interpretive method for 
analysing representations of danger in Afghanistan.  
Given this study’s focus on danger as a discourse and the underlying premise that it is 
used instrumentally by political actors, securitisation plays a significant role in the 
theoretical framework.  Securitisation is understood traditionally (see Wæver 1995; 
Buzan et al. 1998) as a performative act in which threats emerge and become recognised 
(Williams 1998: 435).  The underlying argument is that security issues do not exist 
objectively, but instead become securitised through a performative act known as the 
‘Speech Act’.  This framework is based on John Austin’s Speech Act Theory (see Austin 
1962) which approaches speech as a productive performance.  In simple terms, this means 
that saying something is doing something; thus, the speech, or declaration, produces real 
world effects, rather than merely describing the world.  Securitisation applies this 
framework to the study of security and puts forth the notion that security issues become 
recognised through a speech act.  However, this is not to say that securitising an issue is 
as simple as declaring it publicly and there are some additional considerations that impact 
the success or failure of a speech act.  Chief among these is the requirement that the 
securitising actor (i.e. the speaker) be in a position of authority in order to convince the 
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audience to accept the declaration.  This means that the ability to securitise a particular 
issue, object, or identity is limited to discursive actors found in state institutions and its 
affiliated security apparatus.16   
This particular requirement has been the subject of much criticism in critical scholarship 
as it leads to the silencing of individuals and groups who do not possess authority but 
nonetheless possess knowledge and experience insecurity (Hansen 2000: 306; Milliken 
1999; McDonald 2008).  For instance, the gendered discourse of security which often 
portrays women as in need of sovereign protection maintains asymmetrical power 
relations in society and hinders women from speaking their own experience and 
knowledge of insecurity (Hansen 2000).  Moreover, the emphasis on institutional actors 
to ‘speak’ security ignores the ability of counterhegemonic actors, such as the Taliban, to 
securitise issues, albeit from a relatively marginalised position.  While this statement 
should not be taken as supportive of the Taliban, it does highlight some limitations of 
securitisation in its favouring of institutional structures and power over knowledge.   
Indeed, another critique offered to securitisation is the understanding of the theory as 
unidirectional (Bourbeau 2011: 41).  This point refers to the tendency of scholars to focus 
on the deployment of securitising acts while ignoring the importance of the audience to 
support the narrative (see Balzacq 2005, 2011).  To put it simply, securitisation has 
contributed to the notion that anything can be securitised so long as it is declared by a 
discursive authority; however, the role of the audience in either accepting or rejecting a 
securitising act challenges the autonomy of the speech actor.  This is an important point 
for this study’s framework because it highlights the requirement of speech actors to 
represent danger in a way that is intelligible to the audience (i.e. Afghan society in this 
case).  While the GIRoA holds institutional power over Afghan society, and therefore has 
an advantage in speaking security to the audience, the Taliban’s communications must 
overcome this inferior position.  One of the primary means of doing so is to draw upon 
culturally significant modes of communication in the form of night letters (shabnamah), 
chants (taranas), and poems (see Johnson 2007, 2017; Strick Van Linschoten and Kuehn 
                                                 
16 ‘Security apparatus’ is a term meant to denote the assemblage of institutions, actors, and practices that 
collectively form a dispositif of security (see Foucault 1978; Bussolini 2010).  The utility of such a dispositif 
is an open question with several competing interpretations found in the literature (see Foucault 1978; 
Agamben 2009).  While the dispositif is generally understood as an analytical tool, here the word apparatus 
is meant to denote a broader understanding of the many actors and institutions that form the collective 
security apparatus of a given social-political context.    
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2012b, 2018).  Indeed, these forms of communication contradict traditional securitisation 
theory and lack the institutional power held by state actors; however, the emphasis on the 
role played by the audience in subsequent developments of the theory points to the 
validity of these forms of communication and the application of securitisation to 
counterhegemonic actors.  This point also connects to the broadening of securitisation 
beyond formal speech acts (Huysmans 1998, 2002, 2011).17  While this study is primarily 
focused on linguistic representations of danger, the recognition of broader communicative 
methods in securitisation theory has been an important consideration which has a direct 
application to the Taliban’s counterhegemonic representations of danger.   
This framework utilises securitisation in two ways.  First, the theory contributes to the 
epistemological foundation of this thesis in its discursive approach to danger.  The agency 
held by security actors to construct and disseminate discourses of danger reflects this 
study’s argument that danger is a political representation.  Rather than accepting that the 
Taliban are objectively dangerous or external to some fixed notion of Afghan society, or 
that terrorism is an objective and fixed threat, securitisation reveals the agency held by 
security actors in constructing and disseminating the threat.  This approach also highlights 
the performative aspect of danger in the spectacle of the formal speech act.  The primary 
sources consulted in this study centre on formal speech acts emanating from government 
officials.  While it is recognised that securitisation occurs in multiple ways and is not 
solely observed in the formal speech act (Huysmans 2011), the instrumentality of danger 
in the political context of Afghanistan directs focus towards performances of sovereignty 
and protection via representations of danger.  In other words, securitisation theory 
narrows down the analysed discourse in this thesis when assessing hegemonic 
representations of danger.   
Another way in which securitisation has contributed to this thesis is through its link to the 
state of exception (Schmitt 1995).  One of the foundational elements of securitisation is 
the ability of the speech act to depoliticise a securitised issue and abnormalize politics 
(see Alker 2005; Aradau 2004; Huysmans 2004).  The depoliticization of a particular 
issue, for instance terrorism, renders discussion and alternative interpretations as suspect 
and, in this way, grants the sovereign with the authority to overcome the threat.  While 
                                                 
17 Moreover, the use of visual imagery in securitising issues has been largely ignored until recently (see 
Hansen 2011; Junk and Schlag 2012; Campbell and Shapiro 2007). 
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what constitutes ‘normal’ politics is intersubjective, the political context of Afghanistan 
and the institutional weakness of the GIRoA indicates a strong connection between the 
instrumental use of representations of danger in attempts to maintain government 
hegemony over Afghan society.  By securitising the Taliban via representations of 
(narco)terrorism, the GIRoA attempts to maintain sovereignty over Afghan society and 
delegitimises alternative interpretations of the danger.  The success or failure of 
securitisation is not the focus of this study, but the theory presents a compelling method 
for making sense of representations of danger in contemporary Afghanistan.    
The link between securitisation and abnormal politics can also be found in its effects on 
social identity.  Indeed, one of the main contributions of the Copenhagen School was its 
inclusion of societal security and the application of securitisation to issues of identity 
(Wæver et al. 1993: 24; McSweeney 1996: 82).  Here we can observe the process of 
othering and excluding identities through the rhetorical structure of securitisation and 
exception (see Buzan et al. 1998; Huysmans 2004).  The representation of a particular 
object or identity as an existential threat to society establishes a political context of 
emergency, which in turn further solidifies bordered distinctions between the internal 
endangered identity and the external dangerous other (see also Campbell 1998: 80).  
However, it should also be noted that the conceptualisation of identity within societal 
security has been the subject of debate in which Copenhagen School theorists such as Ole 
Wæver have argued that society can possess a uniform identity that can be threatened 
(Wæver et al. 1993: 24), whereas others such as Bill McSweeney have challenged this 
point as ignoring the diversity of the social body (see McSweeney 1996).  On this point, 
the approach of the thesis is more akin to McSweeney’s position, but instead of viewing 
societal security as reflective of a threat to identity, the argument is that representations 
of danger are used in an attempt to construct a society around a uniform endangered 
identity.  Thus, securitisation serves as an important element of this study’s framework 
in terms of conceptualising the institutional context of danger in Afghanistan, connecting 
performance and representation to the discourse of danger, and theorizing the 
construction of identity in representing danger.   
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Given that the theoretical premise of this study is that danger is a discourse, careful 
attention needs to be taken in theorizing how discourses of danger are established.18  
Moreover, in attempting to connect theorizing of discourse found in Poststructuralism to 
an empirical analysis of representations of danger in Afghanistan, this thesis draws upon 
several scholars and theoretical schools.  The objective is not to present a new way of 
viewing danger as a discourse, but rather to provide the reader with a broad overview of 
the discursive actors, practices, and institutions that contribute to the contemporary 
configuration of (narco)terror.  Rather than viewing (narco)terror as an objective and 
fixed threat, the goal is to theorize the processes and relationships through which 
contemporary representations have emerged.   
The theoretical framework in this area is based largely on Foucault’s (1977, 1978, 1980) 
understanding of discourse and its links to power-knowledge.  This has been a well-
trodden path in Critical Security Studies, but rather than focusing on a particular area of 
danger, this study hopes to establish a broad understanding of the discourse and its 
function in both hegemonic and counterhegemonic circles.   
In terms of this study’s epistemological foundations, Foucault’s concept of 
power/knowledge, and subsequently genealogy, have been the most influential.  Power-
knowledge refers to Foucault’s theorization of power and its interdependence with 
knowledge (Foucault 1977: 27).  For Foucault, knowledge could not be viewed as 
independent of power, but rather that “power and knowledge directly imply one another” 
(Foucault 1977: 27). Thus, power was premised on the construction of a field of 
knowledge, but additionally that knowledge constitutes power relations.  In short, power-
knowledge refers both the use of knowledge as a form of power and the ability of the 
powerful to create new knowledge.  While Foucault first introduced this concept in 
Discipline and Punish (1977), its use as an analytical tool is most clearly evidenced in 
The History of Sexuality, Volume I (1978), in which he revealed how knowledge of 
sexuality had been constructed in the sciences and how this constructed knowledge 
influences social dynamics and practices. The significance of power-knowledge for the 
thesis is in the underlying claim that knowledge is always for some purpose and therefore 
cannot be objective.  With regard to danger, and specifically (narco)terrorism, power-
                                                 
18 Please note that this is not to say that danger exists outside of discourse, but rather to highlight the 
processes and relationships that constitute danger. 
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knowledge is used to theorise the discursive construction of this danger and to connect it 
to power relations existent within Afghanistan.  Power-knowledge theorizes the 
constitution of the discourse and points to its instrumentalization in that the discourse not 
only creates the meaning of (narco)terrorism but also establishes the society as 
endangered.   
Foucault’s theorizing of -power-knowledge leads us to one of the main analytical tools 
used in the thesis: genealogy.  While genealogy is predominately understood as the study 
of an object’s origins, in Foucault’s understanding - and indeed the understanding 
advocated here - genealogy refers to the history of an object that challenges any 
recognition of origin (Foucault 1984: 77).  It is described by Claudia Aradau and Rens 
van Munster as “inquiry into the ‘past of the present’ with the objective to destabilize 
what we know and do not or no longer question…its detailed documentary work serving 
the critical goal of defamiliarization, of rupturing that which is taken for granted” (Aradau 
and Van Munster 2011: 12; see also Burke 2002).   Through a historical inquiry into the 
“discursive constitution of subjectivity conditioned on power relations,” genealogy 
challenges the notion of fixed objects and identities (Ditrych 2014: 16); thus, 
defamiliarizing the familiar.  In first establishing that (narco)terrorism is a discourse and 
then analysing representations of that discourse, genealogy is a helpful tool for revealing 
the fluidity of the danger and challenging notions that (narco)terrorism is a stable or fixed 
category (Stampnitzky 2013: 4).  Moreover, by applying historical inquiry to the 
discourse, the influence of discursive actors and the constellation of power can be 
observed in the periodic changes of meaning and representation.  Essentially, for the 
thesis, genealogy is the application of power-knowledge in historical inquiry with the 
objective of revealing the constitution of the discourse and its relationship to power.  
In keeping with the thesis’ post-positivist methodology, a genealogical study of terror, 
narco(tics),19 and narcoterror (see Chapter III) is used in an inquiry into the history of 
contemporary discourses of (narco)terrorism. This method is used for three reasons.  First, 
genealogy reveals the intersubjective and fluid nature of these concepts, and, ultimately, 
of danger itself (Stampnitzky 2013; Ditrych 2014; Jackson 2012).  Fixed notions of 
terrorism and narcotics in Afghanistan subjugate alternative knowledges and serve to 
                                                 
19 The use of parentheses here is meant to denote that the danger of narcotics is often co-constituted by 
actors affiliated in the drug trade as well as the drugs themselves.   
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maintain sovereign hegemony over the discourse (see Jackson 2012).  Referring back to 
the discussion on danger in Section I, an historical inquiry into the evolution of discourses 
of (narco)terrorism reveals the agency of discursive actors in shaping the discourse in the 
past.  For instance, as illustrated by Ditrych (2013), the association of terrorism to 
anarchist assassins in the early 20th century reveals not only a disconnect with the 
contemporary discourse but also the historical use of the label to subjugate 
counterhegemonic actors and identities.  Therefore, genealogy enables the researcher to 
observe the links between contemporary representations of (narco)terrorism in 
Afghanistan and historical trends in the global discourse, thereby challenging the 
objectivity of these representations while also revealing their instrumentalization.     
The second benefit of genealogy is that it exposes the deeply contextual nature of 
represented danger.  Investigating the many different manifestations and characteristics 
inscribed onto terror, narcotics, and narcoterror demonstrates that these dangers did not 
emerge in a vacuum, rather these concepts serve as a time-capsule or zeitgeist, exposing 
the identities these very dangers are purported to threaten (see Campbell 1998; Stern 
2006).  Furthermore, applying genealogical inquiry to these concepts deprives them of 
the teleological trajectory often afforded to them in hegemonic representations, instead 
highlighting the intersubjectivity of these concepts as their representations vary across 
time and space.  The ‘evolution’ of terror(-ism) is illustrative in this regard as the notions 
and identities incorporated into the danger have varied greatly over the past century (see 
Hoffman 2006; Der Derian 2009b; Stampnitzky 2013).  In the work of Ondrej Ditrych 
(2013, 2014), itself a great influence on the intellectual trajectory of this project, terrorism 
is exposed as a dispositif, remaining as an ‘existential’ danger over the past century, albeit 
with numerous particularised identities that fit the political context of the era (see also 
Stampnitzky 2013).  Similarly, the evolution of the danger posed by narcotics, and indeed 
what constitutes a narcotic, is indicative of contextual features in representations of the 
danger and the contemporary challenges it is understood to pose to hegemonic actors (see 
Herschinger 2011, 2015).  For example, equating the narcotics danger with an eastern 
menace during the Vietnam War, as evidenced first by Kuzmarov (2009) and then Crick 
(2012), followed by its ready association with leftist guerrillas in Latin America (see 
Ehrenfeld 1990), and now with Islamic fundamentalists (Peters 2009b), highlights the 
influence of contemporary political contexts and power relationships in shaping the 
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discourse.  In using genealogical inquiry, the contextual nature of danger is exposed, 
demonstrating hegemonic and counterhegemonic inscriptions in their representation. 
At this point the motivations and use of genealogy should be clear, but there remains a 
need to discuss the choice of speakers and representations subjected to genealogical 
inquiry.  Moreover, the signifiers of ‘hegemonic’, ‘counter-hegemonic’, and ‘hegemonic 
discourse’ need further unpacking in order to present a clear framework for this study.  
This thesis draws on Gramsci’s theory of hegemony (Gramsci 1971).  Gramsci theorised 
hegemony as a method for building consensus between the hegemonic and subaltern 
classes.  The realisation that the hegemonic cannot rule solely through coercive power 
necessitated power over culture and identity, which would be used to build consensus.  
This idea has been taken forward in the discipline by scholars who see the value of this 
theorization in analysis of the structures of values and meanings that order both 
international and domestic society (Cox 1981).  As pointed out by Herschinger (2011), 
“values, norms, and meanings are not really questioned, because in a hegemonic order 
they appear to most actors as ‘naturally’ given, i.e. they are expressed as universally 
valid” (Herschinger 2011: 83).  Culture, values, and norms are produced and disseminated 
to the subaltern classes in order to maintain an asymmetry of power and the ‘loyalty’ of 
the proletariat.  In this way, Gramsci’s theorising reflects Marx’s emphasis on the false 
consciousness and how building consensus is vital for maintaining exploitative structures.  
The end goal is to build a ‘collective will’ in which the hegemonic is viewed as the 
protagonist of the subaltern (Mouffe 1979: 184; Cox 1987: 4).   
In achieving this ‘collective will’ there is a parallel to be drawn between Gramsci’s 
thought and that of Foucault.  Both Gramsci and Foucault viewed knowledge as 
hegemonic production, albeit from slightly different angles.  For Foucault, power-
knowledge reflects the power dynamics that influence and produce knowledge in a given 
context, whereas for Gramsci hegemonic forces produce mechanisms, such as knowledge 
and morals, to direct social relations (see Gramsci 1971: 180).  In both cases, powerful 
actors/classes use their authority to construct norms and knowledges that structure the 
context of the social.  The motivations differ for each theorist, but the salient point for the 
thesis is in how discourse(s) of danger, which can be understood as a hegemonic 
mechanism designed to order and structure society.  It is on this point of similarity that 
the instrumentality of danger is built upon.  Indeed, this point was highlighted by 
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Fairclough (1992) as “a fruitful framework for conceptualizing and investigating political 
and ideological dimensions of discursive practices” (Fairclough 1992: 67).    
While this thesis should not be understood as Marxist – emancipation is not the end goal 
of this work - Gramsci’s theorizing offers a useful method for identifying ‘hegemonic 
actors’ who build discourses of danger.  Gramsci focuses on the ‘ruling class’ in his 
writing, referring not only to the bourgeoisie or corporate class but also to the political 
class and intellectual class (Gramsci 1971: 371, 549) and distinguishes between political 
society and civil society.  Political society refers to society’s interaction with the state and 
is largely confined to coercive power (i.e. use of force).  Civil society, on the other hand, 
refers to the structures of social relations and includes intellectuals, the corporate class, 
and other powerful social actors.  The underlying argument here is that in each society 
there are unequal distributions of power and production reflective in the hegemony of 
some actors over others.  For this particular study, Gramsci’s argument highlights the 
unequal distribution of power and reveals the power knowledge-producers have over 
society, whether political or civil.  Thus, in identifying what is meant by ‘hegemonic 
actors’, this thesis builds on Gramsci’s idea of knowledge-producers and those who 
produce the norms and values that structure social relations.   
Again, there is a parallel to be drawn with Foucault in the emphasis on knowledge-
producers holding power over what Gramsci refers to as ‘subordinate classes’ (Gramsci 
1971: 406).  However, there is a contradiction here between Foucault’s approach and that 
of Gramsci, which has a direct impact on this study’s framework.  For Foucault, the status 
of knowledge-producer is merely discursive and cannot be viewed as fixed or static (see 
Foucault 1989: 201).  The State may be understood in contemporary times as an authority 
on knowledge of danger, but this merely reflects contemporary discourse and is not to say 
that the State occupies this position eternally.  Moreover, this is also not to say that the 
state is the only authority on security and indeed there are numerous discursive actors 
who produce knowledge about danger outside of the state (see Bigo and Tsoukala 2008).  
On the other hand, Gramsci’s approach looks at institutions in political and civil society 
in producing knowledge, morality, values and norms that build consensus among the 
subordinate classes (Gramsci 1971).  The difference lies in the discursive constitution of 
knowledge-producers and its connection to discourses of danger.  For Gramsci, the 
hegemonic class is built on social relations of production, whereas for Foucault (as well 
as Campbell) authority comes from producing knowledge (i.e. constructing) discourses 
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of danger.  The functionality of the discourse remains similar, but in narrowing down who 
is considered to be a hegemonic actor, Foucault’s theorizing is more in line with this 
study’s theoretical framework.   
On the other hand, Gramsci presents one more contribution to this study’s theoretical 
framework in his conceptualisation of the counter-hegemonic.  For Foucault, power-
knowledge is premised on subjugating alternative knowledges that challenge the 
constitution of the discourse (Foucault 1997: 7).  For Gramsci, there is a similarity in how 
the hegemonic suppresses counter-hegemonic voices from the subordinate classes.  
However, for this thesis, the counter-hegemonic is an important actor to consider given 
the Taliban’s representation of danger in Afghanistan.  While hegemonic actors have 
structured Afghan society (and representations of danger) in a way that delegitimises 
alternative voices, the Taliban’s engagement with, and representation of, danger 
undermines this hegemonic position and points to a ‘war of position’ (Gramsci 1971).  It 
should be noted that this is not to present the Taliban as the subaltern challenging the 
unjust corporate class of Afghanistan, nor is it to legitimize their actions, but the ability 
of the counter-hegemonic to effectively challenge the hegemonic position is a theme 
found in this study’s empirical analysis.  The Taliban’s use of vernacular representations 
(poems, chants, etc.) greatly contrasts representations emanating from hegemonic actors 
and reveals how counter-hegemonic discourses must contend with structures and values 
that discredit and delegitimise their communication.  In the end, the use of danger between 
the GIRoA and the Taliban is the same: it reflects an instrumentalization of the discourse 
to establish a society built around an endangered identity.  The arguments of both Gramsci 
and Foucault contribute to the conceptualisation of hegemonic and counter-hegemonic 
actors in contemporary Afghanistan and ultimately shape this thesis’s interpretation of 
the discourse.    
 
Methods and Data Set - Critical Discourse Analysis 
Having established the theoretical framework for the thesis and its conceptualisation of 
danger, attention must now be turned to the methods.  The research question of this work 
requires a critical appraisal of (narco)terror as a discourse in Afghanistan.  Given that the 
contribution of this work is empirical, the methods used to analyse the discourse warrants 
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careful discussion and justification.  Moreover, the particular texts being analysed in this 
study must also be highlighted so that later chapters (e.g. Chapter IV and V) will be 
understandable and relevant for the reader.  Thus, this section will introduce and provide 
a detailed discussion of Critical Discourse Analysis (Fairclough 1992, 1995ab; see also 
van Dijk 2008; Wodak 2013).  First, a clear definition of CDA is provided and the value 
of this research method in using discourse to connect micro- and macro-levels of analysis 
(i.e. individual and structural).  Next, the focus and tenets of CDA are outlined with clear 
links developed between mainstream theorizations of CDA and this study’s 
epistemological premise.  And lastly, a discussion on intertextual analysis is provided to 
provide detailed explanation about the candidate’s interpretive methods and approach to 
discourses of danger in Afghanistan.  The goal is to use CDA to expose how danger is 
used to structure the political and social context of Afghanistan, highlighting the 
dialectical relationship between texts and social subjects (Fairclough 1995b).   The ability 
of CDA to go beyond the text and to connect discourse to context is the rationale for 
employing this framework. 
Pinning down a clear, universal definition of CDA is problematic as it has been the site 
of development over the past 25 years.  Originally coined by Norman Fairclough (1992, 
1995b), CDA is defined as: 
discourse analysis which aims to systematically explore often opaque relationships of 
causality and determination between (a) discursive practices, events and texts, and (b) 
wider social and cultural structures, relations and processes; to investigate how such 
practices, events and texts arise out of and are ideologically shaped by relations of power 
and struggles over power; and to explore how the opacity of these relationships between 
discourse and society is itself a factor securing power and hegemony. (Fairclough 1992: 
135) 
 
Essentially, there are three focuses of CDA.  First, is to explore the connection between 
discursive practices, which refers to the processes of production and consumption of 
discourse (Fairclough 1995b: 57), and the structures that inform such processes in society.  
Rather than approaching text as independent of context, CDA centres on exposing their 
interconnectivity.  Second, CDA is uses the analysis of discourse to reveal how discourse 
is both constituted and constitutive of power.  Here we can again observe a parallel with 
the earlier writings of both Foucault (1989) and Gramsci’s hegemony (1971).  And 
finally, Fairclough points to the use of CDA in revealing how discourse is used to obscure 
hegemonic control over society and maintain social and political structures.  The 
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underlying argument is that “discourse is a practice not just of representing the world, but 
of signifying the world, constituting and constructing the world in meaning” (Fairclough 
1992: 64).   
This definition reveals one of the foundational premises of CDA, which is that language 
is not only description but must also be understood as a social act (see Fairclough 1992, 
1995ab; Fairclough and Wodak 1997).  This means that discourse and text have 
constitutive effects on social order and must therefore be approached as a form of power.  
As van Dijk highlights, “rather than merely describe discourse structures, [CDA] tries to 
explain them in terms of properties of social interaction and especially social structure.  
More specifically, CDA focuses on the ways discourse structures enact, confirm, 
legitimate, reproduce, or challenge relations of power and dominance in society” (van 
Dijk 2008: 353).  Thus, given that language is a social act, CDA highlights what 
Fairclough refers to as the dialectical relationship between discourse (referring both to 
textual language and forms of semiosis) and social practices which shape the lives and 
structures of subjects (Fairclough 1989).  There is a parallel to be drawn here with 
Fairclough’s approach and Foucault’s theorization of discourse in that the dialectical 
relationship between discourse and subject encapsulates Foucault’s argument that 
discourses “are to be treated as practices which systematically form the objects of which 
they speak” (Foucault 1989: 74).  This confirms that discourse is not only descriptive but 
also constitutive, an approach utilised in the scholarship of Campbell (1998), Herschinger 
(2011), and enshrined in this study’s theoretical framework.20  
The conceptualisation of discourse as a social act has a further implication that rests at 
the heart of CDA as an analytical method.  The distinction between linguistics and the 
social sciences meant that there was gap between micro-level and macro-level analysis.  
By focusing on language and discourse, Linguistics would be confined to the micro-level 
(i.e. text) in its analysis of semantics, grammar, metaphor, and so on.  On the other hand, 
the social sciences would be focused on the macro-level, meaning that analysis would 
centre on concepts like power, identities, social groups, and culture (van Dijk 2008).  
However, the connection between discourse and social and political structures advocated 
                                                 
20 Note, there is also a parallel to be drawn between discourse as a social act and the Speech Act employed 
in traditional securitization.  However, this connection abruptly ends given the Copenhagen School’s pre-
discursive understanding of the state.   
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in CDA connects these two levels in analysing both the constitution of the discourse (i.e. 
the text and discursive practice) and the structures constituted by the discourse (i.e. 
sociocultural practices).  The connection between the macro and the micro reveals the 
impact discourse has on mental representations and interpretation in society (van Dijk 
2008).  True, individual experience and knowledge dictates interpretation, but the 
argument that discourse informs structures highlights the how macro-level structures can 
influence micro-level interpretations.  To focus solely on particularised individual 
interpretations of a discourse, for instance (narco)terrorism, would deny the agency of 
wider social structures in informing identities and roles within a social context.  Thus, in 
connecting the macro with the micro, CDA provides an important framework for 
understanding how hegemonic discourse (i.e. Gramsci 1971) informs the consciousness 
of subjects at the micro-level.  The argument of this work, that representations of danger 
are used to constitute an endangered society under hegemonic control, CDA presents a 
clear and useful framework for analysing discourses of danger in Afghanistan.     
Having established a definition of CDA, attention must now be turned to the focus of and 
methods used in the framework.  This thesis adopts Fairclough’s three-part model in 
analysing representations of danger (see Fairclough 1995a).  The three-part model 
consists of text, discourse practice, and sociocultural practices.  Text refers to linguistic 
analysis of the communicative event (Fairclough 1995a).  This refers to the grammar, 
syntax, and semantics of a particular communication in the hope of revealing the 
functionality of the text (Fairclough 1995: 58).  The emphasis in this area is predominately 
on describing the text rather than connecting it to macro-level structures; however, this 
dimension of the model is a necessary component for it informs later analysis on 
discursive practice and the effect these practices have on social relations.  Rather than 
approaching text in isolation, linguistic analysis reveals importance of vocabulary, 
metaphor, and other practices which are discussed in the discourse practice.   
The second dimension of analysis is discourse practice.  This refers to the process by 
which a text is produced and consumed.  In essence, this level of analysis straddles the 
micro- and macro-level distinctions discussed above as the micro-level production of 
discourse is combined with the macro-level consumption (Fairclough 1995b: 58).  
Moreover, in this dimension of the framework, the impact of sociocultural practices on 
the production and consumption of the text are revealed through intertextual analysis 
(Fairclough 1995b: 61).  Indeed, intertextual analysis is one of the chief components of 
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CDA and Fairclough’s Three-Dimensional Model.  It refers to going beyond mere 
description of the text and seeking out the relations between the text and others, as well 
as the changes in language that reflect context and structures (Fairclough 1995b).  
Intertextuality plays a vital role in analysing representations of danger as the often-opaque 
enemy other is represented in a simplistic and intelligible way for the social audience.  
The very label of ‘narcoterrorist’ can be understood as a product of constitutive 
intertextuality in that the complex and frankly unknowable integration between the drug 
trade and terrorist organizations is largely silenced and replaced with the simplistic and 
encompassing label of narcoterrorist.  Moreover, the inference of ‘terrorist’ when applied 
to drug cartels, as in the case of the Medellin Cartel in the 1990s, does more than just 
describe the cartel but also influences the interpretation of the discourse among the 
audience.  Thus, intertextual analysis on the discourse practice plays a vital role in 
interpreting the vocabulary, metaphors, and semantics and explaining the relevance of the 
discourse.   
This leads to the final dimension in Fairclough’s framework, which is the sociocultural 
practice of discourse.  This level of analysis looks at the social and cultural structures 
which enable the communicative event.  It reflects the dialectical relationships of 
discourse and subject in which the social structures inform the discourse, while the 
discourse constitutes the social structures.  For instance, in ‘speaking’ security, the 
structures of power in state-society relations and the dominance of sovereign hegemony 
indicates the privilege of government voices to dominate the ‘official’ discourse of 
(in)security.  Therefore, as a sociocultural practice, representations of danger are enabled 
by these dominant power structures, which inevitably leads to a silencing of the 
vernacular (see Bubandt 2005).  This serves as an important element of the research 
framework and ethos of CDA for it connects discourse to the underlying structures of 
hegemony that prevail in society; moreover, rather than merely interpreting the text, CDA 
enables researchers to explain the relevance of discourse beyond communication.    
In sum, CDA approaches discourse as a form of social action.  It is not merely a body of 
representations of an event or object, but constitutive of power relations and the structures 
that inform society and culture.  The link between discourse and power reflects Gramsci’s 
hegemony and Foucault’s approach to discourse.  The goal of CDA is not only to interpret 
the text but also to explain how discourse constitutes social structures and power relations, 
moving beyond a purely linguistic analysis to a transdisciplinary approach.  Moreover, 
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CDA highlights the ideological utility of discourse in influencing the minds of the 
receiver at the micro-level and how this persuasion maintains social structures at the 
macro-level.   
For this thesis, CDA provides a useful framework for connecting discursive 
representations of danger to the larger processes of constructing Afghan society around 
an endangered identity.  CDA enables the researcher to explain the choice of media in 
communicating with society (i.e. whether an official formal speech act or an orally-
transmitted poem) and how this reflects discursive power structures.  CDA also highlights 
the impact of metaphor and how vocabulary is an active choice in discursive practice to 
invoke a preferred interpretation in the social audience.  In short, CDA does not present 
a clear, uniform approach to discourse, in which methods are used to confirm pre-
determined findings; instead, this method is used to pursue connections between 
discourse and power relations which inform the daily lives of individuals in Afghanistan.  
 
Using Critical Discourse Analysis 
 
Having established the CDA framework used in the thesis, attention must now be turned 
to how CDA will be applied in analysing representations of danger in Afghanistan.  
Primarily, CDA is premised on discourse being a social act and the thesis approaches 
representations of danger in the same way.  The empirical chapters seek to prove that 
representations of danger are produced and disseminated in order to constitute Afghan 
society around the notion of endangerment.  Thus, the discourse analysed in this thesis 
are the various forms of communicative acts deployed by both the GIRoA and the Taliban 
in representing the dangers facing Afghan society.  However, narrowing down what 
constitutes a representation of danger is a challenging task that requires further 
explanation here.  Moreover, once a text has been identified, how will it be analysed 
critically?  It is clear that CDA will be used in the thesis, but the operation of CDA has 
yet to be discussed.  Therefore, this section will outline the particular texts used in the 
research framework and will provide detail as to how these texts were approached and 




Who ‘speaks’ security?  
 
The first consideration is to identify who ‘speaks’ about danger in Afghanistan.  In 
International Relations there is a privileging of the state as the only actor that can shape 
international politics and security (Epstein 2011: 342).  The state-centrism in International 
Security Studies has been shown to silence a range of social actors whose discursively 
constituted role prevents them from speaking about (in)security and danger (Bubandt 
2005; Rowley and Weldes 2012; Jervis 2018).  State-centrism in this regard in not 
considered wholly a negative, as the structures of power that inform social relations are 
currently predicated on the role of a sovereign protector; however, this thesis adopts a 
more expansive approach to discourse and discursive actors, arguing that not only the 
hegemonic can ‘speak’ about danger but also the counter-hegemonic.  Thus, this thesis 
uses CDA to present a more flexible analysis that does not pre-discursively identify agents 
of change, but rather analyses the discourse to reveal the identity of these agents of 
change.  This approach reflects Epstein’s (2011) argument that, “with the focus cast upon 
the discourses, the analysis can then travel across the different levels of analysis in order 
to identify who are the relevant speakers-actors” (Epstein 20111: 342).  Indeed, it is 
problematic to assume that the state is the only relevant speaker-actor engaging with 
representations of danger.  After all, the widespread violence and drug abuse in 
Afghanistan would lead one to believe that citizens and rural farmers would hold more 
authoritative knowledge.  However, in uncovering how discourse is used to constitute 
identity, an analysis of what is being said about (narco)terror reveals that the GIRoA is 
one of the most vocal actors engaging with the discourse.  Thus, public statements, 
speeches, and policies from the GIRoA serve as one of the main communicative events 
used in the CDA of the thesis.   
But again, this is not to deny the agency of other speaker-actors.  Security experts, 
independent researchers, academics, and other actors in the field engage and influence the 
discourse (see Bigo and Tsoukala 2008; Huysmans 2006; Aradau and van Munster 2011).  
This is recognised in the research framework of the thesis and is acknowledged in the 
genealogical inquiry into representations of (narco)terrorism (see Chapter III).  However, 
in terms of representations of danger in Afghanistan, the broader field is speaker-actors 
plays a more indirect role by serving as an intertextual basis for GIRoA representations.  
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Therefore, while remaining relevant to the empirical analysis of the thesis, texts and 
communicative acts emerging from the broader field of elite non-state actors are not the 
primary focus of the CDA.  Rather, applying CDA to GIRoA representations is designed 
to reveal the intertextual connections between government discourse and the wider field 
of security experts.  One prominent example of this is the frequent use by Ashraf Ghani 
(President of Afghanistan) of the label ‘fifth-wave of political violence’ in representing 
the conflation of the drug and terrorism threat (see Ghani 2016b).  This framing draws 
upon Rapoport’s ‘wave-theory’ which has been prominent in mainstream Terrorism 
Studies (see Rapoport 2012).  Read intertextually, Ghani’s communications reveal 
explicit links between GIRoA representations and the knowledge produced by the field.  
Therefore, focusing primarily on GIRoA representations should not be seen as a 
limitation, but rather a reflection of the instrumentality of danger and the connections 
between global discourses of danger.   
On the other hand, to focus exclusively on the GIRoA representations and elite discourse 
would be to deny the counter-hegemonic use of danger to challenge hegemonic power 
structures.  Indeed, if we are to consider that discourse is a social act and that it constitutes 
power relations, it is integral to approach communicative acts emerging from counter-
hegemonic actors such as the Taliban.  Indeed, this is a particularly fruitful endeavour as 
it confirms that discourse is not only used to maintain hegemonic power structures but is 
also serves as a site of resistance.  However, as a counter-hegemonic actor, the social and 
political structures that maintain hegemony prevent actors associated with the Taliban 
from speaking legitimately.  In other words, the formal speech act that reflects the 
authority and official status of the state is not an accepted communicative act for the 
Taliban.  The counter-hegemonic ‘voice’ must therefore use other mediums in its 
engagement with the discourse. The choice to look at Taliban communications reflects 
the core tenets of CDA and the poststructuralist approach to danger outlined above.  By 
not limiting the thesis to hegemonic discourse, the hope is to reveal the instrumentality of 
all representations of danger and its use to (re)order and (re)structure social and political 
relations.  As to why the thesis focuses on the Taliban’s communication and not, say 
Hizb-I Islami (Gulbuddin) or the Islamic State, the rationale is that the Taliban’s 
communication demonstrates political instrumentalization of danger and its use in 
constituting an Afghan identity far more than others.  This was not obvious prior to 
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conducting research but has instead been found by applying CDA to the Taliban’s 
communication.   
Therefore, in critically analysing the discourse, this thesis focuses on communications 
from the GIRoA and the Taliban.  This is not to ignore the agency of other speaker-actors; 
however, for the purposes of revealing how representations of danger are used to 
construct Afghan society, communications from these two actors demonstrate the clearest 
relevance to the thesis and the theoretical framework.  
 
Choice of Texts 
Another important consideration is to identify which communicative acts are relevant for 
the thesis.  Given the multitude of speakers and the broad understanding of representation 
(see Hall 1997), there is a saturation of relevant texts for the thesis.  However, the 
approach outlined above limits the focus to the GIRoA and the Taliban.  Even with this 
distinction there are thousands of potential texts which utilise various medium, ranging 
from the formal speech act to visual imagery to poetry to ‘anonymous’ letters.21  In this 
regard, the texts were identified in accordance with the political and social structures of 
Afghanistan.   
As representative of the state, the GIRoA possesses a unique authority over discourses of 
danger.  This can largely be attributed to the norm of Hobbesian sovereignty and has been 
theorised extensively by Michael Dillon (1996).  Despite a fundamentally weakened 
presence in rural Afghanistan, the GIRoA remains the most authoritative speaker on 
security in the country and is able to utilise formal speech mechanisms in its 
communication with society.  Generally, this reflects the traditional understanding of a 
formal speech act found in securitisation theory (see Wæver 1995; Buzan et al. 1998; 
Balzacq 2005).  As Jackson (2005) points out, ‘high data’ is used by political elites to 
create and impose discourses of danger on the masses (579).  The discursive role of the 
government as the sovereign protector of society grants these speakers-actors with the 
                                                 
21 Please note that anonymous if placed in inverted commas due to the ambiguity surrounding the authorship 
of night-letters.  While Taliban speakers claim authorship over the letters, this cannot be verified in practice 
(see Johnson 2007). 
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authority to use linguistic representations22 to utter danger into existence (Staun 2010: 
410).  Therefore, formal speeches and interviews given by members of the executive 
branch of the Afghan government form the majority of texts analysed in the thesis.  The 
rationale for this approach is twofold: first, formal speech acts (i.e. public statements) are 
widely publicised in the news media and have the ability to be received by wide sections 
of the Afghan population; second, formal speech acts are partly given meaning through 
the socio-political structures that grant government speakers with discursive authority.  In 
other words, by looking at speech acts, the thesis is not only analysing what is said in the 
text, but also highlighting the structural context of the discursive act in line with the tenets 
of CDA.  
Much of these texts consulted were found online.  Given the challenges of conducting 
effective field research in Afghanistan (discussed below), the primary research for the 
thesis was conducted remotely.  However, the GIRoA, specifically the Office of the 
President and the Ministry of Information and Communications, regularly update their 
website and upload translated transcripts of the speeches, statements, and press releases 
made by the president.  In this regard, careful attention was paid when sifting through the 
many texts posted online.  Texts were first organised in accordance with the intended 
audience.  Speeches to foreign governments and at international conferences showed the 
strongest adherence to the (narco)terror discourse, but surprisingly this danger featured 
prominently in domestic speeches and statements.  Furthermore, in communications 
intended for domestic audiences, danger was framed as an expression of the endangered 
Afghan identity as opposed to a problem in need of solving.  Texts were also organised 
in relation to significant attacks on the government and/or civilians.  Cross referencing 
with dates of past attacks (i.e. prior to conducting research for the thesis, 2015-2017) and 
consistent monitoring of Afghan news sites enabled the researcher to identify relevant 
texts.  The objective here was to analyse texts that emerged in a particular context of 
pronounced insecurity in which society would look to the state to interpret the violence 
and represent its meaning. 
                                                 
22 Some scholars have recently asserted that the scope of hegemonic discourse needs to be broadened to 
include visual representations (see Vuori 2010; Hansen 2011; Campbell and Shapiro 2007).  While this is 
a valid argument, this study prioritises linguistic representations as the objective status awarded to the words 
and language used by the securer is itself a performance of its power and authority. 
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However, the publicised statements and speeches of the executive branch of the Afghan 
government was insufficient for this study, and attention was also focused on media 
reports, quoted statements, and interviews.  Three news outlets formed the basis of this 
study: ToloNews, Pajwok News, and Khaama Press.  These sources publish in three 
languages (English, Dari and Pashto) and are considered part of the mainstream news 
media of the country (Asia Foundation 2016; ATR Consulting 2014).  While it is 
recognised that media reports are social representations and the product of interpretations, 
the ability of the GIRoA to communicate with society is far stronger via news outlets than 
through public statements.  Thus, in representing (narco)terrorism the GIRoA must utilise 
media outlets to disseminate their communications.   
Despite the dominance of hegemonic representations of danger in Afghanistan, counter-
hegemonic discourse has emerged from the Taliban; thus, equal focus must be placed on 
critically analysing Taliban communicative acts.  Whereas hegemonic forces retain the 
ability to manifest danger through representation and discourse, counterhegemonic forces 
have a similar ability to (re)represent danger and impose their own discourse on society, 
albeit through different means.  Such an approach to counter-hegemonic discourse has 
not been undertaken with regard to narcoterrorism or Afghanistan, and indeed while 
recent studies have approached Taliban discourse (see Aggarwal 2016; Johnson 2017), 
there is yet to be an academic study looking at how the government of Afghanistan and 
the Taliban engage with representations of danger. 
The delegitimised status of counterhegemonic discourse profoundly shapes the texts used 
by the Taliban.  The labels, language, and practices utilised by hegemonic actors to 
construct and maintain hegemonic structures have delegitimised and externalised 
counterhegemonic (re)representations.  As a result, the same discursive means afforded 
to hegemonic actors (i.e. Speech Act, government policies/statements, (foreign) media 
interviews, etc.) are excluded from the repertoire of the counterhegemonic, subsequently 
excluding the discourse from the authorised public sphere.   Therefore, counterhegemonic 
(re)representations emerge in other areas and are communicated through innovative 
means (see Stritzel and Chang 2015; Ramsay and Holbrook 2015; Aggarwal 2016; Strick 
van Linschoten and Kuehn 2012, 2018; Johnson 2007, 2017; Foxley 2007; Giustozzi 
2009; Nathan 2009).  The inability of counterhegemonic forces to use authoritative 
discursive representations of themselves – speech acts by terrorists stating that they are 
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freedom fighters are seldom accepted by hegemonic actors or society23 – means that they 
are compelled to use modes of representation that are highly visual and active (Hoffman 
and McCormick 2004; der Derian 2005; Richardson 2006).24  While hegemonic discourse 
emerges from a position of authority over society, counterhegemonic discourse enters the 
public sphere from the fringes of society and therefore greater access to the common 
experiences of social actors is awarded to these speakers (see Johnson 2017).  The modes 
of representation used by the Taliban, for instance, reflect this characteristic as their 
ability to communicate with Afghan society is premised on their use of cultural mediums 
(Strick van Linschoten and Kuehn 2012, 2018; Johnson 2017).  Whereas hegemonic 
representations of danger seek to border and essentialise social identity via the binaries 
produced by danger, the existence and experience of counternarratives, demonstrated 
through encounters with danger (counterculture, externalised identities, abnormal 
lifeworlds,25 alterity), exposes the role of society as a stage - an environment where 
competing (re)representations of danger are deployed as a means to cultural hegemony.   
Due to the innovative modes of representation used, it is more difficult to locate specific 
texts and critically analyse them using the same criteria applied to the hegemonic 
discourse.  Indeed, the strategies used by hegemonic and counterhegemonic speakers 
differ greatly in their attempts to shape social identity (see Herschinger 2011).  In 
Terrorism Studies, scholars have looked at violence as a form of communication in which 
targets are chosen as a metaphor designed to represent the political aspirations of violent 
actors (see Sullivan 2014; Ramsay and Holbrook 2015).  While violence committed by 
the Taliban is commonplace, this study focuses instead on linguistic communications that 
represent the government of Afghanistan as danger.  These forms of representation are 
predominately text-based and utilise a variety of different forms of cultural production 
such as poetry, shabnamah (night letters), taranas (chants), and online statements.  What 
is slightly problematic is the different sociocultural structures linked to particular methods 
of communication.  For instance, the Taliban’s online presence is not reflective of its 
position on the ‘fringes of society,’ but rather the need to transcend the hyper-localisation 
of Afghan politics.  Conversely, the Taliban’s use of poetry reflects the Taliban’s deep 
                                                 
23 For an expanded argument, see Zulaika (1995), Toros (2008), Zulaika and Douglass (1996, 2008). 
24 Referring to action, disruption, violence, and other public spectacles.  
25 Abnormality is used here to denote identities deemed alternative to the political conception of ‘normal 
life’ (see Bigo 2008b: 105). 
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integration into Afghan social structures and its desire to use this cultural form of 
communication to challenge political structures.  While the integration of two very 
different forms of communication could be understood as problematic, the complexity of 
the discourse and its socio-political effects requires a more expansive view of the 
discourse.  Common throughout Taliban communication is the use of metaphors and 
cultural tropes that link their identity to referent objects in the collective memory (i.e. 
experience) of the society, affording these ‘excluded’ identities a degree of indigeneity.  
Thus, the choice of text analysed in the thesis reflects the Taliban’s counter-hegemonic 
strategy of using representations of danger to challenge hegemonic structures and 
externalise the GIRoA from their vision of Afghan society.   
 
Limitations 
Ultimately, there are some limitations to this study pertaining to the accessibility of 
Afghanistan and the language limitations of the researcher.  Despite the researcher’s 
professional background in Afghanistan, conducting field research for this study was not 
possible.  This is largely due to increased instability and ethical reasons.  Instead, the 
primary research was conducted largely through online sources.  For the GIRoA 
communications, much of their statements are posted online via government websites.  
Moreover, the Ministry of Communication (GIRoA) regularly updates their website and 
provides English translations for many of their releases.  While being unable to conduct 
ethnographic research for this study was a challenge, online sources enabled access to 
many data sets reflective of this study’s theoretical and methodological framework.   
Another limitation of this study is found in the language limitations of the researcher.  
Despite possessing a basic knowledge of Dari (also known as Farsi), the researcher’s 
ability was insufficient for analysis of primary documents written in Dari or Pashto.  As 
a result, the sources consulted for this study are all printed in English and were translated 
from the original language.  While this may raise some concerns as to the ability of the 
researcher to effectively analyse the communications, substantial secondary research was 
conducted to build upon the researcher’s pre-existing knowledge and familiarity with 
Afghan society and culture.  Furthermore, in some of the sources consulted pertaining to 
Taliban communications, the authors and editors of these works included detailed 
translation notes and descriptions of the context (see Strick van Linschoten and Kuehn 
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2012b, 2018; Johnson 2017).  As mentioned above, the majority of data sets consulted in 
the thesis were found online.  Overall, the limitations of this study have effective the size 
of the data set and have led to a reliance on others’ translations.  However, given the 
researchers extensive background on Afghanistan, and supplementary research on the 
politics, society and culture of the country, CDA could still be conducted effectively.  
 
Conclusion  
This chapter has outlined the theoretical framework for the thesis and its approach to 
danger.  It begun by establishing danger as a discourse, which is derived from earlier 
scholarship from poststructuralist and critical constructivist theorists.  Indeed, the 
intention was not to merely restate old arguments for the sake of it, but rather to lay out 
the theoretical ground for subsequent chapters analysing (narco)terrorism in Afghanistan.  
Furthermore, given the research questions of the thesis focus on how and why discourses 
of danger are represented in Afghanistan, it was important to address the linkage between 
identity and danger at the beginning of the work. The chapter then turned to a discussion 
on securitisation, genealogy, and hegemonic theory, which play a significant role in the 
critical analysis of the thesis.  As a framework for understanding how discourses of danger 
emerge, the thesis draws upon securitization theory and the writings of Copenhagen 
School theorists (Wæver 1995; Buzan et al. 1998) and other critical scholars (Huysmans 
1998, 2011).  The contribution of securitization is that it reflects the institutionalised 
power of hegemonic actors in contemporary social and political structures.  This is not to 
say that the state is the only actor that can speak security, but in approaching how the 
GIRoA uses representations of danger to create and secure the Afghan collective identity, 
securitization proves a very useful conceptual tool.  Genealogy was also discussed as a 
method of critical inquiry.  This method should be taken as reflective of the project’s 
commitment to understanding (narco)terrorism as a discourse.  By problematizing the 
study of ‘origins,’ genealogy reveals the impact of power structures and relationships in 
constituting discourse and representations.  Indeed, genealogy serves as the main tool of 
analysis in Chapter III, so it was important to outline it here.  Lastly, this chapter sketched 
out Gramsci’s hegemonic theory and connected it to power-knowledge.  This section was 
written partly with the hopes of justifying the use of the labels ‘hegemonic’ and 
‘counterhegemonic’ throughout the thesis; however, its relevance is further evidenced in 
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conceptualising the instrumental use of danger by political actors such as the GIRoA and 
the Taliban.   
This chapter then ended with a detailed description of Critical Discourse Analysis and its 
application in the thesis.  This section outlined this study’s understanding of CDA, which 
is derived from Fairclough (1992, 1995ab), and provided a broad overview of the 
framework.  The discussion then turned to a description of the particular texts and 
contexts analysed in the thesis, before ending with a summary of this project’s limitations.   
Overall, the goal of this chapter was to provide the reader with a clear understanding of 
theoretical framework of the thesis.  The hope was that in providing this chapter early on, 
subsequent empirical analysis and the overall findings of this work will confirm the 
assumptions and arguments presented here.      
    








Chapter II: Danger, (Narco)Terrorism, and 
Afghanistan  
 
This chapter serves as a review of the existing literature related to the thesis and reflects the 
three research focuses outlined in the introduction: post-positivist approaches to (in)security 
and danger, which is used in forming the theoretical framework of the thesis; critical 
approaches to discourses of terrorism, narcotics, and narcoterrorism; and the contemporary 
politics and security of Afghanistan.  This review surveys these three areas and seeks to locate 
the thesis in relation to key debates, authors and texts.  Rather than making a theoretical claim 
for how research ought to be conducted or how insecurity should be approached, this chapter 
seeks to establish this particular study as a continuation of the intellectual trajectory 
introduced by authors such as David Campbell (1998), Michael Dillon (1996), Jutta Weldes 
(1996, 1999), Richard Jackson (2005), and others, revealing the original contribution is not 
in its methodology or conceptualisation of danger, but rather in the application of its critical 
framework to contemporary representations of danger in Afghanistan.   
Thus, the chapter is organised to address the three relevant subfields and establish the research 
niche. Section I begins by surveying existing critical scholarship on danger with the goal of 
outlining the utility of such approaches in enhancing both academic and practical 
understanding of how discourses of danger are used instrumentally.  Indeed, the desire is not 
to chronicle the development of Critical Security Studies as this has been done elsewhere (see 
Buzan and Hansen 2009; Rowley and Weldes 2012).  Instead, it will highlight the many links 
between the thesis and earlier debates in Critical Security Studies, with a particular focus on 
the arguments of David Campbell, Michael Dillon, Jef Huysmans, Didier Bigo, and Richard 
Jackson.   
With a firm understanding of this project’s location vis-à-vis developments within Critical 
Security Studies, the chapter turns to a review on literature concerning (narco)terrorism.  The 
focus of Section II is on whether the politics of identity and representation have been applied 
to (narco)terrorism. This section will also highlight connections between this study’s analysis 
of discursive representations of narcotics and terrorism and earlier scholarship from authors 
such as Eva Herschinger (2011, 2012, 2015) and Ondrej Ditrych (2013, 2014).  Interestingly, 
the two constituent elements – narcotics and terrorism – have been the subject of many 
important contributions in Critical Security Studies and their related subfields: Critical 
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Studies on Terrorism and Critical Drug Policy.26  However, narcoterrorism has not received 
adequate attention from critical scholars and has remained dominated by more mainstream, 
problem-oriented approaches.  Thus, there is a gap to fill in terms of critical approaches to 
representations of the converged threat, narcoterrorism.   
Lastly, this chapter concludes with a survey of relevant literature on insecurity in 
contemporary Afghanistan.  Despite the utility of critical approaches danger, and particularly 
(narco)terrorism, such an approach has yet to be applied to Afghanistan.  The discussion 
reveals how the majority of existing scholarship is explanatory, problem-oriented, and 
focused on revealing the inner dynamics of the conflict in Afghanistan.27  Thus, there is an 
important gap to fill in applying critical methods to (in)security in Afghanistan generally and 
representations of (narco)terrorism in particular.  Moreover, the use of communication and 
representation in Afghanistan is grossly understudied, as pointed out by several prominent 
authors in the field (see Johnson 2017; Strick van Linschoten and Kuehn 2018) and provides 
an important area for further research.   
 
Section I: Critical Approaches to Insecurity and Danger  
The conceptualisation of danger as a discourse requires a survey of critical security 
scholarship on the epistemology of threats, how threats are constructed, and their 
ontological purpose.  While the contribution of this work is found in its empirical analysis, 
it is nonetheless important to survey critical security scholarship in order to justify the 
project’s theoretical framework and methodological focus (see Chapter I).  Additionally, 
this first section is important as it locates the thesis in relation to earlier disciplinary 
debates.  Thus, this first section touches on three areas relevant to the thesis and seeks to 
present a more complete image of this project and its theoretical foundations.  However, 
finding commonalities between various theoretical schools in CSS is challenging, so to 
organise and signpost this literature review, a series of questions have been developed in 
                                                 
26 Critical Studies on Terrorism and Critical Drug Policy are the titles of prominent journals in the two 
subfields.  While they should not be taken as uncontentious names for the subfields, they are useful sites 
for locating critical scholarship on (narco)terrorism.   
27 For an in-depth study of the convergence of narcotics trafficking and terrorist groups in Afghanistan, see 
Shanty (2011) The Nexus: International Terrorism and Drug Trafficking from Afghanistan.  For an 
investigative piece on the local dynamics of the post-2001 war in Afghanistan, see Gopal’s (2014) No Good 
Men Among the Living.  Other notable studies of the convergence of narcotics and terrorism include Peters 
(2009b) Seeds of Terror.    
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accordance with the project’s epistemological foundation and its theoretical approach to 
the politics of insecurity in Afghanistan.  The section opens with the rather broad 
conceptual question: What is danger?   While such a metatheoretical consideration is not 
the focus of the thesis, the use of post-positivist theories in analysing the politics of 
insecurity in Afghanistan requires a brief overview of competing perspectives on 
(in)security (and therefore danger) within Security Studies.  The review will reveal the 
location of the thesis within the subfield of Critical Security Studies and its foundational 
assertion that danger is a constructed discourse.   
The second question to consider is: how are dangers (i.e. threats) constructed?  Indeed, 
this forms one of the primary research questions of the thesis and has a significant impact 
on the conceptual tools drawn upon in later chapters (i.e. Chapter IV and V).  The 
contributions of the Copenhagen School, with securitization, and the Paris School, with 
its emphasis on elite discourse, are vital contributions to the empirical analysis of the 
thesis.  Thus, it is necessary to briefly survey the literature in order to locate this study in 
relation to earlier debates within the discipline.   
Building on notions of danger as a construction, the discussion turns to a why question; 
namely, why are dangers fabricated?  This is another broad question, but nonetheless an 
important one for this study given the argument that discourses of danger are constructed 
and represented in order to establish a collective social identity in Afghanistan.  Indeed, 
following the advent of securitisation, there were several important debates regarding the 
role of threats in politics and identity (see McSweeney 1996; Buzan and Wæver 1997).  
The role of identity is particularly pertinent to this thesis, so it is important to briefly 
review scholarship on the role identity plays in representations of danger and the politics 
of (in)security more generally.   
 
What is danger? 
At the epistemological level, there is an important distinction to be made between 
positivist and post-positivist approaches to security and danger.  Whereas the former 
signals a commitment to scientific method, objectivism, and empiricism (see Walt 1991), 
the latter refers to a loose assortment of philosophical positions that challenge the 
objectivity of knowledge and view scientific knowledge as a triadic complex consisting 
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of phenomenic, analytic, and thematic axes (Lapid 1989: 239).  In simple terms, post-
positivism recognises the agency of the human in creating knowledge, whereas positivism 
infers that knowledge exists independent of the ‘scientist’.  Taken together these three 
axes identify the various influences and contextual elements that shape knowledge, 
revealing that knowledge (and therefore ‘truths’) can be challenged.  Moreover, while 
positivism championed the ‘eliminability of the human’ (Margolis 1987), post-positivism 
revealed the agency of the scientist as well as other contextual factors in producing 
knowledge (Lapid 1989: 239-240).  It is this point, the centering of the human in the 
production of knowledge, that resonates with critical approaches to international relations 
and security.  To be sure, the emergence of post-positivism did not develop strictly from 
within IR or (International) Security Studies (see Lapid 1989); however, the Third 
Debate, in which the positivist mainstream in IR was confronted with both post-positivist 
challenges and the merits of methodological pluralism, witnessed the legitimisation of a 
previously suppressed body of critical scholarship seeking to challenge the familiar (see 
Ashley 1988; Shapiro and Der Derian 1989).   
Indeed, this field of critical scholarship remained largely under the radar throughout much 
of the Cold War.  Strategic Studies, which emerged first in the United States and 
subsequently moved to Western Europe in the mid- to late-1950s (Klein 1990: 317), was 
focused on military relations between states and reflected the core assumptions of the 
international system (Smith 1999: 72).  As such, contemporary thinking within this 
discipline centred on nuclear issues and maintaining stability.  In other words, the 
emphasis was on defence rather than security. Contrastingly, from the 1960s another sub-
discipline emerged in Europe, which would become known as Peace Research. Named 
after the Peace Research Institute in Oslo (PRIO), Peace Research adopted a somewhat 
different approach to Cold War animosity and the dangers of conflict.  Cross-disciplinary 
studies came to define the sub-discipline’s approach to conflict in the hopes of 
understanding how and why conflicts emerge, and how peace can be built, maintained 
and spread (PRIO 2018).  Many of the methods and epistemologies that would come to 
define the sub-field of Critical Security Studies, such as Critical Constructivism and 
Poststructuralism, developed from earlier Peace Research scholarship (Buzan and Hansen 
2009: 198).  Thus, by the end of the 1960s the dangers of superpower conflict were the 
primary focus of two very different academic fields. However, many of the differences 
that existed between Strategic Studies and Peace Research would be eroded in the latter 
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years of the Cold War as both disciplines found significant overlap in the concept of 
security, with many pointing to this convergence as the beginning of International 
Security Studies (Case 2006: 462; Buzan 1984; Guzzini and Jung 2004).    
But security itself is a contested concept (Buzan 1991: 27) and there remains no universal 
consensus as to what security means.  In the distinction outlined by Arnold Wolfers, 
security could refer to the objective sense, meaning the absence of threats, but it could 
also refer to a subjective sense related to the absence of fear (Wolfers 1962: 149).  Indeed, 
when considering the research territory of this project, it is important to refer to this 
distinction as the understanding of security (i.e. either objective or subjective) directly 
shapes the methods and concepts used.  The distinction can also be connected to the 
broadening and deepening of International Security Studies following the end of the Cold 
War (see Krause and Williams 1996) for it is the (inter-)subjective understanding of 
security, relating to the absence of fear, that motivates how dangers are constructed and 
interpreted.  The significance of the broadening and deepening for this project will be 
explored further below, however, in terms of locating this study in the (sub-)discipline 
the shift towards understanding, interpreting and defamiliarizing security at the end of the 
Cold War remains salient (Smith 1999: 74).  Indeed, this shift in focus, by no means 
widespread,28 could be connected to what would later become the field of Critical 
Security Studies.   In continuing the interdisciplinary and post-positivist approaches 
introduced by several scholars within Peace Research, Critical Security Studies 
challenges the empirical focus and objectivism of the mainstream.  As Browning and 
McDonald (2011) put it, “…critical security studies scholarship is interested in the 
function of representation or discourses of security in defining group identity, enabling 
particular policy or legitimating particular actors as security providers.  This commitment, 
albeit evident in different ways and to different degrees, follows the recognition that 
security is socially constructed and politically powerful” (Browning and McDonald 2011: 
236).   
So, what does this have to do with representations of danger in Afghanistan?  What is the 
relevance of the Third Debate for the thesis and its contribution to the field?  Essentially, 
                                                 
28 While this shift in focus remains relevant for this thesis, it should be noted that the mainstream of 
International Security Studies remained loyal to the more orthodox assumptions of the international system, 
and thus advocated for scientific method and positivism.   
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the Third Debate laid the groundwork for this study’s epistemological position as it did 
for the body of critical scholarship produced in Security Studies since the late-1980s.  It 
challenged taken-for-granted concepts like security, anarchy, and danger and subjected 
them to intellectual scrutiny.  The result, as pointed out by Krause and Williams (1996), 
was that “debates over the nature and meaning of ‘security’ and the future of security 
studies [became] a staple of the field’s post-Cold War agenda” (Krause and Williams 
1996: 229; see also Buzan 1991; Crawford 1991; Baldwin 1997; Haftendorn 1991; 
Lipschutz 1995; Krause and Williams 1997).  The focal point of these debates was 
contention surrounding the referent object(s) of security (Lipschutz 1995: 7; Buzan et al. 
1998; Smith 1999).  Whereas scholars like Walt (1991) continued to focus on the state as 
the referent object of security, others like Ken Booth (1991) and Wæver et al. (1993) 
shifted attention to the individual and society (respectively) as the referent object of 
security.  This contention is emblematic of a larger trend towards broadening and 
deepening of security that began in the 1980s with contributions from Ullman (1983) and 
Mathews (1989) and crystallised in the mid-1990s (see Krause and Williams 1996, 1997). 
The broadening of security, as outlined by Krause and Williams (1996), refers to 
“attempt[s] to broaden the neorealist conception of security to include a wider range of 
potential threats” (229-230).  The impact of earlier debates concerning the referent object 
of security can be observed in the broadening of security as its meaning fluctuates 
depending on the referent object.  For instance, security for the state has been understood 
as fundamentally different to security for the individual or the society (Booth 1991; Buzan 
1991).  Furthermore, this trend can be understood to reflect the instability of the 
mainstream following the end of the Cold War and the impact of post-positivist 
challenges in the discipline.  Rather than viewing security within the traditional military 
paradigm, the broadening of the agenda advocated for the inclusion of environment, 
economics, identity and various other factors within the discipline (Krause and Williams 
1996).   
However, given the focus of this project, the deepening of security is more salient.  Just 
as the broadening has been framed as a ‘neo-realist’ move towards expanding the security 
agenda (see Walt 1991),29 the deepening reflects challenges from critical scholars and 
                                                 
29 Although this article pre-dates the contribution by Krause and Williams, Walt does make explicit his 
belief that traditional approaches to security can be expanded to other considerations.   
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what they viewed as the privileging of the state within the discipline (Buzan and Hansen 
2009: 197; Tickner 1992; Wæver et al. 1993).  It is problematic to generalise the 
motivations for this reconceptualization of security because individual scholars privilege 
different referent objects - for example Booth’s (1991) focus on the individual when 
compared to Wæver et al. (1993) focus on society.  Moreover, to make claims regarding 
the intellectual drive towards deepening security would be reductive in its generalisation 
to a diverse body of literature.  However, there is a commonality uniting this scholarship 
in the focus on how security effects non-state entities (i.e. individuals and/or society).  
This emphasis on how security dominates the state’s relationship with society is the focal 
point of Michael Dillon’s (1996) Politics of Security.   Rather than maintaining the 
positivist notion that (in)security is a problem to be solved, the critical deepening of 
security signalled a shift towards challenging the concept and revealing how these 
structures effect our world.   
In sum, and to answer the question at the beginning of this sub-section, there is no 
universal notion of security and/or danger.  The schism between positivist and post-
positivist approaches to security reveals wide epistemological differences between the 
two sides.  For positivists, security is a condition to be realised through the mitigation of 
threats and the resolution of security issues.  It is the problem-solving method identified 
by Cox (1981) that seeks to overcome the challenges of an anarchic system through 
rationalism and empiricism (Keohane 1989). Contrastingly, post-positivists revealed the 
limitations of positivist methods and the tendency to replicate the very insecurities that 
traditional approaches were trying to mitigate (Booth 1991).  Instead, post-positivist 
approaches have revealed the intersubjectivity of danger and the political nature of the 
concept.   
 
How is danger constructed? 
One of the more important contributions of critical scholarship was that it exposed the 
political instrumentalization of danger and championed the notion that danger is a social 
construction.  Indeed, the critical unpacking of ‘F/foreign policy’ in Campbell’s Writing 
Security is significant for it exposed how dangers have been constructed and disseminated 
throughout the history of the United States.  Moreover, the use of danger in what 
Campbell terms ‘the evangelism of fear’ was (and remains) integral to maintaining 
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hegemonic power structures, whether they are reflected in the institutionalisation of the 
Church or, its modern equivalent, the State (Campbell 1998: 50, 133).  Thus, there is a 
clear connection between the institution of the state and discourses of danger which are 
understood to threaten the identity of the collective.  The connection between danger and 
identity has been addressed by other scholars, such as Wæver et al. (1993), who looked 
at how the migrant threat was constructed and represented in Europe and the effects this 
has had on representations of a European identity.  The link between security and identity 
was made explicit by the development of ‘societal security’, which is identified as 
“whatever puts [the] ‘we’ identity into jeopardy” (Wæver et al. 1993: 42).  The 
construction of such an identity is an open question (see Connolly 1991; Neumann 1996), 
but the salient point is the connection between (in)security and collective identity.  
However, prior to discussing arguments as to why danger is represented, attention must 
first be placed on how discourses of danger are constructed.  It is important to address this 
consideration first because it leads us to subsequent questioning over the role of danger 
in establishing identity in the social and political context. If, ultimately, the goal of 
representing danger is to secure social identity, then it is necessary to inquire into the 
means of representing danger as the language used have a substantial impact on the 
interpretations of the receiver(s) (see Hall 1997).  In this regard, earlier critical scholarship 
has been quite successful in developing multiple frameworks for conceptualising how 
dangers are constructed, and their contributions are important to discuss here..   
Two particular frameworks that stand out in the literature are securitization and the Paris 
School approaches, which centre on elite discourse production and routinized 
performance(s) of security (Bigo 2008; Huysmans 2011).  Securitization in particular has 
had a defining impact on security scholarship and has received much critical engagement 
since its emergence in 1995 (Wæver 1995; Buzan et al. 1998; Huysmans 2006).  
However, it is also a contested and controversial concept with many scholars pointing out 
its shortcomings and problematics (see Stritzel 2011: 344; Hansen 2000; Balzacq 2005; 
McDonald 2008; Charrett 2009).  Of these, the most pressing criticism for this thesis is 
the claim that the process of securitisation was neglected or under-theorized (Stritzel 
2011: 344; see also Stritzel 2007), and indeed, what this ‘under-theorization’ reveals is 
that the process of constructing danger remains a point of contention within the literature.         
At the root of securitisation is the question posed by Wæver (1995), “[w]hat really makes 
something a security problem?”  In line with debates taking place following the Cold War 
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and the ‘constructivist’ turn in IR, there was renewed interest in how political elites and 
other actors construct security threats (Watson 2012: 279).  These debates were 
significant in forming securitisation because the theory sought to combine a discursive 
understanding of security threats, put forward by poststructuralist scholarship in the 
1980s, with a critical emphasis on how security is used to justify extranormal politics 
(Wæver 1995: 56).  Indeed, as pointed out by Buzan et al. (1998), “by labelling 
[something] as security an agent claims a need for a right to treat it by extraordinary 
means” (Buzan et al. 1998: 26).  While the focus on extraordinary means and the 
suspension of normal politics has played an important role in subsequent critical 
scholarship,30 for this thesis the discursive understanding of (in)security is the most 
influential; therefore, the argument that insecurity is constructed and subsequent debates 
regarding the role of speech actor(s) in constructing danger is the focus of this brief 
review.  
A chief component of securitisation theory is the notion that security only gains meaning 
through articulations (representations) of danger (McDonald 2008: 564).  Wæver’s 
original conception of securitisation privileged a discursive authority, or speech actor, 
who would declare a particular issue as a security issue, thus ‘existentialising’ the threat 
and suspending normal politics (Wæver 1995:  57; Williams 2003: 514; McDonald 2008).  
Drawing upon Austin’s Speech Act Theory (1962), Wæver presented a discursive 
understanding of security that justified the proliferation of security issues and pointed to 
the role of institutions and elites in constructing the narrative.  As pointed out by Watson 
(2012), “for the Copenhagen School, some actors occupy positions of power by virtue of 
being ‘generally accepted voices of security’, through privileged access to the media and 
being able to strategically target specific audiences” (Watson 2012: 286).  The emphasis 
on elite discursive actors is important to note here because it points to a hierarchy in 
knowledge(s) of danger and the authority required to ‘speak’ security.  Fundamentally, 
however, this also contributes to a silencing of the subject of security, rendering them 
unable to communicate their own security concerns (Hansen 2000; Stern 2006; Rowley 
and Weldes 2012).  Indeed, the role of the audience has remained a contentious issue in 
subsequent debates on securitisation (Balzacq 2005, 2011; Bourbeau 2011).  While 
                                                 
30 Connections between security and the Schmittian notion of exception have drawn upon securitisation 
theory and have influenced subsequent poststructuralist scholarship on security and (ab)normal politics 
(see, for example, Huysmans 2004; Bigo and Tsoukala 2008). 
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Wæver’s initial conception emphasized more the constitutive effects of speech acts (and 
actors), later scholarship from Barry Buzan et al. (1998) and Thierry Balzacq (2005) has 
highlighted the crucial role played by the audience to essentially ‘back up’ the speech act.  
Moreover, scholars such as Salter (2008) and Watson (2012) emphasize the importance 
of local contexts in determining the success or failure of a particular security discourse.  
This is an important development in the literature as it points to the importance of local 
narratives in studying representations of danger and further strengthens the understanding 
that securitisation is not unidirectional.  
The issue of who can speak security has also been a point of contention since the 
emergence of securitisation.  While scholars in the Copenhagen School continued to 
emphasize the role of discursive authority(-ies) in securitising particular issues, 
poststructuralist scholars like Didier Bigo (2002; 2008) adopted a more expansive 
understanding of how issues become ‘securitised’.  Scholars in what has become known 
as the Paris School argue that security issues are constructed and securitised in everyday 
performances and practices as opposed to formal speech acts.  This idea is taken further 
by Jef Huysmans (2011) who argues that dangers are too ambiguous to be declared in a 
formal speech act and instead are established through ‘little security nothings’.  Given the 
range of security actors and practices that constitute contemporary security politics, this 
conceptualisation of (in)security presents a more decentralised image of security and 
danger in line with earlier poststructuralist approaches to security discourse (see 
Campbell 1998).  However, these findings also leave somewhat ambiguous the formation 
of danger and threats within the field of security.  In an earlier contribution, Daase and 
Kessler (2007) point to bureaucratic competition among elite security actors in 
constructing danger.  In their understanding, a security field exists in which actors are 
assumed to hold empirical knowledge about potential dangers to (inter)national security 
(Daase and Kessler 2007: 414).  However, this knowledge is largely premised around the 
logic of uncertainty31 and therefore does not exist objectively; rather, danger is formed 
through a lack of knowledge in the sense that security actors must construct and represent 
what could happen.  The Rumsfeldian notion of the unknown unknown places the 
                                                 
31 The logic of uncertainty is derived largely from the emergence of risk within contemporary security 
politics.  The unknowability of danger places emphasis on managing uncertainty rather than securing 




emphasis on the security actor to imagine a potential threat and, through bureaucratic 
competition, to represent their conception of danger as authoritative (Aradau and Van 
Munster 2011; Bigo 2008).  With regard to how danger is constructed, the Paris School 
offers a far more decentralised image of security politics that challenges the privileging 
of the state as the security actor and replaces it with a more diverse body of discourse and 
representation. Indeed, the Paris School provides a more expansive view of danger as a 
discourse, but for the purposes of evaluating hegemonic representations of danger in 
Afghanistan and given the focus of the thesis on the operationalisation of discourses of 
danger, focus must be placed primarily on the representations emerging from the GIRoA.   
While these ideas are important for academic inquiry into the politics of insecurity, they 
largely sidestep important contributions linking (in)security to the production of identity.  
Society, as a subject to be secured, is shelved and replaced with an emphasis on 
uncertainty and the logic of risk in forming security politics.  Indeed, the notion of 
unknowability is an important contribution to the study of discourse, but the diversity of 
actors and the emphasis on ‘bureaucratic competition’ (Bigo 2008a) between security 
actors undermines the ability of danger to be used as a strategy for identity production.  
Moreover, this conceptualisation also reflects a profoundly western context in which risk 
logic has permeated much of contemporary neoliberal capitalism (Beck 2006) and can 
become problematic when applied to non-Western contexts such as Afghanistan.  In short, 
the Paris School’s contributions to critical scholarship on security have been important 
for analysing how dangers become actualised, but they also leave a large gap in terms of 
the role representations of danger play in constructing and securing social identity.  In 
terms of the thesis, both the Copenhagen School and the Paris School have been 
influential.  While the Paris School offers a much broader understanding of the discourse, 
the critical analysis of hegemonic representations of danger in Afghanistan required a 
more narrowed focus on elite speech acts emanating from the GIRoA.    
 
Why is danger represented? 
One of the key focal points of critical scholarship on security has centred around the 
political purpose of danger.  Earlier academic works produced in the 1990s pointed to the 
inseparability of security and politics, an argument most clearly outlined in Michael 
Dillon’s (1996) Politics of Security.  However, there exists a broad spectrum of arguments 
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within the critical subfield directed at expanding linkages between security and politics.  
Rather than embodying a field of separate ‘camps’ (see Buzan and Hansen 2009; Wæver 
2007), careful analysis of these positions reveals significant overlap and the potential for 
a more inclusive methodology.  In this section, the contributions of Paris School, Critical 
Constructivist, Poststructuralist, and Copenhagen School approaches will be assessed in 
order to highlight the theoretical overlap put forth in this thesis.  Moreover, in aspiring to 
employ an inclusive methodology that incorporates themes and concepts from a variety 
of critical theoretical schools, it is important to clearly outline this work’s connection to 
earlier contributions.  Indeed, the argument at the centre of this thesis – that 
representations of danger are used by political actors to secure social identity in 
Afghanistan – is a continuation of this subfield, and therefore a review is warranted.   
One of the main contributions of earlier work in this field is to connect security to political 
control.  The argument was no longer that security was a status or condition to be 
achieved, but rather a tool used by political actors to control and order society (Booth 
1991; Neocleous 2008).  These actors ranged from security practitioners and experts 
within the field32 (Paris School), to the state33 (Copenhagen School), to discourse itself 
(Poststructuralism), but common in these approaches is the claim that insecurity is not a 
condition that can be transcended, but rather “a performative discourse constitutive of 
political order” (Campbell 1998: 199).  Chief among the epistemological foundations of 
these approaches is an adherence of postmodern thought34 and post-positivist 
methodologies outlined above.  Indeed, the postmodern ethic to “make strange what has 
become familiar” (Lapid 1989: 242; Ashley 1988) is reflected in this body of work as the 
epistemic realist attitude of the mainstream is challenged through critical engagement of 
the various processes, procedures and discourses that existentialise danger.  As pointed 
out by Huysmans (2011), rather than maintaining a dichotomized understanding of 
security and politics, post-positivist approaches revealed that security and politics could 
no longer be separated.           
                                                 
32 The Bourdieuian concept of field was borrowed by Didier Bigo (2008a) and reflects the discursive 
economy of security experts.  The status of expert legitimizes discourse emerging from this field and 
subjugates alternative knowledges of security emanating from the rest of society.   
33 The state is used here to denote government officials, most notably the Head of State (or Head of 
Government) and is differentiated from other critical schools which reject this privileging of state actors 
and argue for a more expansive notion of security actors.   
34 Although, the Copenhagen School is a notable exception.  
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Perhaps one of the more important concepts in this body of work is the notion of 
governmentality (Burke 2002; Huysmans 2006; Muller 2017).  While there are traces of 
governmentality as a framework in several different critical schools, it remains most 
observable in Paris School scholarship (see Huysmans 2006; Bigo 2005; 2008b).  This is 
most clearly reflected in the distinction outlined by Larner and Walters (2004) in which 
governmentality is used either to bring attention to the ‘regimes of truth’ that govern a 
society, or to refer to the ensemble of practices, institutions and procedures that form 
power over a target population.  This distinction is important and reflects the difference 
between the poststructuralist emphasis on knowledge and discourse and Paris School 
approaches to insecurity as the routinization of danger.  Despite these differences, 
governmentality has been very influential in critical scholarship on security (Mandelbaum 
et al. 2016: 133) and is a significant factor in the development of this project’s approach 
to danger and the motivations of political actors such as the GIRoA.   
With regard to the Paris School, governmentality has had a lasting impact on how scholars 
such as Didier Bigo and Jef Huysmans have approached security politics.  As mentioned 
above, for Huysmans, security cannot be limited to a simplistic, top-down framework in 
which the state has the unique ability to identify and securitise particular objects; rather, 
security politics are the product of a larger economy35 of security actors, practices, and 
routinized behaviours that govern a population (Huysmans 2006, 2011).  Bigo similarly 
maintains this focus on a broad assemblage of actors and practices which form a field of 
(in)security that manages society via security politics (Bigo 2002).  Indeed, in later work 
Bigo, like Dillon (2007, 2008), connects the dispositif of security to a broader 
understanding of governmentality of the living (Bigo 2008b: 102).36  In highlighting an 
assemblage of practices, procedures, discourses, and actors, the dispositif of security 
reflects the tenets of governmentality and offers an important space for further discussion 
and questioning.  While this area of analysis is important for critical scholarship on 
security and further investigations of security politics, the emphasis on relations between 
practices within the field of (in)security that forms the basis for much of Paris School 
scholarship is not the focus of the thesis.  Rather, this study is most concerned with how 
                                                 
35 This notion of a discursive economy has been taken up by others, see Campbell 1998; Dillon 1996.  
36 However, it should also be mentioned that governmentality is used by Dillon (2007, 2008) in revealing 
the biopolitical nature of contemporary discourses of insecurity.   
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‘regimes of truth’ (Foucault 1977), pertaining to (in)security and danger, serve to govern 
and order society.  Moreover, of the many applications of governmentality observable in 
Critical Security Studies, the focus on security as a ‘truth’ in order to create and secure 
identity remains the most salient in terms of this study’s conceptual framework.   
In exploring the relationship between the politics of security and identity, Campbell’s 
Writing Security remains the most influential for the thesis. Campbell’s work draws upon 
Foucault’s argument that security became the central dynamic in governmental rationality 
from the 18th century onward embodied in the ‘society of security’ (Campbell 1998: 202), 
a premise that finds similar parallels in Dillon’s (1996) Politics of Security.  The central 
claim made by Campbell is that discourses of danger are vital to the state’s institutional 
control and ontology (Campbell 1998: 48, 51).  A comparison between pre-Westphalian 
forms of control within the Church and those found post-Westphalia in the form of the 
modern state reveals a reliance on the evangelism of fear within both (Campbell 1998: 
133).  Again, the parallel between Campbell and Dillon is striking in that both the state 
and the Church have no ontological status of their own, but rather rely on discourses of 
danger and (in)security to constitute their reality (Campbell 1998: 10; Dillon 1996: 14).  
Danger is therefore vital to the survival of the institution as failure to maintain a 
menacing, external other would reveal the lack of pre-discursive foundations and 
therefore denaturalize the state (Campbell 1998: 12).   
But what does this have to do with identity?  Campbell’s work points to the use of 
discourses of danger to define who ‘we’ are, but fundamental to this subfield is the 
ambiguity surrounding who ‘we’ refers to.  Moreover, far from being the only voice in 
this area, there has been significant scholarship linking security to identity dating back to 
the Third Debate (see, for example, Weldes 1996; Weldes et al. 1999; Katzenstein 1996; 
Inayatullah and Blaney 2004; Jackson 2005; Epstein 2011).   In assessing the logic behind 
representations of danger, and insecurity more broadly, many authors have pointed to the 
importance of identity within contemporary technologies of governance.  Following the 
end of the Cold War, there has been a ‘return’ to identity enabled by the emergence of 
constructivism (Epstein 2011: 327).  However, this trend should not be understood as the 
sole progeny of constructivism and numerous contributions from poststructuralist 
scholars similarly advanced the importance of identity, albeit from a slightly different 
direction.  Indeed, critical attempts at opening up new spaces of inquiry, or even to 
‘rewrite’ security, have been required to first investigate the ways in which security has 
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written ‘us’ (Burke 2002: 6).  The complexity of the individual precludes the role of 
identity as a universal explanatory concept (see Epstein 2011), but it does provide an 
important window into the impact of security politics on both state and society.  
Moreover, as the Critical Security Studies project is driven by a commitment to 
recognizing the power of security politics as well as its constructed nature, identity 
remains a key feature in this field (Browning and McDonald 2011: 236).  Therefore, this 
thesis builds on the literature and applies it to a contemporary assessment of Afghan 
security politics.   
However, as a subject of analysis, identity has raised numerous questions and reflexive 
scholarship within the discipline.  Metaphysical debates regarding the epistemology and 
ontology of identity have been an important site of contestation between constructivist 
and poststructuralist scholars (see ‘Epilogue’ in Campbell 1998).  These sites of 
contestation centre around the (pre-)discursive essence of the state, society, and identity.  
For constructivists, the state largely remains the focus of analysis and is understood to 
exist independent of discourse (Buzan and Hansen 2009: 199; Wendt 1992, 1999; 
Katzenstein 1996).  Identity is understood to be a driving force within the international 
system that influences state behaviour (Epstein 2011: 331; Wendt 1999).  
Poststructuralists, on the other hand, assert that nothing exists outside of discourse, 
therefore identity is not something that can be totally constructed and secured but rather 
exists in a permanent state of fluctuation as actors compete for power over it (Campbell 
1998; Buzan and Hansen 2009: 199).  Given that identity cannot be permanently fixed, 
poststructuralists highlight that security politics is not so much about defining the self, 
but rather about constructing and maintaining a ‘radically different, inferior and 
threatening Other” (Connolly 1991: 65; Buzan and Hansen 2009: 143).  This emphasis 
on the negative aspects of identity necessitates critical analysis of security as a means to 
gaining authoritative status within the larger political discursive economy.  The claim is 
not that the state possesses sole authority over identity, but rather that representations of 
danger both constitute the state and society, which is contingent upon identity.   
At this point, it should be clear that ‘identity’ is itself quite ambiguous.  The institution 
of the state is but one actor that engages with representations of danger in the hopes of 
securing (or disciplining) a particular identity; however, the essence and ‘owner’ of this 
identity remains vague.  To put it simply, when scholars speak of identity, whose identity 
are they referring to?  The state’s?  Society’s? The individual?  The collective?  These 
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distinctions are important as they serve as one of the main intellectual fault lines within 
the field37 and have an important impact on the framework used in this study. Within the 
relevant literature the main points of contention centre on the identity of the state and 
whether or not it is able to impose and/or control a uniform identity.  As mentioned above, 
constructivists hold the view that security is reflective of state identity (Katzenstein 1996; 
Wendt 1992, 1999); threats or dangers, in this regard, are in relation to identity, thus 
security is a method for eradicating any challenges to the identity of the state (see also 
Mitzen 2006).  However, as poststructuralist scholars have pointed out, there is nothing 
beyond discourse (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000), meaning that the state itself is 
constituted through discourse as are the particular dangers facing it and, subsequently, the 
endangered collective identity.  Thus, the state cannot possess an identity in a fixed, 
objective sense, but rather identity is fluid and representative of a larger discursive 
economy.   
Another important ontological distinction concerns the personification of the state.  Just 
as the ‘turn’ towards identity in the discipline was brought about through interdisciplinary 
scholarship, several scholars have sought to apply human characteristics to the institution 
of the state (see Mitzen 2006; Zarakol 2017).  One particular argument emblematic of this 
trend can be found in ‘ontological security’ (Mitzen 2006).  Drawing about Giddens 
(1991), Mitzen defines ontological security as referring “to the need to experience oneself 
as a whole, continuous person in time – as being rather than constantly changing – in 
order to realize a sense of agency.  Individuals need to feel secure in who they are, as 
identities or selves.  Some, deep forms of uncertainty threaten this identity security” 
(Mitzen 2006: 342).  The argument is that just as individuals require certainty, a security 
of the subjective self, so too does the state; thus, the security of the state’s identity, 
understood as ontological security, is vital to its existence. But when we speak of this 
identity, are we referring to the role played by the state or its national identity created 
through discourse?  With regards to the former, scholars have developed the notion that 
security is a performative act by the state, thus maintaining its role-based security (Mitzen 
2006).  On the other hand, constructivists and Copenhagen School theorists have pointed 
to the importance of social identity in regard to both state and societal security (Wæver 
                                                 
37 As evidenced by the differences existing between poststructuralist, constructivist, and Copenhagen 
School approaches.  
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et al. 1993; Buzan et al. 1998; Williams 1998).  While the performative aspect is an 
important framework for this thesis in terms of the GIRoA knowing danger, the latter 
point about societal security is the most influential and merits further discussion here.   
We return to the question of whose identity and the ontological aspects of security.  One 
important legacy of securitization theory was its combination with the social sphere in 
the mid-1990s (Case 2006: 453).  Writing in connection to the securitization of migration 
in Europe, Waever et al. (1993) wrote that society’s security centres around “whatever 
puts its ‘we’ identity into jeopardy” (Wæver et al. 1993: 42).  Left ambiguous, however, 
is what constitutes the ‘we’ identity.  Here we are introduced to a particularly important 
debate in the wider study of identity security in the discipline between Copenhagen 
School theorists Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver and poststructuralist scholar Bill 
McSweeney.  For the Copenhagen School, the idea behind societal security (as it would 
become known as) is that security is premised on a fixed social identity.  The argument 
is that security is used to impose a fixed identity on society, or similarly, that security 
narratives reflect a threat to the ‘we’ identity (Smith 1999: 84; Wæver et al. 1993: 42).  
McSweeney, on the other hand, challenges this view, arguing that identity is fluid and in 
a process of negotiation between people and social groups (McSweeney 1996: 90; see 
also McSweeney 1998).  However, McSweeney also recognises the role that political 
leaders and other discursive elites play in shaping social identity, arguing that these actors 
serve a ‘demand’ for identity within society (McSweeney 1996).  This debate is 
particularly significant because it highlights the limits of state-centric approaches to 
identity security and reveals the fluidity of social identity.  Whereas previous scholarship 
approached society as a fixed subject of security, McSweeney’s engagement with the 
Copenhagen School highlighted the role discourse plays in influencing social identity, 
while maintaining the notion that identity is never fixed.   
However, perhaps the most important point to be taken from this debate is the agency of 
society in engaging with discourses of (in)security.  While it has been generally accepted 
that there is a lacuna in the discipline regarding society’s, and the individuals therein, 
ability to ‘speak’ security (see Bubandt 2005; Rowley and Weldes 2012; Jarvis 2018), the 
present study is more concerned with society’s role as a stage upon which different 
security discourses compete.  Identity is not fixed, but that is not to say that the state 
doesn’t deploy representations of danger in an attempt to influence social identity.  Within 
the present sociopolitical context of sovereign nation-states, it is the state which 
70 
 
commands the most authority in speaking and representing security (Williams 2003: 514), 
and therefore places much emphasis on the performative quality of its representations.  In 
this way, we can view a link between Campbell’s argument in Writing Security (see also 
Campbell 2003; Campbell and Shapiro 2007), Neocleous’s emphasis on the security-
identity-loyalty complex (2008) and the use of (in)security narratives by the state in an 
attempt to influence social identity.   
To conclude, this thesis builds on the rich tradition of critical scholarship within the 
subdiscipline of CSS.  The epistemological commitments to post-positivism requires 
additional considerations when approaching danger as a discourse.  As a result, this 
section first began with a brief discussion on how danger has been conceptualised in 
positivist and post-positivist scholarship.  The core assumption here is that danger should 
be understood as a discourse, illustrating the project’s affinities with poststructuralist and 
critical constructivist publications.  The second consideration discussed was how 
discourses of danger are constructed.  In addressing this issue, the literature surrounding 
securitisation and Paris School approaches to elite discourse were discussed.  While the 
underlying argument of the thesis is more in line with the perspectives of the Paris School, 
the context of Afghanistan pushes the research to centre more on state-led representations 
of danger.  In other words, this project recognises the limitations of traditional 
securitization, but is compelled to privilege state actors due to the limitations of the study.  
Lastly, the discussion turned to a brief overview of scholarship concerning why discourses 
of danger are political representations.  In this regard, the thesis builds on earlier 
scholarship establishing the connection between representations of danger and identity.  
The framework, derived from Campbell (1998), is that discourses of danger are deployed 
in order to constitute the state as the protector of society, while also establishing the 
Afghan society premised on an endangered identity.  This argument reflects earlier 
poststructuralist and critical constructivist scholarship and uses the literature to develop 
a framework for critically analysing hegemonic and counterhegemonic representations of 




Section II: (Narco)Terrorism Literature 
While the development of critical literature on security is important to the theoretical 
framework of this study, the focus of the thesis is primarily on critically analysing 
representations of danger in Afghanistan.  Thus, the contribution to knowledge, and 
indeed the gap this study hopes to fill, are found in the narrower subfields of Critical 
Terrorism Studies, critical approaches to narcotics, and contemporary security politics of 
Afghanistan.  As a result, attention must now be turned to previous scholarship in these 
areas in order to establish the extensive links between this study and previous discursive 
approaches to (narco)terrorism and to reveal the gap this study seeks to fill vis-à-vis 
Afghanistan.  Indeed, the two dangers investigated in this study, narcotics and terrorism, 
have both received considerable attention over the past two decades and there has been a 
pronounced increase of critical scholarship in recent years.38  However, despite this trend, 
there remains a gap in critical approaches to the politics of insecurity in Afghanistan and 
the deployment of discourses of (narco)terrorism.  This section charts the development of 
critical scholarship on narcotics, terrorism, and narcoterrorism and sheds light on the 
particular research niche this study hopes to build on.   
 
Mainstream Approaches to Terrorism and Narcoterrorism  
Scholarship on terrorism has been a regular feature in (International) Security Studies 
since the 1980s, with many prominent scholars establishing themselves in the latter years 
of the Cold War (see Jenkins 1974; Schmid and de Graaf 1982; Schmid 1984; Schmid 
and Jongman 1988; Crenshaw 1995).  Even before the broadening and deepening of the 
discipline, terrorism received plenty of attention in the West and was treated as an 
extension of the larger Soviet threat (see Sterling 1980; Cline and Alexander 1984; 
Stampnitzky 2013).  However, during this period, approaches to terrorism largely 
maintained problem-solving methodologies and viewed terrorism as, at the very least, an 
extension of the ‘red menace’.  Post-positivist approaches were stigmatized (see Zulaika 
                                                 
38 While the critical ‘camps’ in (critical) Terrorism Studies are easily recognisable (see Jarvis 2009; Jackson 
et al. 2017), critical approaches to narcotics (and drugs) are far less cohesive with scholars implementing 
largely isolated projects across a wide array of disciplines.  See Campbell and Herzberg (2017) for a very 
recent and exciting contribution to this emerging field.   
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and Douglass 1996) and largely relegated to the fringes of the subfield.  Scholars such as 
James Der Derian and Joseba Zulaika (1995) began to make inroads following the end of 
the Cold War, but a seismic shift can be observed following 9/11.  As Marc Sageman 
points out, “the post-9/11 money surge into terrorism studies and the rush of newcomers 
into the field had a deleterious effect on research” (Sageman 2014: 566).  While 
Sageman’s negative interpretation highlights the proliferation of terrorism research 
among the so-called ‘laymen’, his statement accounts for the dramatic increase in 
scholarship on terrorism and terrorist groups in the immediate aftermath of 9/11.   
In many ways this scholarship merely continued the mainstream focus of the field in the 
late-20th century.  Problem-solving approaches were maintained during the rise of ‘new 
terrorism’ (see Laqueur 1999, 2001).  Definitional issues persisted not only for ‘old’ 
terrorism, which had become a staple of the field since Schmid and Jongman’s (1988) 
study, but also for New Terrorism (see Laqueur 1999; Mockaitis 2006).  Indeed, these 
definitional concerns persist today with both mainstream and critical scholars engaging 
in a seemingly endless debate (see Schmid 2004; Young and Findley 2011; Jackson 2011; 
Ramsay 2015).  What these debates reveal is a convergence of interests between 
politicians and academics in perpetuating the ‘terrorism industry’ (Mueller 2006; 
Sageman 2014).  While a definitional problem emerged in large part due to the political 
nature of the terrorist(-ism) label (Jackson 2011; Ditrych 2013), academic scholarship, 
enjoying a relative boom in research funding as highlighted by Sageman (2014), produced 
an expansive body of literature detailing competing understandings of terrorists, their 
motivations, and terrorism itself (Hoffman 2006; see Ramsay 2015).  As will be expanded 
in Chapter III, terrorism acted as a modular danger that could be applied to any number 
of different identities, a characteristic identified in the early 1990s by James Der Derian 
(see Der Derian 2009b).  Within this context, narcoterrorism emerged as a type of 
terrorism, but remained a phenomenon to be approached uncritically (see Ehrenfeld 
1990).  Positivist approaches to narcoterrorism have become something of a tradition as 
successive scholars sought to understand the nexus between criminal organizations and 
terrorist groups, which became known as the crime-terror continuum (Björnehed 2006; 
Makarenko 2004; Hutchinson and O’Malley 2007; Piazza 2011; Ballina 2011). 
Scholarship on the crime-terror continuum is particularly important for this study because 
it not only produces a gap in addressing the role of discourse in converging these two 
separate dangers, but it also epitomises the mainstream scholarship in the field.  While 
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the link between narcotics traffickers and terrorists had been advanced in both academic 
and policy circles prior to 9/11 (Ehrenfeld 1990; Miller and Damask 1996; Der Derian 
2009a), UN Resolution 1373 explicitly outlined the ‘close connection’ between terrorist 
groups and a string of transnational criminal elements (Björnehed 2006: 313).  Within the 
context of post-9/11 scholarship on understanding the motivations behind terrorist groups 
(see Hoffman 2006), the connection between these two dangers became the driving force 
behind much interdisciplinary scholarship (Dolan 2005; Piazza 2011).  Indeed, this is a 
real point of departure from earlier, more traditional studies that would view narcoterrorist 
groups as unvarying.  Emma Björnehed, in particular, advocated for a more expansive 
approach to a diverse body of groups and contexts (Björnehed 2006: 311).  Others, 
however, advanced a more traditional distinction between terrorists and organized 
criminal groups, appealing to the profit vs. ideology dichotomy (Ballina 2011: 123).  The 
point being made here is that post-9/11 scholarship on narcoterrorism, while vital to the 
study of so-called ‘hybrid’ organisations (see Ballina 2011), left a significant gap in 
applying the critical methods and frameworks that had become characteristic of post-
Third Debate Critical Security Studies.  Scholarship was crucial in revealing that drug 
cartels could deploy spectacles of violence akin to terrorist groups (Cabañas 2014; 
Campbell 2014) and that terrorist groups could engage in aspects of the drug trade 
(Felbab-Brown 2010; Shanty 2011; Piazza 2012), but these studies largely remained loyal 
to positivist methods and were focused on a particular case study.  At the time of writing, 
the discourses of (narco)terror and the use of representations of danger by (narco)terrorist 
groups to ‘secure’ social identity remains under-researched.  Some notable exceptions 
such as Cabañas (2014) look at the politics of representation in their study of drug cartels 
in Mexico; however, overall the literature remains dominated by mainstream theorising 
and positivism.  Therefore, this study boasts greater similarities with previous critical 
scholarship on terrorism and drugs as separate entities than it does with the subfield on 
narcoterrorism.39   
 
                                                 
39 Please note that exceptions apply to this statement.  Critical scholarship on the conflation between 
narcotics and terrorism has been influential in shaping the methodology and theoretical perspective of this 
study (see Damask and Miller 1996; Der Derian 2009).   
74 
 
Critical Terrorism Studies 
In a contrast to existing literature on narcoterrorism, terrorism has received distinctive 
and diverse critical scholarship for over a decade.40  Critical scholarship on terrorism can 
trace its origins back to the definitional debates outlined above.  However, within the 
field, these definitional disagreements did not lead to a quagmire, but rather a resignation 
to the state of uncertainty (Silke 2004: 208).  With such variety in how terrorism is 
defined, critical scholars noticed the subjective nature of this particular danger (Ramsay 
2015).  Who was defining terrorism?  Who possessed the knowledge, or authority, 
necessary to define terrorism?  What were the implications of defining, and being defined 
as, a terrorist?  Questions such as these began to circulate within the subfield, building on 
earlier critical studies conducted in the mid-1990s (see Zulaika and Douglass 1996; 
Jackson 2012a).  A defining feature of this new Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) field is 
its recognition of the discursive power of terrorism.  The rhetorical dimension of terrorism 
became the focal point of an expansive body of literature that sought to challenge the 
state-centric understanding of terrorism and reveal the power of the discourse (Zulaika 
and Douglass 2008: 29; Jackson 2005).  Rather than approaching terrorism and terrorists 
as purely an existential threat, this body of literature sought to uncover the particular 
power constellations that crafted prevailing understandings of terrorism (see Ditrych 
2014; Bain 2005).  Similarly, recent scholarship has built upon this focus to further 
deconstruct dominant representations of terrorism (see Hülsse and Spencer 2008; Bhatia 
2009; Chowdhury and Krebs 2010; Staun 2010; Herschinger 2011; Ditrych 2013).  This 
study seeks to combine both focuses in its investigation of representations of 
(narco)terrorism in Afghanistan; thus, it is important to briefly survey the literature in 
order to outline the similarities and differences between this study and existing 
scholarship.  It is here that we can observe linkages between this area of CTS and earlier 
contributions within Critical Security Studies.   
The main connections this brief survey hopes to reveal are: 1) the understanding of 
terrorism as a discourse; and 2) the role of the discourse in subjugating alternative 
knowledges of terrorism.  Within these two areas we can observe many continuities 
                                                 
40 While critical scholarship on terrorism was prevalent during the 1990s, the beginning of the journal 
Critical Studies on Terrorism serves as a hallmark for the establishment of this critical field.   
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existing between recent CTS scholarship and post-positivist, critical scholarship within 
Critical Security Studies.  While it may be problematic to generalise the entire critical 
subfield, there has been a growing understanding of terrorism as a discursive construct 
rather than an objective danger.  The politics of representation, identity, labelling, 
knowledge, and other focuses have formed the foundation of CTS since its emergence 
(see Jackson 2016).  While this is by no means a recent idea – James Der Derian was 
writing about the ‘terrorist discourse’ in the late-1980s (see Der Derian 2009b) – the 
ongoing definitional debates have further revealed the subjectivity of the terrorist (Hülsse 
and Spencer 2008: 574).  The diverse body of organizations and groups that have been 
labelled as terrorist throughout history, despite sharing scarce, if any, ideological 
affinities, illustrates the power held by discursive authorities in constructing and applying 
the terrorist label (Stampnitzky 2013).  Furthermore, the variation in who counts as a 
terrorist reveals the use of the label as a means of depoliticising and excluding adversaries 
from the established political order (Staun 2010; Barrinha 2011).  The (inter-)subjective 
labelling of terrorists points to an epistemological boundary blocking inquiry into 
terrorism.  Despite the apparent subjectivity, mainstream scholarship in the field has 
approached terrorism through a largely positivist lens (Der Derian 2009b: 69), so the shift 
toward understanding terrorism as a discourse fills an important gap in academic inquiry 
into the phenomenon.  Moreover, by approaching terrorism as a discourse, the politics of 
applying the label become an important research area that has been pursued recently in 
several critical journals. 
Approaching terrorism as a discourse reveals two things.  First, the intersubjectivity of 
the terrorist label points to its role as a political tool for delegitimizing groups that oppose 
the hegemonic order (Zulaika and Douglass 1996; Bryan 2012).  Moreover, the utility of 
this label reflects the changing configuration of the discourse, which is contingent on 
contemporary power constellations within a social and political context (Herschinger 
2011; Ditrych 2014).  This means that changes in definitions and social understandings 
of terrorism are reflective of historical shifts in power structures.  The emphasis here is 
placed on terrorism as an elite discourse designed to maintain power over society.  
Second, there have been several important contributions that critically deconstruct 
discursive representations of terrorism to reveal the linguistic methods used to construct, 
and maintain, identities (see Bhatia 2009; Hülsse and Spencer 2008; Bartolucci and Gallo 
2013).  Metaphors, for instance, are used to render the terrorist more intelligible to the 
76 
 
social audience, infusing the terrorist identity with meaning premised on cultural 
references (Bhatia 2009; Hülsse and Spencer 2008; Spencer 2012).   The represented 
identity of the hostile terrorist other serves to influence the collective identity of the 
endangered society, revealing an important continuity of Campbell’s earlier investigation 
of danger in Writing Security.  Here we see the convergence of these two streams, in 
which terrorism is recognised as a discourse constructed by discursive actors who infuse 
these representations with metaphors and referent objects which create an ‘image’ of the 
terrorist that is both acceptable to social audience and constitutive of the endangered 
identity of the society.  
An important contribution in this area for the present study is the connection between 
discourses of terrorism and the larger process of subjugating alternative knowledge(s).  In 
this regard, Richard Jackson (2005, 2012) has been crucial in his ongoing study of 
discourses of terrorism.  Jackson’s deployment of Foucault’s concept of ‘subjugated 
knowledge’ has been particularly influential in building an elite and authoritative field of 
insecurity (Jackson 2012: 16; Bigo 2008a, 2008b).  In particular, Bigo’s deployment of 
Bourdieu’s concept of field points to security actors’ leading role in constructing and 
disseminating representations of the terrorism (Bigo 2008a; see also Stampnitzky 2013).  
While the field presents a more decentralised notion of discursive power in that it reveals 
a plurality of ‘speakers’ within a field of expertise, its combination with Foucault’s 
perspective on knowledge subjugation indicates that the terrorist discourse is a political 
tool designed to maintain hegemonic structures over representations of danger and to 
influence social identity through these representations.   
Lisa Stampnitzky’s (2013) Disciplining Terror is a particularly good example of 
scholarship in this area.  This book continues earlier scholarship on how terrorism has 
been constructed and disseminated by an elite field of experts.  Stampnitzky writes, “this 
book traces the creation of ‘terrorism’ as a problem, and the corresponding emergence of 
a new set of ‘terrorism experts’ who aimed to shape this seemingly uncontrollable 
problem into an object of rational knowledge” (Stampnitzky 2013: 4).  The book traces 
the evolution of the terrorist discourse and seeks to connect changes in the discourse to 
political developments in the West.  Moreover, by integrating the concept of field in the 
study, Stampnitzky builds on earlier scholarship pointing to a self-perpetuating terrorism 
industry (see Mueller 2006; Lustick 2006; Jackson 2012).  While Disciplining Terror 
does not directly address the implications of the terrorist discourse for social identity, it 
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has remained an important contribution in terms of how security experts control 
representations of terrorism and how the field of expertise silences vernacular 
interpretations of the danger.  The thesis seeks to build on this framework and apply it to 
contemporary politics of insecurity in Afghanistan. 
Aside from elite production of the terrorist discourse, this study also draws on earlier 
critical analyses of the discursive representations of terrorism and the various linguistic 
methods used to render representations of terrorism more intelligible and acceptable to 
the social audience.  In this area there have already been several important contributions 
emerging around the same time as the CTS subfield; however, this research area should 
not be understood as something wholly new or particular to the subfield, but rather as a 
new application of discourse analysis found in earlier critical scholarship within Security 
Studies and International Relations (see Milliken 1999; Chilton 2004; Hansen 2006; 
Epstein 2011).  What makes terrorism such an important application for these methods is 
its ambiguity (Staun 2010: 404).  The plurality of definitions and understandings of 
terrorism poses a serious challenge to its intelligibility within the social audience.  Any 
attempts at declaring an objective definition of terrorism are met with warranted 
challenges (Onuf 2009).  Moreover, the mainstream emphasis on interpreting the 
motivations for violence further problematizes a universal understanding of terrorism 
(Staun 2010: 409) and places the burden of representing the violence on discursive 
authorities such as security experts, government officials, academics, and media figures.  
In the context of such ambiguity, scholars have highlighted the importance of language 
and metaphor in crafting and disseminating representations of terrorism (Hülsse and 
Spencer 2008; Bhatia 2009; Spencer 2012). 
This research area draws upon Critical Discourse Analysis (Fairclough 1992), 
Pragmatics, and Metaphor Analysis and generally centres on a particular case study.  
Alexander Spencer’s (2012) study on the social construction of terrorism in the United 
Kingdom critically analyzes the use of metaphors in representations of terrorism in The 
Sun newspaper.  Spencer links his study to a larger body of discourse analysis found in 
International Relations (see Doty 1993, 1996; Weldes 1996; Milliken 1999) and uses 
metaphors to reveal how objects and interpretations (in this case, terrorism) are 
constructed through social discourse (Spencer 2012: 399).  Without going into too much 
detail about this particular article, Spencer highlights several metaphors found within the 
larger discourse and frames them as a means of understanding how certain interpretations 
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and policies are rendered possible.  In an important link to the relationship between 
discourses of insecurity and identity, the ‘uncivilised and evil metaphor’ is used to further 
strengthen dichotomised understandings of an antagonistic out-group endangering the 
‘good’ and ‘righteous’ in-group (Spencer 2012: 405; see also Lazar and Lazar 2004; 
Bhatia 2009).  This is quite a significant contribution to the field as it highlights the 
interdependence between counterterrorist policies and social representations (and 
interpretations) of the discourse.   
In sum, the study of terrorism as a social construction has become a well-established area 
of CTS, with scholarship building on the earlier contributions made by Jackson (2005), 
Hülsse and Spencer (2008), and Spencer (2012).  Some of the literature has maintained 
focus on critically analysing the linguistic practices deployed in particular representations 
of terrorism (Bhatia 2005; Bhatia 2009; Staun 2010), while others use Critical Discourse 
Analysis in a genealogical inquiry of the broader discourse.  Two prominent examples of 
this scholarship can be found in the works of Ondrej Ditrych (2013, 2014) and Eva 
Herschinger (2011, 2012).  While Herschinger’s work centres more on narcotics, Ditrych 
is a particularly helpful example in his use of discourse analysis in a genealogical study 
of terrorism.  In his 2014 book, Tracing the Discourses of Terrorism, Ditrych looks at the 
changing discourse around terrorism from the 1930s to the present day, revealing the 
control held by elite actors in constructing and representing the danger.  Discourse 
analysis is used to challenge mainstream ‘backwards projections’ of terrorism and 
highlights the influence discursive actors and ‘expert’ knowledge-holders have on 
influencing social understandings of terrorism (Ditrych 2014: 2).  The use of genealogy 
is particularly important here because it challenges the mainstream, ahistorical 
understanding of terrorism.  Instead, Ditrych reveals the role played by contemporary 
power constellations in constructing a meaning of terrorism to fit their particular agenda.  
Given that the focus of the thesis is on how (narco)terrorism is used to influence social 
identity in Afghanistan, Ditrych’s work is helpful in revealing how terrorism is a flexible 
construct (see also Bain 2005) and how this particular danger has been framed in 
historical contexts.   
This brief survey set out to review the major contributions to the field of CTS and has 
revealed an emphasis on critically analysing terrorism as a discourse.  While this is by no 
means the mainstream method of investigating terrorism, it does present many important 
areas for further research and reveals the possibility of successfully deploying similar 
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research frameworks to a range of case studies, such as Afghanistan.  The use of 
genealogy reveals the power held by knowledge-holders and discursive authorities in 
shaping the discourse to fit their particular political objectives.  In this regard, CDA has 
been used in several works to show just how elites construct and represent terrorism (see 
Jackson 2005).  Scholarship within CTS also forms connections to earlier critical 
constructivist scholarship found in CSS, which established the connection between 
representations of danger and social/political identity.  This research trajectory appears to 
be thriving in the field as this presents an exciting avenue for uncovering the how 
particular political contexts influence representations of danger and therefore security.  
 
Critical Approaches to Drugs 
While terrorism has become an important focus for critical research, narcotics has not 
received the same degree of attention.  As will be discussed in Chapter III, many of the 
linguistic methods used in representing terrorism are also found in representations of 
narcotics, and yet, critical scholarship focusing on discourses of narcotics and 
representations of drugs remain largely sidelined.  While mainstream scholarship remains 
largely focused on assessing contemporary (inter)national drug policy, there have been 
several notable examples of critical investigations into political representations of drugs.  
This section will briefly outline the themes in the field with a focus on scholarship linking 
the drugs danger to social identity and the politics of representation.  Despite receiving 
relatively less critical attention than terrorism, the contributions identified in this review 
provide an important framework for better understanding drugs as a discourse and 
revealing the effect of this discourse on social identity.   
One of the essential characteristics of the interdisciplinary field of Drugs Studies is the 
diversity of scholars and publications.  As drugs are not only a political issue, there are 
several well-established subfields in Cultural Studies, Medical Science, Biology, 
Criminology, Policy Studies, and Security Studies.  This presents an unparalleled 
methodological landscape that highlights the range of the phenomenon (Ghiabi 2018: 
208).  Depending on a writer’s profession and expertise, drugs have a unique ability to 
exist unproblematically as the object of study in several different disciplines, pointing to 
what Herschinger calls drugs’ ‘ambivalent materiality’ (Herschinger 2015).  However, a 
common issue found in the varying literature on drugs is the scarcity of critical 
80 
 
approaches.  The political objectivity of drugs is recognised in that they are substances 
made il/legal by government, but scholarship seldom focuses on how or why drugs come 
to be criminalised or securitised, and instead centres on assessing contemporary policy.41  
Indeed, there are many important areas of research in assessing drug policy, such as 
debates surrounding criminalisation vs. treatment, the methods of treatment, and the 
strategies used to combat groups along the drug supply chain (see, for example, Savic and 
Fomiatti 2016; Osborne and Fogel 2016; Davenport and Caulkins 2016).  The 
implications of drugs are wide-ranging and global, so there is no denying that policy 
research is important.  However, the observable emphasis on policy-oriented research 
leaves unaddressed the questions of why and how drugs are represented as danger and the 
implications this representation has on social and political identity.  Therefore, this thesis 
shares less affinity with mainstream research in Drugs Studies, and instead seeks to build 
on a narrow body of scholarship focusing on political representations of drugs as a danger.   
The effects of drugs and drug culture on social identity has been an important field in 
Cultural Studies for decades.  Historical shifts in social engagement with drugs, 
particularly in the West, has contributed to a diverse body of ethnographic research 
studying the emergence of drug use as an expression of rebellion and counter-culture 
(Musto 1987; Willis 1993; Boothroyd 2006).  For Cultural Studies, drugs present a unique 
object of analysis in that they carry with them such variations in meaning and 
interpretation across society, but in spite of this plurality, social discourse remains largely 
dominated by elite power-relations.42  In short, despite widespread social engagement 
with drugs, the represented meaning of drugs remains dominated by political actors as it 
is the il/legal distinction that resonates strongest in social discourse (see Ruggiero 1995).  
Thus, research in this area focuses on either sites of resistance to the political drug 
discourse (i.e. counter-culture; popular culture’s engagement with drugs) or 
deconstruction of the discourse (see Boothroyd 2006; Grayson 2008).  Indeed, for writers 
like Boothroyd, it becomes the task of scholars to reconnect drugs to culture through 
deconstructing narratives of danger rather than merely maintaining drugs’ exclusion from 
                                                 
41 Two prominent journals indicative of this focus are the Journal of Drug Issues and Contemporary Drug 
Problems. 
42 Please note that this also takes into consideration the momentous changes occurring within the United 
States, Canada, and other Western countries over the past five years as Cannabis becomes increasingly 
legalised.   
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society through expressions of otherness.  Such scholarship raises important questions as 
to who commands authority in representing drugs, why drugs have been 
criminalised/securitised, and how drugs are represented as danger.  This discursive 
understanding of drugs has provided an important foundation for later critical scholarship 
in Political Science, International Relations, and Critical Security Studies as drugs are no 
longer viewed as merely dangerous substances; rather, the implications for labelling 
certain substances as (dangerous) drugs becomes the focus.   
This leads to another important area of research which centres on the moral panics 
associated with the drug danger.  One of the more important dimensions of the drug 
discourse highlighted by research in Cultural Studies is the association of drugs with 
dangerous classes and alternative identities (Grayson 2008; Musto 1987; Reinarman 
1994; Boothroyd 2006).  Discourse analysis has revealed that the ‘drugs as threat’ 
narrative has largely been deployed to connect the amorphous drug danger to a series of 
securitised classes and identities (Musto 1987; Gordon 1994; Reinarman 1994).  Common 
in these representations is the notion that drugs are chiefly an external threat that has been 
brought into society to undermine the social fabric (Crick 2012: 408).  On the one hand, 
drugs remain associated with alternative identities that threaten the ‘ideal type’.  This has 
been shown by Campbell (1998) and Reinarman (1994) in their studies on how the danger 
of drugs in the United States has been associated with challenges to the white, Puritan 
ideal.  On the other hand, this also highlights the particular moral framing of the drug 
danger and the resultant ‘moral panics’ that have characterised (Western) social responses 
throughout history.  It is the presence of these moral panics that presents a fascinating 
avenue for further research as they reveal the power held by discourse in shaping social 
interpretations of the drug danger as well as the importance of society as a stage in which 
discourses of danger compete for authority and acceptance. 
Despite important scholarship investigating social engagement with drugs, recent 
contributions, which critically analyse the politics of representing drugs, have had a major 
influence on this project in terms of its methodology and conceptualisation of danger.  
The study of how drugs have become an existential threat is a fascinating application of 
Foucauldian concepts such as genealogy and the dispositif (Herschinger 2011; 2015), 
Gramsci’s hegemonic theory (Herschinger 2012), and the Copenhagen School’s 
securitisation (Crick 2012).  The methodological pluralism here is striking, but also 
revealing in its focus on the agency of elite actors in constructing the drug threat and the 
82 
 
implications these representations have on social identity.  While scholarship in this area 
is by no means mainstream, it has highlighted important links between the political and 
social responses to drugs.   
In regard to recent scholarship in this area, three works stand out in terms of their critical 
engagement with the discourse of drugs.  Eva Herschinger’s (2011) Constructing Global 
Enemies is an important contribution in its application of hegemonic discourse theory to 
not only the global representation of drugs, but terrorism as well.  Herschinger draws on 
Laclau and Mouffe’s (2001) work outlining how hegemonic orders use discourses of 
danger (such as drugs and terrorism) to maintain dominance.  The argument of the book, 
as asserted by Herschinger, is to “…explain [the] process of hegemonic orders ‘in the 
making’.  [The book] reconstructs different understandings of terrorism and drugs in their 
struggle to become dominant, to become the one and only interpretation” (Herschinger 
2011: 2).  However, rather than merely describing the contemporary discourse, 
Herschinger goes further to argue that “the establishment of hegemonic orders at the 
international level in both fields [terrorism and drugs] is a dual process, which can be 
conceptualised […] as the constant attempt to homogenise the image and interpretation 
of the Other,” (Herschinger 2011: 4).  Such an approach looks beyond the objectivity of 
drugs to illustrate how they become part of a larger hegemonic strategy.  One further 
contribution of the book is its detailed application of poststructuralist discourse analysis, 
identifying not only how discourses of danger are deployed but also the techniques used 
in their dissemination.  At the time of writing, there has not been a publication of similar 
detail and sophistication, making it an important contributor to this project’s 
conceptualisation of drugs, terrorism and its methodology. 
Eva Herschinger has also laid significant groundwork in applying Foucault’s dispositif to 
the study of the drugs discourse (Herschinger 2015).  In the 2015 article, titled The Drug 
Dispositif, Herschinger applies the dispositif in her argument that “the ambivalence of the 
material object ‘drug’ is the condition of possibility for the global drug prohibition 
regime” (Herschinger 2015: 184).  The ‘ambivalent materiality’ of drugs appears to limit 
the ability of discursive actors to construct and communicate a homogeneous 
representation; however, Herschinger argues that this ambivalence is what enables a drug 
dispositif to exist, which is dependent upon endless and unproblematic associations with 
other social ills.  In an argument that echoes Musto (1987) and Reinarman (1994), the 
danger of drugs becomes existentialised through its association with objects and identities 
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that disrupt the social fabric (Herschinger 2015: 184; Aradau 2010).  Thus, through the 
application of dispositif, drugs are understood not to be a danger on their own but become 
synonymous with the ambiguous danger of the Other.  The meaning of the global drug 
prohibition regime is therefore not static but embodies the fluidity of hegemonic 
discourse.        
A similar publication that approaches the international discourse of drugs is Emily Crick’s 
(2012) Drugs as an Existential Threat.  This article holds two focuses.  First, the article 
illustrates how drug policy has shifted over the 20th century and how drugs take on new 
meanings in society.  Second, the article applies securitisation theory and makes the 
argument that it is an important tool for analysing how the drug threat has been 
constructed and why it remains dominant today (Crick 2012: 407).  The use of 
securitisation theory, although not the focal point of the article, acts as an important 
contribution to the field because it is one of the few examples of scholarship that directly 
applies a critical lens to what could be considered a security perspective on drugs.  The 
plurality of interpretations of drugs within a given society poses a significant challenge 
to state-based discourses of danger; however, the securitisation of drugs, and the 
subsequent use of the ‘war-metaphor’ (see Herschinger 2011; Stone 2002), reveals 
attempts by political actors to secure ‘the one and only interpretation’.  Earlier 
publications highlighted above, such as Musto (1987) and Reinarman (1994), have been 
vital in illustrating the implications of the drugs discourse on (American) society, but the 
article by Crick builds on this scholarship and uses securitisation as a mechanism for 
explaining how contemporary political representations of danger have become dominant 
globally.  In terms of connecting case studies, such as Afghanistan, to the larger global 
drug prohibition regime, this article sets down important groundwork for observing how 
Anglo-centric approaches to drugs have become dominant.  Indeed, as Chapter IV will 
demonstrate, there is a clear link between contemporary government approaches to the 
drug trade in Afghanistan and the global discourse of drugs as an existential threat (see 
Bewley-Taylor 2014).  This has important implications for how representations of danger 
function at the national level and how Afghan society engages with the drug danger.   
At this point, critical scholarship in the field is making headway with emphasis being 
placed on the discourse of drugs.  However, there is more work to be done as the few 
examples highlighted in this survey are the exception rather than the norm.  In comparison 
to critical scholarship on terrorism, drugs receive far less attention and therefore do not 
84 
 
benefit from the same robust scholarly debates as found in the terrorism field.  Moreover, 
at the point of writing, attempts at creating a cohesive subfield of ‘Critical Drugs Studies’ 
remains in infancy (see Campbell and Herzberg 2017; Ghiabi 2018).  In spite of that, 
there is new ground for interdisciplinary scholarship in the field.  The methodological 
pluralism outlined in Third World Quarterly’s (2018) special issue on drugs indicates 
significant overlap and room for interdisciplinary approaches to local politics of drugs.  
In short, there has been a significant amount of critical scholarship on (narco)terrorism in 
recent years.  While it is true that much of this scholarship has been focused on terrorism 
and narcotics (i.e. drugs) as two separate dangers, the methods used in critically assessing 
discourses of terrorism and narcotics provide significant inspiration for this study’s 
framework and methodology.  Furthermore, the lack of critical attention on 
narcoterrorism presents an important gap in the literature.  Thus, this study seeks to build 
on earlier critical approaches to (narco)terrorism and apply it to a study on representations 
of danger in Afghanistan.   
 
 
Section III: The Politics of (In)Security in Afghanistan 
The ongoing conflict in Afghanistan has produced a wealth of publications describing 
and analysing the endless violence and widespread security issues.  Propelling 
Afghanistan into the limelight of global security politics in the immediate aftermath of 
9/11 has contributed to the range of scholarship covering the politics and history of the 
country (see Dupree 2002; Dorronsoro 2005; Jones 2009; Barfield 2010; Johnson 2011).  
The decades of war and political violence, in a sense, cut off Afghanistan from much of 
the world and resulted in a decline in knowledge about the country and its accessibility 
to researchers.  Indeed, many of these issues remain today, but since 2001 there has been 
a spike in scholarship focusing on security issues, political instability in Afghanistan, and 
the Taliban.  Such scholarship has revealed the convergence of insurgent groups and the 
drug trade (Giustozzi 2007; Peters 2009; Shanty 2011; Piazza 2012), the complex and 
local nature of Afghan politics (Schetter et al. 2007; Schetter 2013; Mielke 2013), and 
recently, the sophisticated use of discourse and representation among the Taliban in their 
communications with society (Strick Van Linschoten and Kuehn 2018; Johnson 2017).  
85 
 
This wave of scholarship has (re)opened the complex politics of (in)security of 
Afghanistan and has provided important new outlets for the study of (narco)terrorism.   
And yet, the majority of scholarship sidesteps the importance of discourse in driving the 
conflict and larger process of identity-building.  Indeed, despite increased scholarship, at 
the time of writing there has not been an analysis of how representations of danger are 
constructed and disseminated in Afghanistan.  Thus, this section of the review seeks to 
highlight the presence of this crucial gap in the literature and to make a case for why the 
thesis is an original contribution in this area.   
When assessing the literature on security in Afghanistan, it is important to look at the 
subjects of research (i.e. which ‘threat’ is being looked at), the use of theory to frame the 
discussion, and the methods used.  A quick glance at recent literature reveals an 
overwhelming focus on two threats: narcotics, and the associated criminal organizations 
that traffic drugs; and terrorism, which includes the dozens of insurgent groups operating 
in Afghanistan and the Taliban.  While the original intention behind the late-2001 
invasion was to oust the Taliban and defeat/destroy Al Qaida, the following 17 years have 
witnessed a series of developments relating to opium production and trafficking, the 
proliferation of insurgent groups, and the purported overlap between insurgent groups, 
such as the Taliban, and the burgeoning drug trade.  This shift in the security narrative is 
most clearly observed in the conflation of the terrorist danger with the drug trade in 
government statements and speech acts.  However, this shift can also be observed in 
increasing scholarship on (narco)terror within both academic and policy circles.   
In approaching the broad topic of security in Afghanistan, there are only a handful of 
works that do justice to the complex and localised nature of the conflict.  Many of these 
books have been written by well-known experts on Afghanistan or journalists who have 
spent considerable time there (see Rubin 1995; Rashid 2010; Bhatia 2005; Giustozzi 
2007, 2009; Saikal 2004; Tomsen 2011; Gopal 2014) and cover a wide range of 
perspectives and interpretations of the conflict.  Addressing the questions of who is 
fighting and why the conflict continues, Gilles Dorronsoro’s (2005) Revolution Unending 
is perhaps the most thorough publication to date.  Despite the fact that this book was 
published over a decade ago, many of the drivers of conflict and leaders of insurgent 
groups remain relevant today.  However, the most significant contribution of this book is 
its broad overview of the conflict and its ability to uncover the reasons behind continuing 
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political instability, which dates back to 1978.  While this book does not address 
representations of danger and challenges the prevailing view that identity and ethnicity 
are driving conflict in Afghanistan (Kamel 2015; Raqib and Barreto 2015), Dorronsoro 
nonetheless presents an insightful and nuanced view of Afghan local politics, the Pashtun 
tribal system, and the importance of class in the now four decades of war.   
A similarly broad publication on the political instability in Afghanistan is Thomas 
Barfield’s (2010) Afghanistan: A Political and Cultural History.  Barfield presents a very 
detailed overview of Afghanistan’s sociopolitical dynamics and highlights the urban/rural 
divide as an important continuity which remains to this day (see also Goodhand 2012).  
Similar to Dorronsoro, Barfield draws on his extensive experience residing in 
Afghanistan and his detailed knowledge of local politics to show how the contemporary 
conflict is nothing new, but rather a continuity of the same structural factors that have 
plagued the country for centuries.  While Barfield does not focus directly on the 
insurgency or drugs, this book sheds light on important political dynamics that provide 
the reader with a basic contextual knowledge of Afghan politics.  Any scholar who is 
interested in applying discourse analysis to a study of Afghan security politics should 
begin with this book as it highlights important cultural factors that are regularly drawn 
upon in both encoding and decoding representations.   
What is perhaps the most surprising feature of the literature is the conflation of the Taliban 
with the ongoing political instability.  Indeed, it is rare to find new scholarship that 
approaches insecurity in Afghanistan at the systemic level.  Instead, recent trends in 
scholarship focus almost exclusively on the Taliban as the sole source of instability and 
the insurgency, more broadly.  While this is limiting in its reluctance to study how the 
GIRoA addresses security politics, hence shifting focus on the Taliban, new literature in 
this area offers the most promise in integrating critical theories and methods (see Strick 
van Linschoten and Kuehn 2012a, 2012b, 2018; Johnson 2011, 2017).  This point will be 
developed further at the end of the section, but prior to assessing the (lack of) theories in 
the literature it is important to first turn attention to recent scholarship on the drug trade 
in Afghanistan.   
This area in particular has taken off over the last decade and presents a wide range of 
research questions, methods, and interpretations of the ‘War on Drugs’ in Afghanistan.  
The literature can be divided into two research focuses: 1) counternarcotics operations 
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and the influence of the US-led coalition on drug policy; or 2) drug trafficking 
organizations and their links to the insurgency and/or local political actors.43  Regarding 
the former, scholarship in this area appears to be more open to critical theories and 
methods.  Recent trends point towards a greater emphasis on the rhetorical value of the 
‘War on Drugs’ for both the US-led coalition and the Afghan government.  In a 2011 
article on the US-led ‘War on Drugs’ in Afghanistan, Mercille presents “an alternative 
interpretation of the war on drugs in Afghanistan, arguing that it is not real and suggesting 
that it is mostly a rhetorical device used by the US and elites as a pretext for intervention 
against groups that challenge US hegemony abroad” (Mercille 2011: 290).  The article 
points to secondary accounts of the involvement by local government officials (i.e. US 
and GIRoA allies) in the drug trade (see also Mansfield 2010) as evidence of the purely 
rhetorical nature of counternarcotics operations in Afghanistan.  Moreover, scholars in 
this area have challenged the government narrative that the Taliban derives the bulk of its 
funding from the drug trade, and instead present an alternative conception of the ‘War on 
Drugs’ being at most a rhetorical legitimizing strategy (Mercille 2011: 294; Mansfield 
2010: 133; Scott 2011: 130).   This points to an acknowledgement of the power of 
discourse in driving the conflict and shaping interpretations of the narcotics threat.   
However, the bulk of scholarship in this area tends to focus on the drug trade itself and, 
at most, the assemblages of actors and cultural contexts in which it operates.  The dramatic 
rise in opium production in Afghanistan over the past 18 years has led to a wave of 
scholarship assessing the scope and integration of the drug economy.  In 2011, for 
instance, several think tanks based in Kabul released reports on the overlap between local 
political actors and the drug trade across rural Afghanistan (Maas 2011; Mehran 2013; 
Bewley-Taylor 2013).  The findings challenge the dominant notion that drug trafficking 
was the prerogative of insurgent groups alone, revealing that the loose system of alliances 
under the Karzai administration, referred to by some as pax narcotica, had actually 
facilitated the spread of the lucrative drug trade.  The extent of this integration was 
highlighted by Maas (2011) who argued that the scale of the drug trade points to a 
criminalised economy and a criminalised peace (Maas 2011: 2).  While the positivist 
approach to the drug trade in Afghanistan contrasts with the thesis’s critical focus on 
                                                 
43 There are also several publications that present a historical overview of drugs in Afghanistan (see, for 
example, MacDonald 2007; Mansfield 2016).  
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discourse, this area of literature remains vital to any study of security politics in 
Afghanistan for it reveals the deeply problematic nature of counternarcotics operations in 
the country and problematizes government discourse associating the Taliban solely with 
drug economy.      
Despite conflicting accounts of the reality on the ground, there have been substantial 
contributions presenting detailed accounts of the overlap between insurgent groups and 
the drug traffickers (see Shanty 2011; Piazza 2012).  The supposed link between drug 
traffickers and insurgent groups has been the main subject of analysis as researchers have 
attempted to quantitatively assess the convergence of both threats.  In particular, the link 
between the drug trade and post-2001 Taliban has been an important subject of analysis 
(see Labrousse 2005; Peters 2009ab).  The argument is that the post-2001 Taliban, also 
known as the ‘neo-Taliban’ in some circles (see Giustozzi 2007; Qazi 2010; Crews and 
Tarzi 2008; Peters 2009a), is more interested in accumulating profits than maintaining its 
ideological commitments (Bewley-Taylor 2013: 9).  Here we can observe a direct 
application of the ‘crime-terror nexus’ framework (Björnehed 2006; Ballina 2011) to 
contemporary Afghanistan.  For the most part, existing literature in this area provides an 
empirical account of the convergence and relies on interviews and other secondary 
accounts for its evidence (see Shanty 2011).  This is understandable given the logistic and 
physical challenges of conducting field research in Afghanistan but what is most 
interesting about this literature is its effect on the discourse itself and scholarly 
understandings of the Taliban.  Given the reliance on secondary sources, one would 
believe it prudent to approach these sources with a pinch of salt and acknowledge that the 
reality could be more complex.  And yet, the challenges of conducting fieldwork in this 
area results in an overreliance on these sources and a reification of their core arguments 
(Strick van Linschoten and Kuehn 2018; Johnson 2017).  The question is not how 
discourse contributed to this naturalised representation of the Taliban as drug traffickers, 
but rather, to what extent are the Taliban profiting from organized crime (Peters 2009b).   
This is a vital point to consider in reviewing existing scholarship.  Why has the literature 
on Afghan security come to centre on this convergence, or conflation, of threats?  
Certainly, drugs and political violence are experienced daily in Afghan society, but to 
take the convergence of these two threats into one larger danger of narcoterrorism is 
problematic and points to a lack of theoretical engagement in the literature.  Of the 
literature on narcoterrorism in Afghanistan, the most notable and well-cited tend to have 
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little engagement with theory or critical methodology.  The challenge of conducting 
effective field research leads to a reliance on security think tanks, peace monitors, and 
other NGOs who are concerned with presenting an accurate description of Afghan 
security as opposed to a critical methodology like CDA.  This creates a wealth of 
secondary information for scholars working on Afghanistan but fails to challenge these 
discourses and their ability to influence social identity.   
However, there are exceptions.  Over the past eight years, there has been a steady stream 
of IR and ISS scholarship that has integrated theoretical frameworks into their research.  
Securitisation, for instance, was the cornerstone of Stritzel and Chang’s (2015) work on 
security dynamics of Afghanistan.  In the article, Stritzel and Chang highlight the gap in 
theorizing the implementation, resistance, and challenges establishing political authority 
in the post-2001 conflict (Stritzel and Chang 2015: 2).  Moreover, they also reveal the 
Taliban’s comparative strength in countering the GIRoA’s securitisation strategy through 
the use of shabnamah (night letters) and taranas (chants) (see also Johnson 2017).  The 
use of securitisation is significant here because it reveals that discourse and representation 
are recognised as having a dramatic effect on the security dynamics of Afghanistan.   
Similar examples can be found in critical scholarship focusing on representations of the 
War on Drugs and War on Terror.  In the 2011 article mentioned above, Mercille looks 
at how the US and its NATO allies have shifted their representation of the war away from 
terrorism and more towards the War on Drugs.  Mercille argues that the connection to the 
war on drugs is designed to legitimise US policies and its hegemonic position in 
international affairs (Mercille 2011: 292).  While the methods used in this particular 
article are not reflective of critical discourse analysis and rely more on a comparison 
between the US rhetoric and its policies, it does open up new areas of study in the use of 
discourse to frame and rebrand the ongoing conflict.  A similar approach can be observed 
in Nazir’s (2010) discursive analysis of the War on Terror in Pakistan and Afghanistan.  
While this article focuses more on Pakistan than Afghanistan, it challenges positivist 
understandings of the War on Terror and mainstream approaches to the conflict.  Nazir 
illustrates the power of hegemonic discourse in the War on Terror which is used to 
delegitimise counterhegemonic discourse emerging from Islamist groups and other non-
state actors (Nazir 2010: 64).  This contribution is particularly significant because it 
highlights the importance of discourse for both ‘sides’ of the War on Terror and connects 
to this project’s focus on counterhegemonic discourse emerging from the Taliban.   
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One final study worth highlighting for its focus on discourse and representation is Judith 
Renner and Alexander Spencer’s (2013) article on the shifting representations of the 
Taliban (see also Strick van Linschoten and Kuehn 2012a; Shahrani 2014.  The focus on 
the extent to which the Taliban have been ‘de-antagonized’ is poignant for this thesis 
because it illustrates the power and agency held by state actors and other security experts 
in constructing and representing the Taliban.  The notion that the Taliban can be ‘de-
antagonized’ is particularly interesting because it relies on the silencing of voices from 
the organization.  A good example drawn upon in the article is how the Taliban became 
‘virtually indistinguishable’ with Al Qaeda following 9/11 (Renner and Spencer 2013: 
485; Shahrani 2014).  By equating the Taliban with a terrorist group, this effectively 
depoliticised and dehumanised the organization and its members and, due to the ‘terrorist 
taboo’ (Zulaika and Douglass 1996), any discourse with the Taliban would be deemed 
unacceptable.  Thus, the eventual recognition of the separation of these two organizations 
points, not to the ability of the Taliban to ‘set the record straight’, but rather, to the 
dominance of hegemonic voices in representing terrorists and other dangers.  
While the above contributions have laid promising groundwork in critically studying 
discourses of insecurity in Afghanistan, there remains a significant gap in connecting 
representations of danger to the imperative of securing social identity.  The articles 
illustrate the merits of theorizing contemporary security dynamics but remain narrowly 
focused and largely confined to international discourses.  In addition to these 
contributions, this project hopes to build on the critical analysis of representations of 
danger in a field dominated by positivism.  Indeed, this is an exciting new trajectory in 
the study of Afghan security because it broadens the scope of security politics beyond the 
militarised paradigm of problem-solving approaches.  Given the challenges facing the 
politics of identity and weakening government legitimacy in Afghanistan, there is a 
pressing need to explore how social identity functions as an object of security in the 
present conflict.  Critical analysis of representations of danger reveals that (narco)terror 
is not merely an assemblage of existential threats, but rather a discursive terrain in which 
the hegemonic and counterhegemonic compete for dominance.   
One final consideration to take into account is the methods use in the literature.  As 
mentioned above, the dominance of empiricism and positivist approaches has 
characterised the literature.  However, what is striking about this privileging of positivist 
methods is the lack of adequate field research throughout much of the publications on 
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both the drug trade and terrorism in Afghanistan.  This is an understandable limitation 
given the rampant political violence, frequency of kidnapping, isolation of violent non-
state actors (i.e. criminal organizations and/or terrorist groups), as well as a harsh 
geography and poor infrastructure.  These factors pose a significant barrier to accessing 
local politics and society in Afghanistan and conducting effective ethnographic research.  
This limitation also effects the methods and empirical data available to researchers, 
leading to an overreliance on secondary sources produced by journalists, government 
statements, and research conducted by independent think tanks.  The good news is that 
there is a wealth of secondary sources on Afghanistan, so there is no shortage of literature 
in that regard.  On the other hand, the lack of field research prevents researchers from 
directly observing how discourses of danger are decoded at the societal level.   
Another important impact of the lack of field research is the difficulty in verifying data 
collected in secondary sources.  The literature produced on the Taliban serves as a case 
in point.  The clandestine and secretive nature of the organization presents serious 
challenges in researching the command structure, organizational structure, ideology, and 
operations (Johnson 2017; Strick van Linschoten and Kuehn 2018; Crews and Tarzi 
2008).  Reliance on local government officials and journalists for data often presents 
contradictory findings and skews academic approaches to the Taliban.  For instance, the 
question of the level of integration between the Taliban and the drug economy has 
produced mixed results, with some writers such as Gretchen Peters (2009b) asserting that 
the Taliban are the head of a broad criminal racket including drug smugglers, traders, 
traffickers, and trucking groups (Peters 2009b: 10), whereas others argue that the Taliban 
merely applies a religious tax (ushr) from the drug traffickers (Shanty 2011).  While such 
debates are understandable, they also provide a window into the limitations faced by 
researchers hoping to present an accurate picture of contemporary security dynamics.  
Moreover, this further demonstrates the unfortunate necessity of using secondary sources 
as prima facie evidence.   
This project differs in its approach.  While it acknowledges the necessity of using 
secondary sources to conduct research on Afghanistan, it approaches secondary sources 
more as an object of study than as pure evidence.  For instance, as journalists rely on 
government statements in representing security issues, this study critically analyses these 
statements in the hopes of uncovering a larger process of representing danger.  Thus, the 
plethora of secondary sources should not be viewed as a limitation to the study of the 
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Taliban, but rather as an important outlet for interpretivist methods and Critical Discourse 
Analysis.  While this approach has yet to catch its stride in the literature, significant 
groundwork has been laid in the subfield of literature on the Taliban. 
Indeed, gaining access to Taliban communications is a difficult endeavour and requires 
ethnographic research in Afghanistan.  There also remains the issue of giving a voice to 
what is understood as a violent political (i.e. terrorist) organization.  As a result, to date 
there remains scarce literature on Taliban communications.  The methods used, the 
messages sent, and the audience targeted remains significantly under-researched.  On the 
other hand, the literature that has been produced has provided a growing body of 
(translated) statements, poems, videos, songs, and other forms that serve as a foundational 
data-set for future studies (see Johnson 2007, 2011, 2017; Johnson and Dupee 2012; 
Strick van Linschoten and Kuehn 2012b, 2018; Giustozzi 2009; Aggarwal 2016).  Not 
only is this scholarship important for its empirical contribution to the literature, but many 
of these sources take steps to theorize Taliban discourse and highlight the merits of 
applying discourse analysis to the study of the Taliban.  Aggarwal’s (2016) study on the 
Taliban’s virtual presence utilises CDA (Fairclough 1992) to uncover how the Taliban 
uses online communication to build a distinct political identity that challenges hegemonic 
discourse (Aggarwal 2016: xvi-xviii).  Thomas Johnson’s recent work similarly analyses 
the Taliban’s deployment of stories and other cultural narratives in undermining 
government control over Afghan rural society (Johnson 2017).  Alex Strick van 
Linschoten and Felix Kuehn’s (2012b) anthology of Taliban poetry, while leaving the 
poems open to the interpretation of the reader, nonetheless highlight the central role 
poetry plays in influencing Afghan culture and identity.  These contributions are 
significant developments in the literature as they reveal that discourse and representation 
play a seminal role in the Taliban’s efforts to retake control over Afghan society.  This 
thesis hopes to build on these contributions and to connect the Taliban’s communications 






To conclude, this literature review establishes the thesis as a critical investigation into the 
politics of representing danger in Afghanistan.  However, the scope of this research focus 
and the underlying assumption that danger is used instrumentally by political actors 
merited further discussion and brief overview of the literature.  As stated in the 
introduction, the desire was not to rehash old arguments but rather to survey the body of 
scholarship that has been influential to this thesis.  This objective was expressed in 
Section I which provided a brief overview of critical scholarship on danger.  Particular 
attention was placed on poststructuralist and critical constructivist scholarship; however, 
in investigating how dangers become constructed, the contributions of the Paris School 
and the Copenhagen School were illustrated.  The goal of Section I was to outline this 
study’s indebtedness to previous critical scholarship on (in)security, danger, and identity. 
Section II shifted focus to existing literature on narcoterrorism and the two constituent 
dangers, narcotics and terrorism.  One of the findings of this literature review was the gap 
in applying critical methods to the study of narcoterrorism.  Indeed, much of the literature 
consulted fails to address the constructed nature of these dangers and instead reaffirms 
the validity of hegemonic representations.  On the other hand, the literature surrounding 
terrorism and drugs appears much more promising.  The remainder of this section 
highlighted the vibrant body of critical scholarship on danger and in particular highlighted 
discursive approaches to the danger (e.g. Jackson 2005; Spencer 2012; Ditrych 2013).  
While not receiving the same degree of attention from critical scholars, drugs shows a 
great deal of promise as a handful of scholars are making significant headway in 
establishing a new subfield of Critical Drugs Studies (Campbell and Herzberg 2017; see 
also Herschinger 2011, 2015; Crick 2012).  Overall, the lack of critical engagement with 
narcoterrorism presents a gap in the literature.  Moreover, the existence of robust critical 
scholarship on terrorism and drugs indicates the importance of future scholarship on these 
dangers, and by extension narcoterrorism.  
Lastly, this chapter provided an overview of contemporary literature on Afghanistan and 
its (in)security.  The review showed that research in this area is dominated by positivist 
approaches that remain focused on (re)solving the conflict.  While the researcher notes 
the merits of such an approach, it is also recognised that the existing scholarship fails to 
94 
 
address the role discourses of danger play in defining the identity(-ies) of the conflict.  
Therefore, there is a significant gap in the contemporary literature in terms of applying 
critical theories, CDA, and illustrating the connection between discourses of danger and 
identity in Afghanistan.          
     
 




Chapter III: Tracing the Discourses of 
(Narco)terrorism 
 
Terrorism, narcotics, and narcoterrorism: these three concepts are taken as an objective 
danger faced by both society and state; a danger that galvanises society around a narrative 
of binary distinctions between good and evil, moral and immoral, civilised and barbaric.44  
However, what the previous two chapters have shown is that danger is an intersubjective 
concept which is constructed and represented by political actors.  It is anything but static 
as identities and values transform over time, leading one to question what we truly know 
about terrorism, narcotics, or even narcoterrorism.  After all, terrorism can be reduced to 
a form of violence committed in an ‘illegitimate’ way by ‘illegitimate’ people (Ditrych 
2014: 94; Bain 2005: 10; Laqueur 1999, 2001; Stampnitzky 2013).  Similarly, narcotics 
are substances deemed dangerous by the state (as well as other experts within a social 
space45), constituting a field of illegitimate substances deemed evil and immoral 
(Herschinger 2015: 190; Crick 2012).  Indeed, the illegitimate label is what defines the 
antithetical nature of terrorism and narcotics to a society, but what is the basis of this 
illegitimacy?   
This chapter approaches these dangers and applies genealogical inquiry in an overview 
the global discourse(s).  Rather than embodying any sense of an objective danger, 
terrorism and narcotics, and hence narcoterrorism, are the product of political and social 
representations of violence and health.46  These dangers, and society’s knowledge of 
them, have developed throughout history, reflecting particular relationships, identities, 
and values in a given period.  Rather than embodying a ‘new’ and ‘dangerous’ threat, 
narcoterrorism illustrates how danger and security are created and represented through 
interactions between hegemonic and counterhegemonic actors. 
                                                 
44 This framing was used consistently under the Bush administration.  For a strong example of this type of 
language, see Address by President George W. Bush before the 56th regular session of the UN General 
Assembly on November 10, 2001. 
45 Experts refers to those who hold an authoritative status over knowledge within society (e.g. civil society 
leaders, academics, local government officials, etc.). 
46 Social health refers to the idea of securing the body politic from immaterial dangers, which are 
represented as metaphorical diseases.  Drug addiction, crime, differing political views, and immorality are 
all examples of dangers to social health.   
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Undoubtedly, this is a difficult point to prove given that knowledge of the past is 
inherently biased and hence flawed.  Our lack of any empirical experience of the past 
reduces our knowledge of it to mere interpretations founded solely in our present 
environment (Ditrych 2014: 2).  The inability of present-day individuals to experience 
history reduces the past to an assemblage of images and imaginaries, combining with 
what is contemporary to form a constellation of meaning (Benjamin in Arendt 1969).  
However, this is only a problem if one sets out to uncover a truth.  Instead, this chapter is 
devoted to illustrating the construction of (narco)terror and challenging dominant 
understandings of terrorism and narcotics.  Rather than embodying a linear evolution of 
danger, (narco)terrorism epitomises the asymmetrical relationship of power and 
knowledge occurring between the hegemonic and the counterhegemonic.  The hope, 
therefore, is not to prove that terrorism has always existed, nor is it to link contemporary 
utterances and occurrences of (narco)terrorism to historical manifestations.  Instead, the 
goal of this chapter is to look at how the globalised discourses of terrorism and narcotics 
have developed over time and how representations of each danger have reflected 
dominant periodic power structures and identities throughout history.  Such an 
investigation will illustrate how dangers, in this case terrorism and narcotics, have been 
constructed by hegemonic forces and deployed within society.   
In order to illustrate this process, this chapter will utilise the Foucauldian method of 
genealogical inquiry (Foucault 1980).47  The negotiated and (re)represented nature of 
danger requires a decentralisation of its history and rejection of any origin/evolution 
(Foucault 1984: 77).  If danger is constantly being (re)represented to reflect a 
contemporary zeitgeist, can there really be a definitive starting point?  Our contemporary 
knowledge of terrorism, for instance, is plagued by our own biased and subsequent 
interpretations of the phenomenon (Hülsse and Spencer 2008: 573; Ditrych 2014: 16), 
historicising an image that is very much rooted in the contemporary.  Instead, 
narcoterrorism, as well as its sub-parts terrorism and narcotics, is very much a 
contemporary manifestation of a longstanding discourses of danger.  Certainly, there are 
particular elements emerging from history and influencing this contemporary danger; 
however, to base our understanding of narcoterrorism as a new danger begat entirely from 
humanity’s evolution and globalisation would be a falsehood and intellectually limiting.  
                                                 
47 See Chapter I for a detailed discussion of the method. 
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Therefore, the task of this chapter is to examine the history of representations of terrorism, 
narcotics, and narcoterrorism to reveal the role of context, power structures, identity that 
inform the discourse.   
This chapter begins by providing an overview of the dominant representations of 
terrorism and narcotics.  In critically assessing the discourse, attention is paid to the 
deployment of essentialising labels and inferred connections along an equivalential chain.   
The focus will then shift towards the emergence and presence of narcoterrorism in 
contemporary globalised security discourses, maintaining a consistent analytical 
framework in illustrating interactions between political actors, society, and the securitised 
danger.  Therefore, the objective of this chapter is not to provide a purely historical 
account of (narco)terrorism, nor is it to place (narco)terrorism at a specific point along a 
larger evolution of danger; rather, the objective is to “destabilize what we know and do 
not or no longer question” (Aradau and Van Munster 2011: 12).  By looking into the 
history of narcotics, terrorism, and narcoterrorism, the hope is to de-familiarize 
contemporary understandings of the phenomena and to expose how the discourses of 
(narco)terrorism are deployed to influence social identity.  
 
 
Terrorism, Hegemony and Identity 
As a discourse, terrorism is a fascinating space of interaction, where emotion, ideology, 
and action converge in a concept whose meaning is ultimately ambiguous.  The ambiguity 
surrounding its meaning hinders hegemonic domination of the discourse and instead 
relies heavily on the interpretation of the receiver (see Zulaika and Douglass 2008; Der 
Derian 2009b; Stampnitzky 2013).  Indeed, many of the same emotions, motivations and 
means of violence are observable in acts not labelled as terrorism, which raises the 
question of when violence becomes understood (read interpreted) as terrorism.48  
Terrorism research has been asking this question for decades now (Schmid 1984; Schmid 
and Jongman 1988; Laqueur 2001; Jackson 2005, 2011, 2012b; Hoffman 2006; Ramsay 
                                                 




2015) and has dutifully uncovered hundreds of smaller, contentious definitions.49  The 
presence of so many different definitions makes problematic any hope of a hegemonic 
representation naturalising (see Hall 1997; Doty 1996).  The biggest question being 
raised, therefore, is whether terrorism can be understood objectively.  Does terrorism exist 
in a positivist sense, or is it a discourse that is constituted by discursive actors and 
constitutive of the terrorist?50  While it should be clear that the understanding advocated 
in the thesis reflects the latter, the question itself is crucial to this understanding because 
it highlights the intersubjectivity of knowledge of terrorism and challenges naturalised 
representations of it.51  How does a society come to ‘know’ the difference between 
terrorism and insurgency?  How do social actors understand the difference between a 
heavy-handed police operation and state terrorism?  What are the sites of differentiation?  
As a discourse, terrorism is broad, intersubjective, and ultimately ambiguous, leaving 
positivist scholars and social audiences alike with little hope of realising their goal of 
gaining an objective understanding of the phenomenon.  The genealogical inquiry into 
terrorism provided in this chapter sidesteps this epistemological trap and approaches it as 
a discourse dominated by hegemonic actors.  It is a discourse meant to secure the state’s 
hegemony over society and to subjugate the self-representation of the Other.   
In this sense, terrorism is a site of contestation where violence is interpreted as 
communication (Schmid and de Graaf 1982; Crelinsten 2002).  Expressions of violence 
are infused with meaning as two opposing conceptions of identity, that being hegemonic 
and counterhegemonic, interact in the social sphere.  The violent act perpetrated by the 
terrorist is communication from the counter-hegemonic (see Schmid and de Graaf 1982; 
Crelinsten 2002; Richardson 2006; Staun 2010), which is met by an opposing 
interpretation of meaning communicated by the hegemonic actors.  In other words, 
terrorism is violence directed at specific targets designed to send a message to an audience 
(Chowdhury and Krebs 2010: 126; Richardson 2006; Weissman et al. 2014).  It becomes 
terrorism when the securer utters it into existence, using linguistic and extralinguistic 
                                                 
49 The most famous example in the literature is Schmid and Jongman’s (1988) 109 definitions of terrorism. 
50 An argument put forth recently by scholars such as Staun (2010) and Ditrych (2014).  Similar to 
securitisation, the argument draws on linguistics and the ability of speech actors to materialise a certain 
phenomenon (in this case terrorism) through discourse.   
51 This can also be linked to what Stampnitzky (2013) highlighted as the politics of anti-knowledge 
immediately after 9/11, in which the evil and supposed irrationality of terrorists delegitimised any 
knowledge of them. 
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representations of the violence to label it as terrorism.  In this relationship, we can observe 
that terrorism is a message, “[with] a sender (the terrorist), a message generator (the 
victim [or target]) and the receiver (the public)” (Staun 2010: 409).  This dynamic is 
present in both the securer and the securitised as both send conflicting messages to the 
social audience.  Indeed, as Schmid and de Graaf (1982) point out, “in order for a violent 
act to become terroristic, it needs an audience” (Schmid and de Graaf 1982: 15).  The 
same applies to the sovereign: in order for a sovereign to exist, it must have a discursive 
audience to support it.  In this way, we can observe how the terrorist communicates 
through violence – illegitimate and ‘alternative’ forms, as it were – directed at symbolic 
targets (Seib and Janbek 2011: 7; Weissman et al. 2014: 261), whereas the securer 
communicates through ascribing meaning and sacredness to these targets.  The interplay 
of these two messages, hegemonic and counterhegemonic, is therefore infused with 
contextual meaning that encapsulate the knowledges, values, and identities of both sides.   
The fluidity of interpreting violent acts demonstrates the validity of understaindg 
terrorism as a discourse.  It is a construct which encapsulates a plethora of different 
elements and binaries, anecdotally reflected in the ‘hundreds’ of definitions mentioned 
above (see Schmid and Jongman 1988).  The discourse, through its imposition of 
self/other identities, constitutes the secured subject (i.e. the endangered society) and 
consolidates the ambivalent Other into the image of terrorist (Ditrych 2014: 1).   These 
identities are given meaning through the usage and naturalisation of constitutive binaries, 
stressing the antagonistic alterity of the terrorist in contrast to the moral and just vision of 
society.  The binary traits ascribed to the terrorist, and deployed through labels such as 
barbaric, immoral, unjust, evil, etc. (see Bush 2001), exclude the terrorist from society 
via representations of these characteristics.  In other words, the terrorist becomes the 
manifestation of a threatening difference, which through negative association becomes 
constitutive of the self (Campbell 1998: 61; see also Connolly 1991).  The characteristics 
of the terrorist are reflective of the challenges facing hegemonic representations of the 
ideal society.  Whatever the contextual basis for defining terrorism - whether it be fears 
of anarchy, fears of transnationalism, fears of alterity – the represented identity of the 
terrorist reflects the challenges to the sovereign’s authority over its society.  The role of 
context in shaping the discourse can be observed in the historical ‘waves’ of political 
violence (Rapoport 2012) and has been analysed elsewhere by Ditrych (2013).  The 
terrorist, therefore, is represented to personify counterhegemonic challenges to the 
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established order, which are reduced to a mutual antagonism and incompatibility with 
society.  The face, cause, and ethos of the terrorist are consequently decivilized, 
dehumanised, and depoliticised.  In this way, terrorism, like all discourses, is located in a 
specific context and should be approached historically (Bartolucci and Gallo 2013: 19).  
Moreover, approaching discourses of terrorism in this way reveals that representations of 
terrorism are not meant to describe but rather become a form of social action that 
constitutes social identities and structures.   
As an outside observer, identifying the specific constitutive elements of terrorism’s 
represented identity is challenging because it requires deconstructing political 
representations of the terrorist as well as society’s own interpretation of the discourse.  
Furthermore, attempting to locate an origin of the discourse and chronicling its evolution 
over time would be flawed because it would assume that terrorism is part of a teleological 
chain, fixed throughout history when in fact the ‘face’ of terrorism and the discourses 
around the phenomenon have shifted periodically (Laqueur 2001; Bain 2005).  Instead, 
terrorism is formed from a particular political and social context, becoming the episteme 
of our times (Zulaika and Douglass 2008: 29).  For example, contemporary discourses of 
terrorism often cite the erosion of sovereign borders and the threat of the migration as the 
root of the danger (Enders and Sandler 1999; Nail 2016), reflecting many of the 
challenges faced by nation-states in a globalised world (see Aradau 2004; Huysmans 
2004; Behnke 2006).52  Therefore, our current understanding of terrorism is premised on 
hegemonic responses to these challenges.  Manifestations of this policy can be observed 
in tougher immigration laws, increased border security, surveillance of society, expanded 
state powers, and so on, all of which are enacted with the stated objective of protecting 
society from this new danger (see Dillon 2007).  Thus, if we critically analyse 
contemporary discourses of terrorism, we can observe the impact of our current political 
zeitgeist defined by increased freedoms, permeable borders, globalised migration, and a 
reduction in state-based antagonisms.  Indeed, it has become almost a cliché to cite the 
post-Cold War world for creating everything ‘new’ in security and politics; however, 
there is some agency here in that this environment greatly destabilised the discursively 
constituted roles of state and society.  In other words, the traditional sovereign is faced 
                                                 
52 Another prominent example of this is the securitisation of migrants in Western countries.  The refugee 
crisis in Syria is was such instance in which those fleeing groups identified as terrorist and reframed in 
political and social representations as (possible) terrorists themselves 
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with a crisis of control over its imagined community (Anderson 1982), requiring the use 
of terrorism as a means to normalise and retain hegemony over the collective (Ditrych 
2013: 232).  
This new context and its resulting ‘new’ dangers illustrate the importance of the normal 
in the sovereign’s relationship with society.  The post-Cold War environment presented 
the world with an extranormal context in which the traditional structure of security 
quickly evaporated (Weldes et al. 1999: 3).  Similarly, terrorism is also represented as the 
‘extranormal’ and as a rule violation (Victoroff 2006: 2).  Why is this?  After all, there 
have been many books written recently which chronicle the historical presence of 
terrorism since the time of the Romans to our contemporary experience (see Laqueur 
2001; Sinclair 2003; Law 2015; Chaliand and Blin 2007.  The reason terrorism is 
considered extranormal and a rule violation is because it reflects emerging instabilities in 
state-society relations.  The state’s discursive hegemony over discourses of danger is 
increasingly challenged from the subordinate as many counternarratives and 
(re)representations emerge, asserting society’s own discursive agency.  Thus, 
contemporary discourses of terrorism represent it as an act and an ethos, which challenges 
the hegemonic discourse of an ideal society as evidenced by representations of normality 
under attack (Aradau and van Munster 2008).  Its ‘newness’, a product of the modern 
political environment, challenges traditional sociopolitical structures.  In this way, the 
extranormal quality of terrorism has a constitutive impact on normality itself (Aradau and 
van Munster 2008: 200).  Its extranormal nature, identified and represented by through 
hegemonic discourse, historicises normality in a previous era where the roles of state, 
society, and threat were deemed more stable.  In a genealogical study of modern 
discourses of terrorism, Ondrej Ditrych (2013; 2014) arrives at the same conclusion, 
illustrating how discourses of terrorism have developed in certain periods and reflect 
dominant contexts and identities at the time.  For Ditrych, terrorism is part of a larger 
dispositif designed to retain political control over the secured, in both material and 
immaterial terms.  As a danger, terrorism presents the secured society with an image of 
evil that is dehumanised, depoliticised, mutually antagonistic, and ultimately deemed 
very dangerous.  Terrorism is therefore not an inevitable danger, but rather “a violent 
reinterpretation” (Ditrych 2014: 50) of old discursive themes encapsulating danger.  
Defined by its extranormal qualities, terrorism is paradoxically nothing ‘new’ but is 
instead a contemporary danger used by the securer to construct the normal.  
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This understanding of terrorism as a discourse highlights the role of knowledge-power 
(Foucault 1980).  The discursive construct of the Hobbesian state informs sociopolitical 
structures in which the state is understood to possess authority over knowledge of danger 
and (in)security (Dillon 1996).  Indeed, the authority the state holds over knowledge of 
danger – in this case, terrorism - is integral to its existence and necessitates suppression 
of other forms of knowledge about that danger (Jackson 2012a: 21).  In this way, the 
state’s knowledge and representation of terror acts as part of its larger discursive 
hegemony over the secured society (Herschinger 2011).  Similarly, the choices of labels 
applied to terrorists effectively dehumanises them and essentializes their identity into a 
binary antagonism to the endangered society.  The idea that ‘you don’t negotiate with 
terrorists’ is used to demonstrate that the hegemonic representation of terrorism is so 
complete that it negates any need for dialogue and discourse with the terrorist (Zulaika 
1995: 220; Jackson 2005: 9).  Moreover, these binaries make it unthinkable for social 
actors to engage with terrorists or recognise their politics (see Zulaika and Douglass 1996; 
Jackson 2012a: 18).  As a result, the hegemon engages in a programme of knowledge 
subjugation and protection over the elite field of danger.  The agency of social decoding 
of the representation is hindered as dominant myths and incomplete understandings about 
the nature and threat of terrorism are maintained (Jackson 2012a: 19).   
The subjugation of alternative knowledges on terrorism, due to the terrorism taboo 
(Zulaika and Douglass 1996), grants hegemonic actors with relative freedom to construct 
‘common’ knowledge of terrorism and attach particular meanings to it.  As a result, 
representations of the immorality and illegitimacy of terrorism are disseminated and 
largely accepted in the social sphere.53  While it is true that certain social groups may 
hold different views of terrorists and their politics, the argument being made here is that 
society as whole accepts (at least tacitly) the immorality and illegitimacy of the terrorist.  
If society held the opposite view, the terrorist would cease to be a terrorist.  One particular 
example, pointed out by Zulaika (1995), is the fact that we, as a society, refrain from 
dialoguing with terrorists, the reason being that such a dialogue would allow us to 
humanise the dehumanised terrorist (Zulaika 1995: 182).  Our distancing and ‘othering’ 
                                                 
53 While the acceptance of the discourse among a society is unquantifiable due to the particularised 
interpretation of the discourse by individuals, the argument being made here is that the subjugation of 
alternative knowledge grants acceptance of the preferred meaning.   
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of the terrorist maintains official discourse and knowledge about this danger, de-
problematizing intersubjective labels such as (im)moral and (un)just.   
This process of excluding and othering is not only confined to the terrorist but is extended 
to identities discursively connected to it.  The bordering function of danger highlighted 
by Campbell (1998: 81) remains at the heart of the terrorist discourse.  The terrorist is 
assumed as part of the ‘ban-opticon dispositif’, in which “a logic of exclusion [rests] upon 
the construction of profiles that frame who is ‘abnormal’” (Bigo and Tsoukala 2008: 2).  
The antithetical nature of the terrorist is used as a vehicle for identifying and securitising 
elements existent within society that contradict the hegemonic discourse.  For instance, 
the image of the immoral and criminal terrorist is used to create ‘suspect communities’ 
(see Breen-Smyth 2014) consisting of individuals that challenge the politics of the state.  
Moreover, one only needs to look to the ‘waves’ of terrorism to observe how these 
communities reflect challenges to the hegemonic (see Rapoport 2012).  These features 
are then politicised through public images and objects that personify hegemonic 
representations of terrorism (see, for example, Hervik 2018).  Objects located in images 
induce associations and meanings (see Hall 1997), therefore the use of objects in official 
representations of terrorism, as well as subsequent (re)representations emerging from the 
media, illustrate the dominance of hegemonic knowledge of terrorism through the 
interpretation and (re)representations of the discourse emerging from social actors.  
Images of religious fundamentalists in distinct clothing is but one example of how objects 
– in this case traditional clothing – are used to associate undesirable identities with danger.  
Furthermore, the use of these objects and their associated meaning in representations of 
individuals/groups voicing unpopular fringe opinions illustrates how counternarratives 
are depoliticised through their link with terrorism.  Given the hyper-visualised basis of 
contemporary society and the predominance of mediascapes (Conway 2012), the 
hegemon’s ability to (de)politicise has become so developed that these representations 
are recognised and adopted “when one sees it” (Der Derian 2005: 24-25), resulting in 
exclusion of marginal groups.     
Terrorism reflects the use of danger to border and impose an identity on society.   Just as 
the authority of the sovereign rests on authoritative knowledge of danger and security, the 
terrorism discourse is an expression of sovereign power as its representation embodies 
the antithesis of the ideal society.  The expert knowledge held by the state is protected 
through the suppression of securitised (i.e. terrorist other) knowledges emerging from the 
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counterhegemonic.  Government agencies and other experts form fields of security, which 
further separates the securer’s official knowledge from society’s unofficial knowledge, 
reducing and delegitimising their interaction with terrorists while reinforcing political 
representations of the phenomenon (Bigo 2008a; Jackson 2005, 2012).  In this way, 
terrorism illustrates the use of representations of danger to control society.  Its presence 
is a manifestation of sovereign power over knowledge of danger.  Terrorist groups 
certainly exist, as both their members and victims would certainly agree;54 however, the 
existence of terrorism and what we really know about terrorism is the product of discourse 
constructed by the securer in order to govern and control the secured.   
 
Historical Representations of Terrorism 
Before deconstructing representations of terrorism, it is important to turn to a brief 
account of how terror(ism)55 has been represented and engaged with over several 
historical periods.  Indeed, many scholars have attempted to provide a historical 
chronology of terrorism in order to justify claims about the teleology of contemporary 
terrorism (see Laqueur 2001; Sinclair 2003; Hanhimäki and Blumenau 2013); however, 
this approach is undoubtedly flawed as it merely consists ‘backward projections’ of a very 
contemporary concept56 (Ditrych 2014: 2).  Indeed, such an approach mistakenly 
essentializes the terrorist into an ahistorical and timeless phenomenon with only minute 
differences existing between the terrorists of the ancient world and contemporary groups 
like al-Qaeda (Mockaitis 2006: 19).  This section, therefore, is not about providing a 
chronological account of how terrorism has developed over the ages, but is instead about 
analysing and highlighting the discursive themes that constitute terrorism, revealing how 
these discourses and representations of terrorism are a form of hegemonic power over 
society.   
                                                 
54 The former would certainly deny being part of a ‘terrorist’ organisation, instead focusing on the 
characteristics of their own self-identity. 
55 The use of parentheses is meant to denote both the political use of terror as well as the contemporary 
danger known as terrorism.  
56 I use the term ‘contemporary’ loosely here to refer to our present knowledge and understanding of 




The ‘origins’ of terror are quite diverse and contested with many pointing to the French 
Revolution, perhaps due to simple word association, as the beginning of what we now 
know as terrorism (Der Derian 2009: 76; Hoffman 2006: 3; Bain 2005). Other scholars 
have gone back further, identifying examples of terrorism as early as the 1st century AD57 
(Hanhimäki and Blumenau 2013: 2; Chaliand and Blin 2007).  The confusion is quite 
understandable because while there are many authoritative definitions of terrorism (the 
US military definition having the largest impact on the global discourse), the distinction 
between terrorism and other forms of political violence remains problematic and highly 
contested (Mockaitis 2006: 2).  Furthermore, if we adopt the perspective that terror is a 
basic class of emotion, as suggested by Victoroff (2006), then humans’ capitalisation on 
this emotion (i.e. terrorism) is nothing more than a means of social interaction and is 
therefore timeless (Victoroff 2006: 2).  Terrorism is a natural and ever-present mode of 
socio-political interaction and while there are differences in historical interpretations of 
it, these differences merely reflect the various power constellations that shape the context 
(Ditrych 2013: 233).  In other words, a historical study of terrorism is a chronicle of 
political zeitgeists, not a narrative of historical determinism.   
The Reign of Terror during the French Revolution illustrates this point as terror was used 
to protect the revolution and educate the citizenry.  Through identifying, publicly trying, 
and subsequently executing ‘enemies of the state’, the National Convention used terror to 
educate the citizenry about who and what was acceptable in the First Republic.  The use 
of public executions on such a massive scale, combined with legally-derived justifications 
(i.e. tribunals), constructed a new socio-political order based on extranormal uses of 
public violence.  The dichotomisation of society into friend/enemy binaries reflected the 
politicised distinction between pre- and post-revolutionary France, with the emphasis 
being placed on individuals within society to identify and bring ‘enemies’ to justice.  
Again, the criteria for being an enemy of the state was quite diverse, however, in a broad 
sense these criteria reflected the National Convention’s vision of a new social order in 
which all were equal, albeit in fear of the sovereign.  In the United Kingdom, this form 
of governance and usage of terror received the suffix ‘-ism’ in the late-18th century as 
writers sought to delegitimise the movement and distinguish it from other legitimate 
                                                 




forms of political violence (Bain 2005: 11).  In other words, “[t]errorism is an illegitimate 
form of political violence because it is democratic (arising from the ‘people’, the ‘mob’, 
‘the dangerous classes’, or ‘criminals’) and revolutionary (a direct challenge to the powers 
that be)” (Bain 2005: 10).  In this era, on both sides of the English Channel, terror(ism) 
epitomised the political order.  In France, it was used to identify ‘others’ and educate the 
citizenry, whereas in the UK it was used to delegitimise democratic forms of political 
violence and reaffirm the authority (and legitimacy) of the established political order.  
The similarity found in both countries was that the terror label was used to legitimise the 
authority of the hegemon and to securitise the counterhegemonic.     
This legitimising/delegitimising feature can also be observed in how terrorism was 
deployed during World War I and World War II.  In these two periods, terrorism was used 
as a signifier of barbarity and dehumanisation of the enemy Other, in this case Germany.  
In World War I, terrorism was framed as a breach of conventional warfare norms and to 
dehumanise Germany (Ditrych 2014: 34).  For instance, the ‘barbarous practices’ of 
German submarines were termed terrorism and used as proof of the Central Powers’ 
inhumanity.  More importantly, however, terrorism was used in this era to symbolise a 
negation of the existing order (Ditrych 2014: 38).  Through unrestricted submarine 
warfare, Germany flouted the conventional rules of war by targeting civilians and not 
rescuing survivors.  In World War II, Nazi policies of terrorism also symbolised a 
negation of the conventions of war as civilians were targeted in bombing raids, towns 
were executed, or forcibly displaced, and entire social groups were sent to extermination 
camps.  By targeting civilians, Nazi Germany embodied the use of terror as a weapon, a 
point highlighted by the Allies in justifying their similar acts towards the German 
population.58  These examples highlight the labelling of ‘new’ forms of violence as a rule-
violation, requiring a universal effort to defeat this unconventional danger.  The 
application of the terrorism label represented Germany as an enemy of the people and 
consequently made any interaction with this enemy, or recognition of this enemy’s 
humanity, impossible.  Furthermore, the use of this label further strengthened the ‘good’ 
and ‘just’ image of the securer within the public sphere and reinforced the politicised 
                                                 
58 An interesting comparison is observable when reviewing the justifications given by Winston Churchill 
and Arthur ‘Bomber’ Harris.   
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values of identity in the Allied countries.  Terrorism was therefore used to dichotomise 
two competing identities and to further strengthen the sovereign’s authority over society.   
This same tactic can be observed in the emergence of non-state terrorism during the Cold 
War.  During the Cold War, both media and government officials in the West referred to 
the heavy-handed tactics of the Soviet Union as terrorism (Ditrych 2014: 33); however, 
the difference between the terrorist discourse during the Cold War compared with other 
periods lies in the use of ideology in the framing of the danger.  The emergence of many 
non-state actors who used extreme forms of political violence (for example the Baader-
Meinhof Gang, Red Brigades, Black October, ETA, and so on) characterised a ‘new’ 
ideologically motivated terrorism, which was represented as leftist and revolutionary.  
Indeed, many of the groups labelled as terrorist, from the IRA to ETA, embodied this 
linkage with the Left through publicising Marxist-Leninist slogans in their literature 
(Laqueur 1999: 32). This linkage was used extensively by security actors in the West to 
dichotomise social groups along political binaries: the civilised liberal vs. the barbaric, 
eastern communist.  The emerging field of terrorism studies in the 1970s and 1980s 
reflected this understanding as scholars promoted the idea that the Soviet Union was 
behind global terrorism (Stampnitzky 2013: 7).59  As Stampnitzky argues, the terrorism 
discourse emerging in the 1970s “is best understood as the creation of interested parties, 
generally identified as Western state elites and experts whose theories reflect the interests 
of these elites” (Stampnitzky 2013: 24).  The ideological framing of the terrorist illustrates 
the political zeitgeist of the period and the power of global security actors to subjugate 
and exclude counterhegemonic discourse from the public sphere. This era, or ‘wave’, of 
terror illustrates the precarity of established political and social structures in that the 
danger was no longer solely identified with an external menacing other, but rather from 
subversive elements within society.  The perils of liberal freedom would inevitably lead 
                                                 
59 Clare Sterling’s (1981) The Terror Network is an excellent example of the discourse at the time.  Despite 
being under-researched and ultimately based on CIA disinformation, Sterling’s book became a best-seller 
and had far reaching consequences for public discourse.  Other notable examples include Cline and 
Alexander’s Terrorism: The Soviet Connection (1984) and Rachel Ehrenfeld’s Narco-Terrorism (1990).  
Lisa Stampnitzky’s Disciplining Terror (2013) provides an excellent summary of the field and the role 
played by the Cold War. 
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to increasingly plural societies in which counter-narratives60 could be easily 
disseminated.   
In the contemporary era, the emergence of ‘networked terror’ has dominated international 
security as well as domestic politics (Ditrych 2013: 231; see Sageman 2004).  The 
somewhat stable spatial order of the Cold War was disrupted by the rise of global 
hegemonic power and the spread of liberal ideology.61  Combined with the emergence of 
globalisation, the post-Cold War order has meant that the world is now connected through 
complex social networks and is characterised by porous sovereign boundaries (see Enders 
and Sandler 1999).  As a result, non-state terrorism has reached new prominence as the 
barbaric ‘Other’ is represented as having the capacity to easily infiltrate the heterogeneous 
and porous society.  Furthermore, the fragility of liberal society, founded in its free and 
diverse character (i.e. the core tenets of liberalism), has necessitated the further use of 
terrorism as a tool of governance due to the absence of traditional interstate antagonisms.  
As a result, the many diverse characteristics of contemporary terrorism - religious 
fundamentalism, excessive violence against civilians, economic destruction, targets 
relating to travel - capture the antithesis of the liberal ethos.  Indeed, this binary distinction 
forms a substantial part of president Ashraf Ghani’s representations of the Taliban and 
the larger terrorist threat, which will be investigated in Chapter IV.   
Despite there being several different eras of terrorism, with some occurrences dating as 
far back as the 1st century AD, there are several consistencies in the discourse.  First, 
terrorism is framed as a criminal act in which violence has been used illegitimately.  One 
of the contemporary definitions of terrorism found in UN Resolution 49/60 (1994) defines 
it as “criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, 
a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes,” which highlights the fact 
that terror is understood as a violation of hegemonic political structures and social 
conventions on violence.  Secondly, terrorism, in whichever era, is loaded with contextual 
elements that shape its representation.  As a discourse, terrorism is rooted in its own 
                                                 
60 Referring to Shapiro’s idea of counter-narratives and counter-histories that challenge the state’s official 
representations of nationhood and social identity (see Shapiro 2004). 
61 An interesting development in the field worth mentioning is the argument that terrorism, the larger 




contextuality and is anchored in the interactions between hegemonic and 
counterhegemonic identities in a given period.   
 
The Political Value of the Terrorist Label  
From this brief, and by no means exhaustive, account of historical representations of 
terrorism we can observe how terrorism is used as a label and reflects the politics and 
assemblages of power in a given period.  First and foremost, terrorism denotes criminality 
and rule-violation; its danger rests in its extranormality.  The concept itself is quite 
straightforward: terrorism is the illegitimate use of violence for political purposes.  
However, the contentious feature, and therefore the subject of this discussion, is the label 
itself.  In using the label, security actors identify and signify an observable danger in a 
way that encapsulates a diverse set of constituent binaries and identities.  These sub-
products provide the linkages necessary for broadening the scope of terrorism and what 
it means to the social audience (Herschinger 2011).  These linkages primarily emerge 
from the discursive authority and are constructed in order to reflect (and interact with) 
contemporary norms and values.  In the section that follows, the terrorist label will be 
critically analysed in an effort to uncover its utility, its composition, and to reveal how 
‘terrorism’ effects social and political structures.  
The defining feature of the label is that it is a social action that utters terrorism into 
existence (Bhatia 2005; Staun 2010; Ditrych 2014).  Drawing on securitisation theory, 
the argument here is that terrorism does not exist prior to being declared by a discursive 
authority (i.e. security actor).  Terrorism has no pre-discursive foundations and therefore 
cannot exist without first being spoken or declared. In other words, without the label to 
give meaning to an act of violence, terrorism remains unknown (Bhatia 2005: 15).  It only 
becomes known when a hegemonic actor understood to hold authoritative knowledge 
over danger identifies an act as terrorism.  The reason for this is found in how individuals 
collectively interpret and understand phenomena.  Our use of language constitutes 
meaning for deeds in a way that is shared and recognised throughout society (Staun 2010: 
407).  Without the means to ascribe an accepted meaning to a particular object or act, the 
act itself remains incomprehensible, or at the very least ambiguous.  This is why there is 
always a clear statement from a political authority after an act of violence stating whether 
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or not the violence is being treated as a terror attack.  Furthermore, if we take security as 
a performance of governance, then it is the sovereign that utters terrorism into existence 
through the pronouncement of this label.  In labelling a violent act as terrorism, the state 
takes part in a performative utterance that raises the violent act to the realm of the 
extranormal (Bhatia 2005: 14; Staun 2010: 410).  The state is at once uttering terrorism 
into existence, while also reinforcing its position as the security provider for society in its 
identification of an existential threat.  Through identifying the danger, the security actor 
disseminates the accepted and inferred associations with terrorism, thus strengthening the 
cohesiveness of the political community while also maintaining its own claims to 
legitimate authority (Bhatia 2005: 15).   
The utility of the label has been the subject of analysis throughout this chapter and by 
now it should be clear that the terrorist label is a product of hegemonic discourse.  
Certainly, the meaning of terrorism has differed greatly over time and strongly reflects 
political zeitgeists; however, its intersubjectivity highlights the fact that it is a discursive 
construction derived from hegemonic discourse.  Furthermore, if we consider that 
terrorism is uttered into existence by a speech actor then it becomes clear that the 
application of the label is an instrumental social action.  Fairclough (1992) recognised the 
constitutive capability in his understanding that discourse is “a practice not just of 
representing the world, but of signifying the world, constituting and constructing the 
world in meaning” (Fairclough 1992: 64).  Our knowledge of terrorism and security is 
founded on the official meanings constructed by hegemonic security actors. On the other 
hand, this perspective runs the risk of oversimplifying society’s interaction with danger.  
The biggest question encountered is why a constructed concept like terrorism is so readily 
accepted by society?  After all, terrorism is one of the few concepts that we, as humans, 
can ‘know’ without having experienced it (Der Derian 2005).62  Does society possess no 
discursive agency?  Is the counterhegemonic effectively silenced by hegemonic 
discourses of terrorism?  Does society not create its own identity as asserted by 
McSweeney (1996)?  The answer lies in how the discourse of terrorism is created and 
disseminated to the social audience and the political and social contexts that influence its 
                                                 
62 This is due to the highly visualised nature of contemporary terrorism and media representations of the 
spectacle.  Moreover, the language used by political actors in representing acts of violence as terrorism 
often frames the violence as an attack on the larger collective rather than a specific institution.   
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interpretation.  Essentially, hegemonic actors have tapped into the constitutive role of 
image and text (visual and linguistic) in its construction of a danger-dominated reality.   
As Dillon (2007: 10) wisely pointed out, “different discourses of danger revolve around 
different referent objects of security,” and as such any deconstruction of the terrorism 
label needs to look at the referent objects being securitised in the discourse. The use of 
metaphor as a grammar of security (see Stern 2006) is one of the most illustrative 
analytical tools in this endeavour because it connects the scarcely unknown concept of 
terrorism to an assemblage of additional objects a security discourse is attempting to 
securitise.63  “Metaphor introduces to political discourse the paradoxical combination of 
clarity and ambiguity necessary to present a biased and ideological representation of the 
world as impartial and objective” (Bhatia 2009: 280).  It enables a security actor to take 
a danger, identify it, and make it collectively known to the social audience through 
linkages with recognised objects.  Certainly, the friend/enemy, self/other dichotomy is 
important in interactions with danger, itself the essence of the Schmittian political 
(Schmitt 1995: 26); however, in contrast to Schmitt, these distinctions are anchored in 
symbols and metaphors necessary for their collective recognition in the social audience.   
These linkages are established as metaphorical understandings and framings attain 
relevance through the empirical experiences of the receiver.  Linguistic metaphor, 
through linking an abstract concept like terrorism to something more familiar and 
experienced, like war or criminality, encourages the audience to reconceptualise the 
unfamiliar concept and adopt a new understanding (Bhatia 2009: 280).  Moreover, this 
new understanding is designed to reflect the sender’s preferred meaning and demonstrates 
the steps taken by discursive actors to influence the interpretation of the receiver (Hall 
1997).  Whether these linkages exist or not, the use of metaphor presents a new meaning 
onto the represented and projects a known association onto the previously unknown, 
creating a new reality and constituting a new object (Hülsse and Spencer 2008:578).  
Two of the most prominent metaphors used in the terrorist label are the crime metaphor 
and the war metaphor.  While the terrorist-criminal linkage has existed in the discourse 
for over a century (Ditrych 2014: 43), this linkage re-emerged in western political and 
media representations following the Madrid (2004) train bombings (Hülsse and Spencer 
                                                 
63 This also opens up the Other to a diverse set of linkages that pluralises its identity, rather than an 
essentialized Self-Other dichotomy (see Hansen 2006). 
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2008: 583).  This example can be read in two ways: first, the terrorist is committing a 
crime via rule-violation in their illegitimate use of violence; and secondly, that the 
terrorist is nothing more than a criminal existing within the domestic sphere and is 
therefore a social problem that must be rooted out through vigilance and collective efforts, 
thus constituting a bordered collective identity.  Moreover, the criminal metaphor has an 
additional effect, which is to invoke a sense of the enemy within, contributing to the extra-
ordinary character of the danger and legitimising exceptional security practices.  
Underlying this metaphorical association is the shared understanding of the criminal 
throughout society (Bhatia 2009: 283).  It is a label replete with stereotypes and inferred 
meaning, making the danger known even if it has not been directly experienced by the 
receiver.   
Similarly, the war-metaphor, epitomised by the ‘War on Terror’ and the ‘War on Drugs’, 
used in framing both terrorism and narcotics illustrates the representation of this danger 
as exceptional (Stone 2002: 154; Herschinger 2011; Crick 2012).  In both instances, the 
war-metaphor creates a sense of emergency in which the state is seen as the legitimate 
actor (i.e. protector).  With terrorism, the war-metaphor invokes a traditional approach to 
this danger and invokes a sense of loyalty to the state, consequently stabilising the mass 
of heterogeneous interests within society (Neocleous 2008: 135).  In the case of narcotics, 
this metaphor frames the danger as state-based danger rather than a social issue (Crick 
2012: 411; Herschinger 2011).  Despite widespread experience and knowledge of 
narcotics within society, the war-metaphor reimagines the concept into a more 
recognisable national security issue.   
Another prominent tactic used in representing danger is to deploy metaphors linking 
terrorism to health (Ditrych 2013: 231; Stampnitzky 2013: 77).  This metaphor is 
particularly interesting because it frames terrorism as a danger faced by the collective 
body (i.e. society), cultivating a sense of social belonging.  However, the notion of disease 
also highlights the danger’s exceptionality and its potential to cause great harm.  Former 
CIA Director John Deutch writes, “terrorism, like the plague in the Middle Ages, 
frightens both leaders and citizens.  It is a disease that is spreading; its cure is unknown” 
(Deutch 1997: 10).  This quote illustrates the discursive connection between the western 
historical experience of the Black Death in which both hegemonic and subordinate were 
victims, while also revealing the limits of hegemonic knowledge of the danger.  This 
broadens the threat of the danger to all of society through reference to historical 
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epidemics.  Framing terrorism in this way also constructs the notion that terrorism is a 
disease which must be eradicated from the social body.  Given the importance of silencing 
counterhegemonic discourse in maintaining social and political power structures this 
metaphor is an important method for excluding the terrorist’s voice from the public 
sphere.  Notwithstanding the inference that diseases are incapable of communication, this 
metaphor reduces the terrorist to something mutually exclusive of society: a dehumanised 
entity that must be eradicated if society is to ‘live’.   
Critical investigation of the use of metaphors has been employed in Critical Terrorism 
Studies in recent years (see Hülsse and Spencer 2008; Bhatia 2009; Bartolucci and Gallo 
2013; Ditrych 2014), however, these perspectives are limited in their exclusive focus on 
linguistic uses of metaphor, and neglect the use of visual metaphor in representations of 
terrorism.  James Der Derian wrote that “…terrorism, terrorists and terror itself have 
become the political pornography of modernity,” and because of the lack of an established 
universal understanding of terrorism (due to the subjectivity of metaphorical 
representations), “terrorism is only truly ‘known’ when one sees it” (Der Derian 2005: 
25).  As new standards of authenticity are applied in the public sphere, visual 
representations become more prominent.  The reason for this lies in our contemporary 
context.  If we consider that discourse is firmly rooted in context (Bartolucci and Gallo 
2013: 19), then the current emphasis placed on visual culture necessitates a highly-
visualised discourse of terrorism.  Furthermore, the characteristic distrust between liberal 
societies and political authorities contributes to an emphasis on objective representations 
as society is compelled to observe an ‘unbiased’ representation of it: “What the word can 
only represent, the picture supposedly proves” (Der Derian 2005: 34).  The prioritisation 
of authenticity over representation (Der Derian 2005: 33; see Barthes 1977) characterises 
a shift in how society engages with discourse, from the linguistic to the visual.   
Visual (re)representations of terrorism illustrate the acceptance or rejection of the official 
discourse as these forms are largely produced by actors within the social audience.  
Representations of terrorism emanating for security actors utilise visual imagery, 
however this usually adopts a complementary role, supporting linguistic representations 
(speech acts, interviews, statements, etc.).  Visual representations are found more in social 
re-representations of the discourse. The plurality of identities and categories within a 
society hinders the development of a singular voice necessary for linguistic methods.  The 
intersubjectivity of social representations and interpretations is well-established; 
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therefore, the emphasis is placed on using images that denote a sense of objectivity.  
However, the question arises as to whether or not the discursive tactics used in the official 
discourse are transferrable to visual (re)representations found in society.  Can metaphors 
be deployed in visual representations?  Are images able to capture the essence of a social 
disease?  And most importantly, do social actors consciously reproduce the official 
discourse?  Certainly, the key characteristic of the image (specifically the photograph) is 
that it captures a seemingly unadulterated image of the past.  However, the objectivity of 
the image is only a half-truth as there is an agency on the part of the image-taker (choosing 
what to photograph, choosing the angle, choosing the subjects, and so on) as well as on 
the part of the observer (Barthes 1977: 29).  For instance, news media, consisting of 
commercial news agencies, investigative journalism programmes, documentary films, 
photography, and so on, selects and scrutinises a large body of ‘raw’ images in 
constructing an account of a particular event, group, or concept (Frosh & Wolfsfeld 2007: 
110).  Certainly, a great deal of time and effort is involved in determining the ‘most 
accurate’ representation of a particular event, group, or concept; however, the categories 
and characteristics employed are encoded with collective understandings and values that 
shape the editor’s interpretation of the event.  As Frosh and Wolfsfeld (2007) point out, 
“news broadcasts are perhaps the most central to the production of national social 
imaginaries, to the collage of images we have of the social totality and our relationship 
with it…the news broadcast purportedly reports those events that are of key interests to 
the society as a society” (109).  As a violent spectacle, terrorism becomes a key interest 
to the society as a society as it plays upon a portfolio of politicised binary distinctions 
found in discourses of insecurity (Frosh and Wolfsfeld 2007: 109).  The linguistic 
metaphors used to give meaning to the terrorist label are experienced through the selected 
imagery of news media, reifying rather than challenging official representations and 
knowledge.  
Similarly, the content of media representations of terrorism largely reflects the official 
discourse.  One example of this is through victim placement, referring to how victims are 
represented in media accounts of terrorist acts (Frosh & Wolfsfeld 2007: 113). In a 
reportage, the victim is positioned to capture the essence of the terrorist act and what it 
means for society.  Social representors are confined to codes intelligible to the audience 
and reflective of their identity, therefore the qualities of the victim highlighted in a report 
are selected to personify the hegemonic discourse identity.  Certainly, in some instances 
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victims are selected by terrorist groups for political purposes (Weissman et al. 2014: 261; 
see also Crellinsten 2002; Richardson 2006; Chowdhury and Krebs 2010); however, the 
practicalities of suicide bombing and largescale attacks negates the possibility of the 
terrorist holding knowledge about the victim(s) beforehand.  The real interpretation and 
representation of the violence emanates from the media’s reconstruction of the event, 
which requires visually compelling, dramatic, and relevant imagery (Seib and Janbek 
2011: 7).  The use of victim placement in the media serves as a metaphor designed to 
enhance the social audience’s understanding of the event and the intelligibility of 
terrorism, attaching the violent act to a series of stable referent objects of the collective 
identity.                    
The use of the terrorist label is not confined to social or security actors; rather, terrorists 
themselves also deploy this label in their discursive communications.  Terrorists 
resoundingly reject the application of the terrorist label onto them and readily turn the 
label around and apply it to the societies and governments they attack (Hoffman 2006: 
23).  A consistent official framing of the terrorist as the enemy of humanity, hostis humani 
generis, influences the rejection of the label as its capacity to depoliticise and dehumanise 
is widely recognised.  This is an important point to consider because the terrorist is unable 
to use the same modes of representation as political and social actors (i.e. those included 
within legitimate society).  Their counterhegemonic status as danger and existence 
outside the politico-social community silences them and delegitimises their counter-
hegemonic discourse (Zulaika and Douglass 1996: 182).  Political and social 
representations of the terrorist render this identity incompatible with modern society 
because of its historicised barbarism; it is seen as something that has no legitimate place, 
or voice, in contemporary society (Ditrych 2014: 226).  Thus, our image of the terrorist, 
both emerging from hegemonic security actors and (re)represented within the public 
sphere paints a one-sided picture, reducing the voice of the terrorist to acts of violence.  
The implicit label of ‘Other’ attached to the terrorist prevents it from being accepted by 
the bordered society (Barrinha 2011), forcing the terrorist to operate from a realm outside 
of legitimate (i.e. normal) discourse.  As a result, terrorist organisations speak through 
violence coded with metaphorical meanings (Chowdhury and Krebs 2010: 126).  The 
choice of targets, much like the journalist selecting images, is a means of self-
representation.  Essentially, the terrorist targets everything that it considers dangerous to 
its counterhegemonic discourse and its vision for society.  
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An interesting product of this communication tactic is the (re)representation of the 
violence by terrorists after the event.  The terrorist re-interprets its own violence and 
attempts to justify such acts to the social audience.  In the case of the Taliban, the terrorist 
label is deployed in communications to society in order to delegitimise the role of the 
government (see, for example, Al Emarah 2016c, 2017d).  While it is unlikely that a 
society will suddenly adopt this counter-representation, the salient point remains that the 
label is engaged with by terrorists themselves as actors realise the implications of the 
label and its recognition in the social audience.  Essentially, the terrorist discourse is not 
only the property of hegemonic actors but is also engaged with by terrorists themselves, 
thus revealing the political value of the label and the larger discourse. 
Terrorism, therefore, is not a static, objective concept; rather, terrorism is a discourse that 
is constituted and deployed by hegemonic actors in constructing a bordered, endangered 
society.  The concept was initially constructed by political actors and deployed to 
maintain moral distinctions between the legitimate Self and the illegitimate Other (Tuman 
2003: 69).  This distinction has largely remained, however the references and assemblages 
between terrorism and other concepts have differed greatly over time, exposing the use 
of this danger in maintaining hegemonic structures of power and identity.    
 
Narcotics and Other Societal Plagues 
Unlike terrorism, narcotics has no representational agency of its own.  As a controlled 
substance, the ability of a narcotic to represent itself is severely limited and at first glance, 
it may seem like its objectivity problematizes the assertion that danger is a representation.  
After all, how does one kilogram of heroin ‘speak’ to society?  However, narcotics reveal 
a different side to representations of danger, illustrated in the use of these substances to 
securitise counterhegemonic narratives of identity in society.  The silence of narcotics64 
leaves it open to signification and a wealth of different assemblages with other known 
dangers.  Through an investigation of these assemblages, we can observe the use of 
danger to maintain hegemony over social identity.  Rather than signifying a purely 
external threat, the narcotics danger has been framed in terms of culture and the need to 
                                                 
64 Please note that while I am using the plural form, narcotics, it is meant to denote the collectivised concept 
of narcotics, and thus should be understood as singular.   
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purify the deviant society.  At the root of this danger is the potential of the 
counterhegemonic to challenge and disrupt the discursively constituted hegemonic 
identity; thus, narcotics illustrates the process by which hegemonic actors exclude and 
securitise alternative identities within the social sphere.   
Before investigating the discourse, we must first address the constitution of narcotics.  
The primary question surrounding this concept is when does something become a narcotic 
drug?  The word narcotics is derived from the Greek word narkos, which loosely 
translates as ‘to make numb’.  Certainly, narcotics have this effect, but it is in framing the 
consequences of this effect that the label attains its significance.  There is a duality in 
narcotics use.  On the one hand, drugs have been used extensively for medicinal purposes 
and have revolutionised public health.  On the other hand, these substances are 
represented as having the ability to produce addiction.  Herschinger writes, “drugs are a 
deeply ambivalent matter…they destroy and cure” (Herschinger 2015: 183).  It is this 
duality that requires hegemonic actors to securitise narcotics as subordinate actors (i.e. 
non-experts) are not trusted to recognise the distinction between medicinal use and 
addiction.  Thus, to be a narcotic is to be controlled and kept away from the autonomous 
choices of the secured social actors.  While prohibition regimes have ultimately been 
unsuccessful in this regard, the various discourses deployed by political actors reveals the 
larger process of representing danger and exposes the motivations behind securitising 
narcotics. 
At the root of the narcotics danger is the autonomous society.  In an earlier discussion on 
discourses of (in)security and the politics of fear, we observed how terrorism has been 
used to maintain the security dispositif, legitimising the role of the sovereign as protector 
(see Ditrych 2013).  The various metaphors, labels, and references attached to the terrorist 
constitutes an endangered Self, reflecting the works of Campbell (1998) and Jackson 
(2005).  However, with narcotics, the objective is slightly different with the representation 
being focused inward.  Narcotics use reflects the freedom of choice within the secured 
society.  Rather than epitomising a threat from ‘outside’ the social order, the threat with 
narcotics is that social actors will actively make choices that challenge or problematize 
the hegemonic identity.  Engagement with narcotics signifies a rejection of the hegemonic 
discourse of danger and the representation of narcotics as harmful, signalling a challenge 
to the entire security narrative.   
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Therefore, narcotics are represented in such a way that members of the public encounter 
the danger on a daily basis and witness its exclusion firsthand.  In contrast to 
representations of terrorism, narcotics are viewed primarily as a social problem65 with the 
antagonistic Other operating within the secured society.  A return to Bigo’s ‘ban-opticon’ 
is useful here for it illustrates the use of danger in securitising the ‘abnormal’ (Bigo and 
Tsoukala 2008: 2).  Within a given society or culture there is a characterisation of the 
ideal subject, whether that be represented through national narratives, collective 
memorialisation, or cultural productions (see Shapiro 2004).  Through representing 
narcotics as danger, drug users and sellers are placed on the fringes of society as their 
identities are treated as subversive and abnormal.  The state’s performance of power, 
exemplified by arrests, seizures, and incarceration, form the day-to-day practice of 
excluding these undesired categories from legitimate society, restricting the freedom of 
choice of the secured subject.  Mass media and government institutions engage in a 
“routinization of caricature – rhetorically recrafting worst cases into typical cases and the 
episodic into the epidemic” (Reinarman 1994: 159).  Rhetorical questions such as ‘Is it 
worth it?’ are juxtaposed with images of narcotic substances or victims of drug abuse to 
construct a narrative around drug use that problematizes the freedom of choice of the 
subject and connects the ‘wrong choice’ to the excluded Other.   
The practices of exclusion and securitisation of choice point to the threat posed by alterity.  
Claudia Aradau wrote, “drugs become materialized primarily through their capacity to 
disrupt the smooth functioning of members of society and society in general” (Aradau 
2010: 506).  While widespread drug addiction would certainly disrupt contemporary 
social order, ‘smooth functioning’ could be reconceived as adherence to the secured 
identity.  Cultural governance is instructive here as it illustrates the various processes 
through which a state controls social identity (Shapiro 2004).  Objects, concepts, and 
values are identified and deployed as a tool of governance, homogenising the 
heterogeneous society into a politicised collective.  Certainly, there are many cultural 
elements that are developed by social actors, however, in determining what attains 
widespread relevance (i.e. mainstream culture) and what does not (i.e. counterculture), 
                                                 
65 Narcotics are treated as a social problem to varying degrees.  While society-based approaches treat it as 
a problem to be solved by members of the public, this does not exclude state-based approaches that have 
treated narcotics as a militarised threat (e.g. the War on Drugs).  There is an interesting duality in which 
addiction is viewed as a social problem, while the act of selling and trafficking narcotics is treated as a 
security threat.   
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the state holds authority because it is through the state that these referent objects transcend 
the local to the national.  In doing so, social actors attain a sense of belonging and 
organisation along the lines of the values coded within these referent objects (Shapiro 
2004: 46).  A master narrative is created in which subjects become loyal to the image of 
the virtuous citizen; however, in doing so, alternative categories are subjugated and 
represented as subversive.   
This is most observable in the framing of immigrants, particularly Chinese and Mexicans, 
in American representations of the narcotics danger.  The alternativeness of new arrivals 
in terms of culture and appearance raised suspicion of their intentions in the US and, most 
importantly, their loyalty to the American identity.  The ‘Mongolian vice’ of Chinese 
opium users became one of the dominant characterisations of recent Chinese immigrants 
at the turn of the 20th century (Reinarman 1994: 157; Musto 1987).  ‘Killer Weed’ was 
another theme used to vilify Mexican-American males as violent and aggressive due to 
their supposed marijuana use (Campbell 1998: 205; Reinarman 1994: 157).  The 
conclusion that can be drawn here is that, while cultural governance is deployed to foster 
a sense of belonging and uniformity, this also casts suspicion on alternative social 
categories and allows easier justification of manufactured associations.  Craig Reinarman 
sums it up best, stating, “drug scares are never about drugs per se, because drugs are 
inanimate objects without social consequence until they are ingested by humans.  Rather, 
drug scares are about the use of a drug by particular groups of people who are, typically, 
already perceived by powerful groups as some kind of threat” (Reinarman 1994: 161, 
emphasis in the original).  Therefore, narcotics are deployed to demonstrate the inherent 
danger alternative categories pose to the secured society and the constructed narratives 
that hold it together. The externalisation of drug users is a very important point because 
it follows the same process of excluding individuals and groups associated with terrorism.  
In defining the society through discourse, one of which being cultural governance, the 
state deploys discourses of danger to assume authority over who can reside within its 
ideal society and who cannot. 
Another key feature of narcotics is the use of morality in framing it as danger, drawing a 
parallel with representations of the immoral terrorist.  This association is based primarily 
on the role of the sovereign as the moral guide to the nation.  If we consider morality to 
be a reflection on the Self, the diversity of a modern society precludes the development 
of a universal morality.  However, moral pluralism also challenges the acceptance of 
120 
 
social institutions, and consequently loyalty to the state (Rawls 1971).  Thus, the 
cultivation of a common morality in any society is a chief requirement to maintaining 
social and political structures.  This is why politicians in democracies are largely regarded 
as ‘moral entrepreneurs’ who use discourse to create common understandings which 
serve their interests (Fisk 1993: 600).  Reflective of their role as moral entrepreneurs, 
politicians have consistently framed the narcotics danger in moral terms.   
The moral dimension of narcotics has existed for over a century.  Emily Crick (2012) 
chronicled how, throughout the 20th century, drugs became infused with politicised moral 
values.  For instance, at the turn of the 20th century drugs became an existential threat due 
to the damage done to individuals and vulnerable groups; however, in highlighting this 
existential threat, the state (in this case the US) began to portray drug users as outsiders 
which threatened to undermine the moral fabric of society (Crick 2012: 408; Musto 1987; 
Grayson 2008).  The danger of narcotics then shifted from the immorality of recent 
immigrants to the danger immorality posed to the ideal type (i.e. the virtuous citizen).  
The changing approach to narcotics in the 1960s (i.e. the War on Drugs) is revealing as 
drug use dramatically increased among the white middle-class population.  Widespread 
drug use among returning Vietnam veterans and disillusioned middle-class youth 
challenged the dominance of politicised values as these groups became emblematic of 
social change (Reinarman 1994: 159; Crick 2012: 411; Kuzmarov 2009; Weimer 2003).  
The militarisation of the narcotics threat under the Nixon administration reflects the 
politics of the era and the belief that narcotics were corrupting the ideal type.  Thus, 
immorality became securitised in an effort to draw a boundary around the virtuous 
community (Morone 1997: 998; see Herschinger 2011).  By criminalising the use of 
narcotics and ostracising drug users, the state asserts its dominance over national morality 
and further coheres the secured to its vision.   
 
Constructing Narcotics as Danger 
Similar to representations of terrorism, the discourse surrounding narcotics adopts several 
key themes.  Binary distinctions between good and evil are integrated within 
representations of individuals and groups affiliated with the drug trade.  These 
representations are also heavily laden with metaphors, often framing the danger in terms 
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of health and biology (Campbell 1998: 75).  Similarly, health officials, government 
actors, and other knowledge-holders are used extensively to justify hegemonic 
representations of narcotics as danger.  The use of these social actors renders official 
knowledge of the danger as unquestionable, subjugating alternatives in the process.  A 
brief investigation of the various discursive themes and strategies used in representing 
narcotics as danger is useful here for it illustrates the ways in which the discourse 
functions and the agency of hegemonic actors in constructing it.  
The use of totalising language is an important aspect of narcotics.  While individuals use 
drugs for a variety of reasons, representations reduce narcotics to an essentialized ‘good’, 
in terms of medicinal use, or ‘evil’, in terms of illicit use.  Today, drug use is seen as 
deviant behaviour, but this is only a recent development (Herschinger 2015: 187).  This 
development can be traced back to the early-20th century when the danger of narcotics 
was largely framed in religious terms.  The deployment of religious terminology reflected 
the politicisation of morality, evidenced by the Temperance movement and other moral 
crusades (Crick 2012: 411).  Interestingly, the deployment of the good/evil binary 
expanded the scope of this danger and constructed the narrative that narcotics were a 
threat to ‘mankind’ (Crick 2012: 411; Herschinger 2011).  International efforts to 
securitise and generalise narcotics exemplified this use of language.  In the 1961 Single 
Convention on Narcotic Drugs, for instance, “drugs materialize as a ‘social evil’ or are 
considered as ‘the common enemy’” (Herschinger 2015: 190).  The use of this language 
universalises the threat of drugs and establishes a clear Self/Other boundary.  The use of 
the word ‘evil’ also legitimises state-based, or even international, practices to secure the 
moral non-using subject against the deviant Other (Herschinger 2015: 190).  As a result, 
this binary is maintained within society as drug users are generalised into a dangerous 
class and are subsequently excluded.   The ‘evilification’ (Lazar and Lazar 2004) of 
narcotics is further supported through the deployment of the disease metaphor.  
Uncoincidentally, narcotics became associated with disease and illness throughout the 
20th century in an attempt to expose the difference between licit and illicit narcotics use.  
The antithesis of a disease to the Self essentialises the complexity and ambiguity of 
narcotics into a singular threat to public health.  By framing narcotics as a disease, 
discursive authorities render the concept more understandable to the social audience, 
playing upon common experience with health and illness (Herschinger 2012: 81). 
Similarly, this metaphor generalises the secured society into a uniform body politic.  The 
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notion of a narcotic disease harming the ‘body’ of the nation was a common theme used 
in American representations of drugs (see Musto 1987; Weimer 2003).  However, the 
disease metaphor also leaves room for interpretation.  Herschinger (2012) argues that this 
was an intended consequence of the discourse in which political actors sought to establish 
an antagonistic frontier so that various sub-issues could be linked to the larger narcotics 
disease (Herschinger 2012: 81-82).  This signifies a chain of equivalence in political 
representations of danger, the openness of the disease metaphor allowed undesirable 
social identities and categories to be attached to the larger narcotics threat (Herschinger 
2011).  For instance, addicts symbolise a disease of will (i.e. individual/social weakness), 
traffickers and criminal symbolise a disease of the mind (i.e. subjects who do not associate 
with the mainstream vision of the social actor), thus homogenising a diverse set of 
securitised traits and values (Hershinger 2012: 81).     
The prevalence, and to some extent success, of the disease metaphor had several 
implications.  Primarily, the logic of equivalence opened the metaphorical danger to an 
expansive body of associations and characteristics.  Take, for instance, the disease of the 
mind associated with narcotics trafficking and production – in other words, the ‘criminal’ 
elements.  The notion of a diseased mind stems from a rejection of politicised values 
within society (i.e. rule-violations, criminal activity, anti-social behaviour).  Immorality, 
or a rejection of communitarian morality, is portrayed as a sickness. Such a broad and 
intersubjective label undoubtedly covers a potentially infinite number of identities as 
what is deemed criminal or diseased thought reflects the counterhegemonic vision of 
society.  The point being made here is that an individual’s association with narcotics 
serves as a gateway to a range of various other ‘social diseases’ identified by the 
discourse.   
Narcotics, like terror(ism), is represented as an external phenomenon.  True, narcotics 
users/traffickers/producers are located in practically every society; however, the danger 
posed by narcotics is consistently framed as emerging from outside and infecting the pure 
(ideal) society.  The genesis of narcotics lays in the immorality of outsiders who infect 
the ideal citizen and lead to their exclusion (Weimer 2003: 265).  The representation of 
narcotics as emblematic of social disease(s) highlights a set of undesirable qualities and 
serves to cohere individuals within society to adopt the hegemonic identity (e.g. the 
upstanding citizen).   The association, specifically in the West, with narcotics being an 
eastern disease is particularly illustrative in demonstrating how narcotics are used to 
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demonstrate the state’s sovereignty over society (see Kuzmarov 2009).  This 
dichotomising language, employed particularly in the West, is a form of cultural 
governance because it refers to a politicised morality found in representations of national 
culture.   
Militarisation is another discursive tactic used in representing narcotics.  This aspect is 
more pertinent to the emergence of narcoterrorism, but the initial militarisation of 
narcotics under the Nixon administration and the escalation of the War on Drugs under 
the Reagan administration has had a profound effect on how drugs are approached in 
politics and society.  Something seemingly personal and innocent like an alternative 
lifestyle was rebranded as a threat to the American ‘way of life’ (Der Derian 2009a: 81), 
requiring an observable performance of power by the state.  But the shift to militarised 
language and the application of the ‘war-metaphor’ (see Herschinger 2011; Crick 2012), 
reflects the need for the state to take over official representations of the narcotics threat.  
The popularisation of counterculture (i.e. social categories known for engaging in 
narcotics use) illustrates encounters between hegemonic and counterhegemonic discourse 
in society.  Western governments were witnessing a re-representation of identity that 
challenged traditional narratives.  In tandem with the militarisation of narcotics, a range 
of medical professionals and other experts promoted scientific studies on narcotics, most 
of which confirming the hegemonic discourse.  Reinarman writes, “these groups have 
included industrialists, churches, the American Medical Association, the American 
Pharmaceutical Association, various law enforcement agencies, scientists, and most 
recently the treatment industry and groups of those former addicts converted to disease 
ideology” (Reinarman 1994: 160).  However, many of these studies later turned out to be 
misleading and funded primarily by government agencies (Reinarman 1994: 158).  What 
we can infer from this discussion is that political representations of narcotics were coming 
under increasing threat, undermining the authority of the larger security narrative in the 
process.  The deployment of ‘experts’ and militarised language created a new knowledge 
boundary from which various security experts could re-exert their exceptional knowledge 
of the danger.  By locating ‘solutions’ to the problem of drugs within the purview of the 
state, the hegemonic discourse subjugated a wealth of new knowledges emerging from 
social actors.       
The emergence and subsequent representations of narcotics as danger illustrates the use 
of danger to create and control the endangered society.  Counterhegemonic discourse and 
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alternative knowledge challenge the hegemonic narrative and opens the possibility of 
restricting social and political relations.  As Chandler argues, “the problem of insecurity 
is understood to be one of problematic ‘choices’ made by autonomous subjects” 
(Chandler 2010: 98).  As a substance, a narcotic has no representational agency of its 
own, but rather becomes represented by discursive actors.  An individual’s engagement 
with narcotic substances reflects their sense of Self and understanding of danger.  In terms 
of sovereign control over society, this presents a challenge to the securer’s ability to 
control the identity of its subject(s).  Moreover, the allure of narcotics undermines the 
securer’s control over the loyalties and lifeworld of the secured.  Herschinger sums up 
this point nicely, stating “at a more general level, it is the human body that materializes 
here – or, to be precise, at minimum two ‘types’ of bodies: the addicted body and the 
healthy body, the using body and the non-using body” (Herschinger 2015: 193).  Levine 
(1992) points to the ‘loss of control’ as the real threat behind drug scares (Reinarman 
1994: 163).  The bodies and lives of the secured society are the real focus of the discourse.  
Narcotics do not imperil the whole of society, but rather they symbolise the precarious 
hold the hegemon has over the secured society.   
 
 
Conflation and the Emergence of Narcoterror  
The late-1960s witnessed many monumental changes in the political and social history of 
the world.  Protests in the United States, France, and in Eastern Europe signalled a 
challenge to the established political order and left a mark on how society interacts with 
political authority.  In the West, the late-1960s represented a jump towards late-, or post-
, modernity most noticeable through art, music, architecture, literature, and importantly, 
narcotics use (Boothroyd 2006).  The traditional, politicised values enshrined in national 
narratives were being renegotiated within the public sphere and (re)represented back to 
the securer.  Essentially, through the late-1960s and 1970s society witnessed the 
mainstreaming of counterculture, infused with expressions of the social identity 
autonomous of the government (read national) narrative.  It was a break from the 
domination of political narratives of social identity (nationalism) towards a more 
‘grassroots’ sense of being: popular culture (see Storey 2006; Grayson et al. 2009).  This 
change of social context had an effect on political representations of danger.  The new 
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social identities brought on by social changes encountered political representations with 
varying degrees of acceptance (Boothroyd 2006).  Indeed, the plurality of society as a 
discursive space challenged the hegemony of the state; thus, governments needed to refine 
discursive strategies if they were to retain sovereignty over knowledge of danger. 
The most notable shift was the in the language used in representing danger, the best 
example found in global approaches to narcotics.  The totalising narratives and metaphors 
used in previous eras became more problematic in the changing social context.  In western 
societies, moves toward secularism challenged the use of religious language in framing 
the narcotics danger (Crick 2012: 411).  The supposed immorality of drugs became 
problematized by drastic increases in recreational drug use.  As a result, binary 
distinctions such as good vs. evil no longer found the same degree of acceptance in 
western societies as drug culture became synonymous with rebellion (Boothroyd 2006). 
The important point to note here is that while these narratives were still being used by 
governments (Herschinger 2011), the significance was that mainstream society accepted 
the presence of counterculture, thus renegotiating social identity as a whole.  Drug addicts 
and other ‘internal-others’ could no longer be excluded from society, requiring the 
western governments to adapt their discursive strategies.  This resulted in the emergence 
of the ‘war-metaphor’ to represent social dangers like narcotics (Crick 2012: 411; 
Herschinger 2011).  The significance of this shift lies in how the government, in particular 
the United States government, framed the narcotics danger in militarised terms (Weimer 
2003; Kuzmarov 2009).  Whereas narcotics had been previously framed as a social issue 
requiring society to band together to root out deviant behaviour (Reinarman 1994), it was 
now framed as a danger that the state needed to confront and defeat through conventional 
means.  In a link to the discussion in the previous section, the emergence of the war-
metaphor strengthened the notion that society could not be trusted. 
The ‘war-metaphor’ and the militarisation of the narcotics threat had many profound 
implications for later representations of danger.  The very language used to represent 
narcotics – the ‘War on Drugs’, in particular – meant that the danger was now 
characterised as an external, militarised entity bent on the destruction of society.  This 
shift also coincided with a similar development in how terrorism was represented and 
characterised.  As a discourse, terrorism captures the particular zeitgeist of a period.  
Similar to most dangers, it encapsulates and reflects the Self/Other dichotomy of a 
particular context.  From the late-1970s to the end of the Cold War, terrorism was framed 
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as part of an ideological threat and as a continuation of the East/West conflict (Sterling 
1981; Stampnitzky 2013).  The presence of ‘leftist’ terrorism in the West was framed as 
part of the covert war with the USSR, resulting in new approaches to terrorism and 
narcotics, which used language symbolic of military conflict.   
The militarisation of both narcotics during the period and the frequent association of 
terrorists with criminals eventually led to the convergence of these two discourses; thus, 
narcoterrorism was ‘born’ in the latter years of the Cold War.  The danger itself was first 
alluded to in the 1970s in US and western European policy circles, albeit with many 
dissenting views amongst experts, but was largely kept outside of public discourse 
(Laqueur 1999: 211). What narcoterror needed to be truly ‘born’ was a speech act, which 
would take these two known dangers and materialise a new one previously unknown to 
the political order and the constituent society.  This act first occurred in 1983 when 
Peruvian President Belaunde Terry used the term ‘narcoterrorism’ to describe attacks on 
drug enforcement agencies in the Upper Hualaga Valley (Davids 2002; Hartleius 2008; 
Der Derian 2009a).  Interestingly, there is some debate regarding the usage of this term 
as either denoting something ‘new’ and dangerous, or if it was used merely to combine 
two separate policing strategies into one (Davids 2002: 22);66 however, the significance 
of this point is the convergence of these two dangers and how their novelty requires 
political violence to secure society. 
The United States similarly adopted this danger in its representation of the leftist threat 
in Central and South America.  In the early 1980s, Cuba was identified as the symbol of 
this new danger due to its trafficking of arms and narcotics to well-known guerilla 
movements, such as M-19 in Colombia (see Ehrenfeld 1990).  The threat of a worldwide 
communist revolution became infused with the militarised narcotics danger in the 1980s 
as policymakers (mostly in the US), mainstream media, and academics linked the social 
plague of narcotics with the militarised threat of leftist-guerilla (i.e. terrorist) movements 
in Latin America (Der Derian 2009a: 66).  From a practical perspective, this was an 
accurate depiction of the situation in many leftist guerilla movements in the 1980s and 
1990s (see Ehrenfeld 1990; Davids 2002), although it has also been shown (with 
hindsight) that these associations were frequently overstated (Miller and Damask 1996: 
                                                 




115-121).  However, the salient point to make here, about the emergence of 
narcoterrorism, is how the discourse was applied to leftist groups as a means of 
delegitimization and depoliticization.  Furthermore, in the American context, 
(narco)terror was used as part of a wider strategy of vilifying the USSR (Stampnitzky 
2013: 109; Miller and Damask 1996: 117).  While drug usage was becoming more 
tolerable in the West at the time, the application of narcotics to the larger Soviet threat 
had several important implications.  Primarily, narcotics depoliticised movements on the 
Left through purported links to criminal organisations and challenged their self-
representation as political organisations.  At the same time, this representation located 
narcotics use and trafficking along a chain of equivalence used to symbolise the 
communist antagonistic Other.  Thus, the emergence of narcoterrorism embodies the 
same dispositif as previous representations of terrorism (Ditrych 2014: 19; Herschinger 
2015: 184).  Narcotics are used at once to both depoliticise counterhegemonic movements 
deemed illegitimate by the securer as well as frame narcotics, up to now treated as a social 
ill, as the tool of the antagonistic Other.  The emergence of narcoterrorism, therefore, was 
more than a simple account of a changing reality on the ground; it became a new danger 
which was deployed to stabilise hegemonic power structures in an era of social change.      
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the end of the Cold War did not witness an end of narcoterrorism, 
but rather it witnessed a redefining of the linkage (see Marshall 2002).67  The leftist 
association so readily applied to the (narco)terror danger lost its foundations in the 1990s 
as the political character become less salient in the new threats facing the West (see Klein 
1990).  In this new environment, narcoterrorism moved more towards the realm of 
criminality and the rise of transnational non-state actors (Makarenko 2004: 130; 
Björnehed 2006: 306).  The frequent association of narcoterrorism with non-state actors 
reflected the challenges facing the traditional state system in a globalised liberal order 
(Amoore 2006).  Moreover, this new understanding of narcoterrorism symbolised the 
hegemony of the United States as the global representor of danger, as new dangers were 
constructed as threatening the post-Cold War order.  Whereas in the 1980s political 
authorities enjoyed clearly defined, state-based antagonisms, the post-Cold War 
                                                 
67 The early-2000s witnessed the emergence of a new subfield on the ‘crime-terror’ nexus.  The focus was 
now on understanding to the degree to which terrorist groups and criminal organisations cooperated.  Within 
the literature, the crime-terror continuum was established to understand this new synergy.  Some strong 
examples include Makarenko (2004); Björnehed (2006); Piazza (2011, 2012). 
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environment challenged these clear inside/outside distinctions and forced states to adapt 
their security narratives to fit the new transnationalism.  This environment largely persists 
to this day as governments around the world combine traditional state-based approaches 
to non-traditional social dangers.  
 
The Nexus 
How can we understand this danger?  On the one hand, it is understood as an accurate 
reflection of new organisations that straddle the supposed boundary between militant and 
criminal.  Governments readily deploy concise definitions, which are supported with a 
wealth of objective facts, figures, and jargon, effectively silencing alternative knowledge 
and incurring a sense of helplessness (Der Derian 2009a: 65).68  One the other hand, 
narcoterrorism can be reduced to a discursive strategy that does not objectively reflect 
reality, but instead reflects a constructed discourse used as a tool of governance.  The 
ambiguity of narcoterrorism leads to confusion in how to approach it.  Can criminals 
commit terrorist acts?  Which danger is more pressing?  Interestingly, the opacity of 
narcoterrorism alludes to the larger schism (i.e. mainstream vs. critical) in contemporary 
approaches to security addressed in Chapter II.  On the one hand, (in)security is something 
real, existent, and vital to our existence.  On the other hand, recent (critical) approaches 
to security, particularly terrorism, have demonstrated that (in)security is constructed and 
ultimately used as a means of political control rather than something objectively existing, 
or even attainable (Neocleous 2008).  This schism is illustrated in contemporary 
approaches to narcoterrorism in which the majority of studies, forming the mainstream, 
treat narcoterrorism as a new problem that needs to be overcome (see Ehrenfeld 2003; 
Makarenko 2004; Piazza 2012; Felbab-Brown 2010, 2011, 2013).  In these studies, the 
discourse surrounding narcoterrorism, the processes of representing and signifying the 
danger, are left unaddressed.  Rather, devising accurate policy recommendations and 
innovative strategies to overcome this ‘new nexus’ is the primary goal.   
                                                 
68 Another parallel can be drawn here with Bigo’s (2008a) argument about the authority of statistics and 
the creation of a ‘field’ of security in which the data monopolises legitimate knowledge about the danger 
(see Bigo 2008: 12). 
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This practical approach looks at narcoterrorism as the product of a nexus between the 
illicit and militant realms (Makerenko 2004; Björnehed 2006).  Rather than relying on an 
archetypal model of the narcoterrorist, recent studies place it on a larger crime-terror 
continuum, which is meant to accurately reflect security environments and cooperation 
between dangerous non-state actors (see Makerenko 2004).  While insightful, the 
continuum literature fails to approach narcoterrorism as a discourse and places it 
alongside other dangers reflective of new security.  This practical approach sustains the 
contemporary danger dispositif and precludes any hope of a more concrete understanding 
of the discourse.  Even the supposedly illustrative crime-terror continuum is plagued by 
definitional problems as locating a ‘narcoterrorist’ organisation on an objective scale, 
which is applied subjectively, renders any concrete understanding all but impossible.   
To truly understand narcoterrorism, we must dismantle its core elements and look at how 
it has been represented as a danger.  While narcoterrorism may exist on a continuum of 
crime and terror – the latter’s definition already inherently problematic – it is ultimately 
the unification of two discourses of danger that sustains it.  Instead of attempting to define 
and solve the problem of narcoterrorism, the task must be to understand how this 
problematic concept is used and applied by securer.  In doing so, it becomes clear that 
narcoterrorism is used to constitute society built around an endangered identity.   
The question arises as to why security actors would link these two dangers?  As the above 
sections on terrorism and narcotics have illustrated, both dangers are replete with 
metaphors and linguistic strategies designed to construct and secure a politicised identity.  
Moreover, the acceptance of these narratives at domestic and international levels 
demonstrates their effectiveness and general acceptance in the social audience.  Is this 
convergence merely part of the day-to-day practise of governance (see Dillon 1996; Bigo 
2002; Huysmans 2004)?  Or is it necessary to conflate these two dangers to maintain 
hegemonic power structures?  The answer lies somewhere in the middle as the state is 
confined to representing dangers that reflect the identity of the secured society.  Here we 
witness the effect the social audience has on representations of danger and the need for 
these representations to be accepted.   Attempting to fight a two-front war against the new 
dangers of terrorism and narcotics proved difficult as the definitions of both were quite 
loose and contested by large sections of society (Boothroyd 2006). The supposed danger 
of narcotics was problematized by the levels of engagement among large sections of 
society as counterculture became more accepted, while the ideological foundations of 
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various ‘terrorist’ movements also became more accepted in Western societies.  Thus, the 
emergence of narcoterrorism in the 1980s and early-1990s reflected the shortcomings of 
the independent narcotics and terror threats and illustrated the need for a new 
universalised danger reflecting the requirements of the ‘New World Order’.   
Thus, (narco)terror needed to be more expansive, observable and frightening.  Ironically, 
the narcotics traffickers needed to be taken more seriously in their capacity for violence, 
while the terrorists needed to be viewed as less important and apolitical.  The result was 
the conflation of narcotics production with insurgent movements universalised under the 
banner of narcoterrorism.  David Campbell summed it up best, stating: 
the conflation of narcotics production and trafficking with insurgent and 
revolutionary movements in central and southern America has been an attempt, 
largely without foundation, to both inflate the dimensions of danger associated with 
drugs, and render it more intelligible on the traditional national security 
register…The power of ‘narco-terrorism’ as a concept is that it subsumes under one 
banner a number of ideas, including the assertion that guerilla movements finance 
their operations largely through drug-trafficking, and the more believable argument 
that the principals of the drug industry employ extreme violence. (Campbell 1998: 
212) 
Essentially, narcoterrorism was the result of a larger process of universalising danger to 
reflect the political requirements of the time.  As a productive hegemonic strategy, 
universalising two separate dangers into one antagonistic frontier enabled political 
authorities to present a new, observable danger to the social audience (Herschinger 2011: 
80).  While representing a danger understandable to the secured society is vital to 
maintaining hegemonic discourse, it is just as important, if not more so, that the danger 
be observable, both proving the danger’s existence as well as allowing the state to perform 
its sovereign power by overcoming the danger.  The importance of observability also lies 
in how it brings together the material and immaterial aspects of danger.  For 
narcoterrorism, the union between narcotics and terrorism fills the respective immaterial 
and material gaps in the representations of both, respectively.  The rise in narcotic use in 
the 1960s and 1970s challenged the immaterial nature of this danger in the public sphere.  
The supposed immorality and evil associated with narcotics was problematized as society 
renegotiated the essence of the danger (Boothroyd 2006: 7).  However, once narcotics 
became associated with the immaterial aspects of terrorism, namely its political alterity, 
a material danger became associated with an immaterial threat to identity.  On the other 
hand, the questionable materiality of terrorism, the general disconnect from experiencing 
the danger, was overcome when it became associated with narcotics, which remain 
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widespread and easily accessible in society.  As James Der Derian writes, “[with] US 
national security and the American way of life now being at risk, narco-terrorism took on 
the qualities of a synergistic threat” (Der Derian 2009b: 81).    
Thus, we return to the core aspect of narcoterrorism and other dangers: meaning.  What 
meanings are attached to narcoterrorism?  At first glance narcoterrorism quite simply 
means a terrorist organisation that engages in narcotics trafficking;69 however, 
narcoterrorism, like all politicised dangers, is represented to embody the traits of the 
Other, reaffirming to the society what it is not, or at the very least what it ought not be.  
Its negative meaning and its embodiment of a hostile alterity are constitutive of the 
hegemonic discourse of identity.  Therefore, the conflation of narcotics and terrorism was 
not the result of a ‘new’ danger, but rather a political response to a changing sociopolitical 





This genealogical inquiry into (narco)terrorism revealed two things.  First, while the 
labels narcotics and terrorism remain in common usage, the meaning and reference 
constituting these labels has shifted several times throughout the 20th century to fit 
particular power constellations.  The intersubjectivity of the label reveals that narcotics 
and terrorism fall within the larger instrumentalization of danger in which representations 
of (narco)terrorism are deployed to constitute a society built around an endangered 
identity.  Within Critical Security Studies this is a well-trodden path with seminal authors 
such as Weldes et al. (1999), Richard Jackson (2005), David Campbell (1998), and others 
laying the theoretical groundwork for this approach.  The argument of this chapter was 
that narcoterrorism was not borne out of new and exceptional organisations, but rather 
that this discourse was constructed to meet the challenges facing hegemonic authority 
over society.  Narcotics use and drug-culture undermine(d) the cultural narratives that 
                                                 
69 Interestingly, the reverse (i.e. criminal organisations engaging in terrorist acts) is hotly contested and 
rarely accepted by practitioners of security.  A few notable examples include the framing of the Medellin 
Cartel’s downing of Avianca Flight 203.  
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shaped society by opening up the public sphere to a world of alternative visions and 
identities (Boothroyd 2006).  The threat posed by drug culture to the ideal type of the 
American identity contributed to its securitisation and the militarisation of the discourse 
(Musto 1987; Reinarman 1994; Weimer 2003).  Terrorism was, and remains, a label used 
to delegitimise counterhegemonic actors who hold an alternative vision for politics and 
social identity.  Genealogical inquiry reveals that the mutual exclusivity between the 
terrorist outsider and the endangered society has remained the same, but the identity of 
the terrorist has changed to reflect developments in narratives of identity.  Consequently, 
narcoterrorism reflects the continuation of this use of danger in its conflation of discourses 
of narcotics and terrorism.  However, the emergence of narcoterrorism also points to an 
infiltration of danger into the secured society.  Whereas terrorism was understood to come 
from outside of society, narcotics has been represented as a disease that affects the weak 
sections of the body politic (Weimer 2003).  Thus, in militarising hegemonic 
representations of drugs, we can observe a shift in the constitution of the discourse 
reflective of changing social structures.  As will be shown in the next chapter, the 
constitution of the discourse, largely derived from political and social contexts in the 
United States, has had a profound impact on hegemonic discourses of danger in 

















Chapter IV – Securing Identity: Hegemonic 
Representations of (Narco)Terrorism  
 
The previous chapter applied genealogical inquiry to (narco)terrorism to illustrate how 
these dangers are not static or fixed threats, but rather contemporary discourses that have 
been constructed and deployed by hegemonic actors.  The focus on Anglocentric 
representations of (narco)terrorism was deliberate as discursive actors from the United 
States and the United Kingdom have had a profound impact on global understanding of 
these dangers.  However, that is not to say that these dangers do not function elsewhere 
and indeed the empirical contribution of this thesis is to critically analyse how these 
discourses operate in contemporary Afghanistan.  Indeed, far from being universal, 
(narco)terror has been constructed, transmitted, and redeployed around the world (Der 
Derian 2009a; Seib & Janbek 2011; Ditrych 2013; Herschinger 2015), and, more 
significantly, has been redesigned by various actors70 to fit the needs of particular social 
and political contexts.  It is the interplay between global and local discourses of 
(narco)terror that forms the basis of this chapter.  Indeed, it is this interplay that has 
defined the Afghan political context, revealing a continuity between representations of 
(narco)terrorism outlined above and local representations of danger discussed in this 
chapter.   
This chapter sets out to illustrate the operationalisation of discourses of (narco)terrorism 
by the GIRoA in their attempts to establish a collective Afghan identity.  This identity is 
constituted through representations of both an evil (narco)terrorist other (associated with 
the Taliban) and an endangered victimised self.  Thus, this chapter utilises Critical 
Discourse Analysis (CDA) to illustrate how hegemonic representations of (narco)terror 
have been constructed and deployed in post-2001 Afghanistan, and through this analysis 
the motivations of the GIRoA will be revealed.71   
                                                 
70 The identities of these actors will be discussed at length throughout this chapter.  Generally, key actors 
are understood to be those that hold discursive authority in the realm of security and produce narratives of 
danger (e.g. security experts, government officials, academics within relevant fields, members of the 
established media, etc.).   
71 While narcotics and terrorism had been firmly established as global dangers before 2001, for the sake of 





Data and Methods 
At the centre of this discussion are three main research questions.  The first question, and 
indeed the most important, is the primary research question of the thesis: what are the 
motivations behind hegemonic (and counterhegemonic) representations of danger in 
Afghanistan?  This will be addressed through an application of CDA to the texts selected 
for the thesis.  An extensive summary of CDA can be found in Chapter I and is therefore 
not necessary to repeat here; however, for the sake of continuity the framework will be 
outlined as discourse analysis that investigates how discourses emerge and are shaped by 
relations of powers with the hope of revealing the use of discourse in securing power and 
hegemony (Fairclough 1992: 135).  As such the goal here is to situate GIRoA 
representations of danger as part of a hegemonic strategy aimed at maintaining power 
over the social sphere.  While discourse is the method, the main argument is that the 
GIRoA’s hegemonic strategy is premised on establishing a collective Afghan identity.  
Therefore, there is a secondary focus in critically analysing the GIRoA’s representations 
in order to reveal the development of hegemonic identity narratives.  This focus will 
centre on the deployment of language, metaphors, and cultural tropes in dominant 
representations of danger.  The use of these linguistic techniques will be referenced with 
the summary of Afghanistan’s political and social context discussed in Section I.  Indeed, 
this focus is reflective of the second research question of the thesis: how are 
representations of danger deployed in Afghanistan?  The claim here is that discourses of 
danger are deployed by the GIRoA via speech acts and other public statements which 
interpret the ongoing violence and insecurity as endangering the Afghan collective 
identity.   
Lastly, this chapter holds an additional sub-question pertaining to the influence of global 
hegemonic discourses of (narco)terrorism on domestic representations in Afghanistan.  
While this should not be taken as the main area of study, the interplay between 
international and national in the Afghan political context presents an interesting area of 
analysis.  Moreover, the imposition of largely Western narratives of (in)security on non-
Western countries has been the subject of much scholarship in postcolonial circles (see 
Ayoob 1997; Barkawi and Laffey 2006; Bilgin 2010).  Thus, in seeking to establish a 
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connection between global discourses of (narco)terrorism and local representations, this 
chapter hopes to reveal that representations of danger are not just a hegemonic strategy 
confined to the domestic sphere, but rather exist similarly in the international.  Having 
established the objectives of the chapter, attention must now turn to the data sets 
consulted.   
While recent surveys of the Afghan population have produced a body of information 
concerning society’s engagement with security narratives (see Asia Foundation 2016; 
ATR 2014), this study will focus largely on the ‘high data’ (Jackson 2005) of government 
speeches, statements, policies, and representations of (narco)terror.  Indeed, while 
adopting a top-down focus restricts our ability to determine the success or failure of these 
representations and largely silences (re)representations emanating from society, it 
nonetheless reflects the framework adopted in this study which understands danger as a 
hegemonic (and counterhegemonic) discourse.  In other words, the ‘high data’ of political 
representations shape the discourse, and it is through this discourse that subjects, like the 
Taliban, and objects, such as narcotics, attain meaning (Ditrych 2014: 10).  Therefore, it 
is vital to critically analyse official statements emanating from the upper levels of the 
Afghan government in order to uncover how global and local processes of representing 
danger converge and to illustrate how these representations are deployed in attempts to 
construct Afghan society and identity. 
Thus, the bulk of the data cited in this chapter consists of official statements by former 
President Hamid Karzai and the current President Ashraf Ghani.  Other sources include 
statements by the Chief Operating Officer of Afghanistan, Abdullah Abdullah, Ministry 
of Information and Communication Spokesmen, Feroz Bashari, and statements by 
government officials quoted in Afghan national news outlets such as ToloNews, Khaama 
Press, and Pajwok News.  These news outlets are all based in Kabul but form the 
mainstream national news media for the country.  Interviews conducted by foreign media 
outlets such as CNN with presidents Karzai and Ghani have also been analysed to assess 
discrepancies between domestic communications and international statements.  While the 
use of metaphor and cultural tropes differs depending on the audience of the 
representation, the analysis in this chapter reveals continuity in representations of 
(narco)terror.  In terms of language, the sources consulted for this study were either 
English original or translations from Dari or Pashto into English.  This reflects the 
language limitations of the researcher and the accessibility of the material.   
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As mentioned above, the rationale for focusing exclusively on government actors in this 
chapter is to illustrate how danger is being used to discursively constitute contemporary 
Afghan society.  No doubt that there is an assemblage of state and non-state security 
actors operating in Afghanistan, such as analysts employed by think tanks, research units, 
and foreign governments; however, in maintaining consistency with the theoretical 
framework outlined in Chapter I, this chapter is focused on the operationalisation of 
representations of danger by state actors.  Thus, the objective is not to silence other 
discursive actors, but is instead to illustrate how the GIRoA uses representations of danger 
in its attempts to construct and secure contemporary Afghan society.  
    
The chapter will be structured as follows.  Section I begins with a brief survey of 
Afghanistan’s history of violent politics and international influence.  The political context 
of Afghanistan, characterised by ethnic and ideological plurality, is a vital factor shaping 
contemporary power dynamics and sociopolitical relations, more generally.  
Afghanistan’s history and experiences with imperialism is an important underlying theme 
that directly contributes to the interplay between global and local representations of 
danger as well as the formation of the Afghan identity.72  As Bartolucci and Gallo (2013: 
19) point out, “a discourse can only be understood as located in a specific context,” 
therefore, a brief analysis of Afghanistan’s sociopolitical context is a necessary first step.  
Section II proceeds with a critical analysis of the global discourse surrounding the Taliban 
and (narco)terrorism. The roles and identities of key discursive actors shaping these 
representations, such as government officials, security experts, as well as academic 
experts both within and without Afghanistan, will be explored in order to highlight the 
effects these identities have global and local understandings of (narco)terror.  Moving 
forward, Section III will critically analyse representations of (narco)terror in order to 
reveal why and how these dangers are used to create and secure Afghan society.  This 
section is divided into two subsections: the first addresses the use of danger as a means 
of institutional control, paying particular attention to how security narratives are used to 
legitimize the hegemonic position of the GIRoA vis-à-vis society. The second subsection 
                                                 
72 This is a commonly held argument in contemporary literature on Afghanistan.  Some particularly useful 




looks at the immaterial implications of these representations and reveals how 
(narco)terror has been used to create loyal identities.73  This chapter forms the foundation 
of the thesis’ empirical contribution and illustrates how representations of danger are used 
to discursively construct and secure the hegemonic vision of contemporary Afghan 
society.   
 
 
Section I - Violent Politics: The Afghan Political Context 
Afghanistan holds many designations in world history.  In the Western experience, it is 
commonly referred to as the ‘graveyard of empires’ due its mythical unconquerability 
(Johnson 2011: 30; Kamel 2015: 69; see also Jones 2009; Barfield 2010), a label that has 
both placed it within the sights of geopolitical ambitions and brought unseen destruction 
and violence to its geography.  Indeed, the territorial identity of Afghanistan as a site of 
imperial clash and conflict has shaped its politics in many profound and lasting ways.  On 
the one hand, it has led to two major, yet unsuccessful, foreign invasions over the last 
half-century, vindicating those who apply this label.  On the other hand, it has led to an 
inherent fear of external influences and established the theme of externality within the 
discourse of danger.  The ‘graveyard of empires’ has established the image of the Afghan 
fighter within global collective memory but has also shaped its politics as one of struggle 
and sacrifice against foreigners (Kamel 2015: 69).   
Recently, a new distinction has been taken up by both the Government of the Islamic 
Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) and its foreign supporters.  Referred to as the ‘Heart 
of Asia’, the ‘Roundabout of Asia’, and other metaphors for its central location, this new 
identity attempts to legitimise Afghanistan’s geopolitical position while also seeking to 
integrate it within the broader regional and global system.74  Moreover, the emergence of 
a ‘New Silk Road’ discourse has framed Afghanistan as a country in need of development 
                                                 
73 ‘Loyal identities’ refers to social and political identities that do not challenge the central government 
(GIRoA) and adhere to its national narratives. 
74 ‘Heart of Asia’ has been a common label for Afghanistan in regional politics.  The Heart of Asia – 
Istanbul Process is indicative of this push to establish Afghanistan as a central part of Asia’s regional 
politics.   
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and modernization for the benefit of the Afghan people as well as the surrounding region 
(Haidari 2017).75  While the ‘Heart of Asia’ discourse is clearly more peaceful and 
progressive than ‘the graveyard of empires’, it nonetheless points to a key characteristic 
of the Afghan political context.  Afghanistan is marked by a political dualism where 
domestic and foreign ideologies and ambitions meet and compete.  Far from being 
isolated, Afghanistan has served as a meeting point for global and domestic discourses 
for decades and it is this underlying characteristic that shapes contemporary discourses 
of danger, such as (narco)terrorism, and sociopolitical relations more generally.  Thus, it 
is important to pay particular attention to the dual role played by foreign and domestic 
actors in perpetuating conflict and insecurity in Afghanistan.   
Indeed, the roots of Afghanistan’s current conflict76 date back to the Saur Revolution in 
1978 when a violent coup was staged by the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan 
(PDPA) resulting in the execution of President Mohammad Daud Khan and the 
establishment of communist rule.  Since World War II, the Afghan monarchy, and later 
republic,77 had been one of the focal points of the ideological Cold War, resulting in 
lucrative aid packages from both the Soviet Union and the US.  Afghan leaders used the 
Soviet Union to modernise their military, while the US, wary of Soviet assistance, 
competed for influence by providing substantial economic aid (Dorronsoro 2005: 91; 
Barfield 2010: 162).  Education, especially in the main urban centres (Kabul, Herat, 
Mazar-i-Sharif), was a key source for development aid and led to the establishment of an 
educated urban-class; however, much of rural Afghanistan remained largely unchanged 
(Barfield 2010: 136; Giustozzi 2013; Rubin 1995).  With the emergence of several 
political parties and movements in Kabul, it was clear that change was coming.  In April 
1978, with Soviet acquiescence, the PDPA seized power through the coup and began a 
series of problematic and deeply unpopular land reforms in the countryside, which had 
hitherto remained largely untouched by Kabuli politics.  Moreover, in the months that 
followed the Saur Revolution, tensions between the two factions of the PDPA, Khalq 
                                                 
75 The proposed TAPI Pipeline is a strong example of this push towards integration and development, with 
key regional players such as India having a vested interest in Afghan security and stability.   
76 While many have viewed certain events as beginning and/or ending particular eras of conflict, I believe 
that the violence witnessed today is a continuation of conflict that dates back nearly forty years.   
77 Afghanistan became a republic following a coup led by Daud in 1973, forcing the King into exile in Italy 
(see Dorronsoro 2005). 
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(Masses)78 and Parcham (Banner), boiled over resulting in purges and widespread 
murder, causing the Soviet Union to intervene (Barfield 2010: 135).  While the Saur 
Revolution was certainly an Afghan-led process, the influence of foreign ideology (in this 
case Marxism) in fomenting a revolutionary struggle cannot be overlooked.  The 
relatively cosmopolitan urban centres of Afghanistan provided a gateway for foreign 
money and influence designed to reshape the elite politics and bring change.  Kabul and 
the urban elites would remain the focus of foreign intervention and would continue to 
shape the politics of Afghanistan throughout the Soviet-Afghan war, the Afghan Civil 
War, and in the contemporary period.   
The resistance movement during the Soviet-Afghan War also illustrates the interplay 
between domestic and foreign in Afghan politics.  Afghanistan has a long-storied history 
of resisting foreign invasions with many of its greatest national heroes drawn from the 
Anglo-Afghan Wars.79  The notion of resisting foreign (i.e. imperial) invaders is an 
important characteristic of the Afghan national identity because it is largely recognised 
as one of the only values capable of transcending the highly-localised signifiers of 
Afghans’ individual identities (Saikal 2004).  In other words, in a largely isolated, rural, 
tribally- and ethnically-diverse society few signifiers are capable of uniting such a diverse 
population.  The Soviet-Afghan War embodied this characteristic by adopting the form 
of jihad against the foreign invaders, allowing Afghans to largely overcome traditional 
qawm80 barriers and ‘unite’ (Dorronsoro 2005: 10; Barfield 2010: 180).  But where did 
this sense of jihad come from?  In addition to a wealth of ethnic and tribal differences, 
Afghanistan is also a diverse country in terms of religion.  Again, we can observe the 
presence of foreign influence in the evolution of the Afghan resistance and the 
‘Islamification’ of the Afghan political context.   
                                                 
78 These factions were also largely divided along ethnic lines with Khalq consisting mainly of Pashtuns 
(Khalq is Pashto for Masses) and Parcham (Persian for ‘banner’) consisting largely of Tajik and other ethnic 
groups. 
79 One of the most prominent examples is Dost Muhammad Khan (1793-1863), who has become 
memorialised as a figure of Afghan resistance against imperialism for his efforts against the British 
occupation.    
80 Qawm refers to close-knit communal groups that structure most of Afghan society.  These are largely 
limited to what Dorronsoro describes as a ‘solidarity network’ (2005: 10) which exists at the family or 
community level.  The impact of the qawm system is that Afghan identities are largely confined to other 
individuals within the local community; thus, cultivating any sense of national identity in Afghanistan is a 
challenging endeavour.   
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From the beginning of their time in power, the PDPA sought to emulate Soviet atheism 
and began to remove traditional Islamic symbols and salutations from the politics of the 
country (Barfield 2010: 173).  Rooted in a modernism characteristic of urban Afghanistan 
in the post-war era, this attempt at secularising Afghanistan exacerbated tensions between 
the government in Kabul and rural Afghans.  As local commanders began to mobilise 
young fighters to oppose the PDPA and the Soviets, the motivations driving the resistance 
began to adopt a deeply Islamic tone.  Indeed, as Barfield (2010) points out, local leaders 
“used the old political language of Afghanistan, calling on their followers to defend their 
property [referring to the imposed land reforms], the faith of Islam, and the honor of their 
families against outsiders” (178).  The association of the PDPA regime with atheism 
bound it to the foreign occupier in the minds of many Afghans; however, in reality this 
linkage was hardly limited to the PDPA.  Rather, both sides of the conflict benefited from 
substantial foreign backing and influence (see Dorronsoro 2005; Scott 2011; Shanty 
2011).  The PDPA was propped up by the Soviets, whereas the resistance (now referred 
to as mujahideen) were funded by the United States and Saudi Arabia, with help from the 
Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) (Dorronsoro 2005: 143; Barfield 2010: 181; 
Shanty 2011: 23; Scott 2011).  As a result, the war in Afghanistan took on a variety of 
different meanings and interpretations in connection to the increasing number of foreign 
interlopers with a stake in the conflict.  Barfield (2010: 186) concludes, “[a]s a result, the 
Afghan mujahideen found themselves sucked into two larger conflicts: the ongoing cold 
war struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union, and a new struggle by Saudi 
Salafis to make the war in Afghanistan the vanguard of a transnational jihad that they 
hoped would bring about Islamic revolution in the Sunni Arab world and beyond.” 
When the Soviet Union withdrew in 1989, Afghanistan was largely destroyed with 
millions living as refugees in Pakistan and Iran.  Once again, national unity in defence 
against a foreign power had ‘saved’ Afghanistan and the mujahideen were largely 
regarded as national heroes.  However, the regime did not fall following the Soviet 
withdrawal but rather took on a new identity in reference to Afghan national solidarity.  
Under Mohammad Najibullah, the PDPA transformed into the Watan (nation, or 
‘national’) Party and adopted a platform of Afghan nationalism and governance through 
security (Barfield 2010; Dorronsoro 2005).  In this new political climate, links to foreign 
powers was seen as dangerous and illegitimate; however, foreign powers, particularly 
Pakistan, maintained deep involvement in Afghan politics throughout this period, 
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sponsoring a succession of would-be powerholders and fomenting discord (Barfield 2004, 
2010; Dorronsoro 2005; Crews and Tarzi 2008; Shanty 2011; Giustozzi 2007; Aggarwal 
2016).  The Najibullah-led regime eventually fell in 1992, owing largely to the withdrawal 
of Soviet aid following the collapse of the USSR (Barfield 2010: 188).  Pakistan’s ISI 
had long had its sights on Najibullah as it was feared that Afghanistan would ally with 
India and therefore leave Pakistan encircled.  With many of the Afghan political leaders 
still living in Peshawar, Pakistan pushed Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, leader of Hizb-i Islami, 
to seize power (Barfield 2010: 187).   What resulted was the Afghan Civil War (1992-
1996) that would see Kabul destroyed and the emergence, and eventual rise to power, of 
the Taliban. 
   
Section II: Building the Discourse: (Narco)Terror in 
Afghanistan  
 
As a discourse of danger, (narco)terror remains true to the interplay between foreign and 
domestic influences characteristic of Afghan politics.  While both narcotics and violence 
share a long history in Afghanistan,81 their representation as a new danger is a recent 
development.  Indeed, throughout the Soviet-Afghan War and continuing throughout the 
Afghan Civil War, narcotics played a substantial role in the financing of mujahideen 
factions and perpetuated a state of violence and lawlessness in the countryside (Jalalzai 
2005: 9; MacDonald 2007: 88; Shanty 2011: 23; Rashid 2010).  However, the narcotic 
link to danger was seldom mentioned in public discourse and remained largely absent 
from the politics and security of the country.82  This changed in the aftermath of 9/11 as 
the War on Terror laid out a new global enemy personified by al Qaeda and the Taliban.  
It is through the War on Terror and subsequent occupation of Afghanistan that the 
(narco)terror discourse would (re)emerge, a representation that continues to this day.  
Prior to analysing particular representations of (narco)terror, it is important to illustrate 
                                                 
81 David MacDonald provides a concise description of the former in Drugs in Afghanistan: Opium, Outlaws, 
and Scorpion Tales (2007). 
82 At the time, narcoterrorism was beginning to be discussed in the United States in government and elite 
circles but was directed almost exclusively at the Soviet Union.  Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
narcoterrorism was widely considered to apply to ongoing violence in Colombia (see Ehrenfeld 1990).   
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how this discourse has been built and the key actors involved in its construction.  This 
section will look at how (narco)terrorism came to be applied to Afghanistan, and more 
specifically the Taliban. It will first address the unknowability of danger and will connect 
it to the general ambiguity surrounding the Taliban.  The discussion will then turn to a 
critical analysis of the international discourse on (narco)terrorism and will highlight 
specific uses of language and rhetoric that correlate to Afghan representations of the 
danger.  Lastly, a brief discussion on the role of experts and non-governmental discursive 
actors will illustrate the interplay between these two groups in perpetuating this danger 
and shaping government responses.     
The discursive role of the state as the protector of society is premised on ambiguity 
surrounding danger and insecurity.  Drawing from the Hobbesian tradition, contemporary 
politics and international relations are premised on a recognised understanding of an 
unknown danger residing beyond the limits of political sovereignty (Der Derian 1993; 
Dillon 1996).  The emergence of security as a tool of governance has used the ambiguity 
of danger as the very foundation of political authority as it is the fear of the unknown that 
drives citizens into the protection of an authority (Dillon 1996: 16; Booth and Wheeler 
2008: 62; Der Derian 1993).  However, in material terms, the unknown does not exist; 
rather, it is an immaterial space upon which discourse and knowledge is inscribed.  
Indeed, in their seminal work Aradau and van Munster (2011) assert that the 
unknowability of a catastrophic event requires expert knowledge “to tackle its very limit: 
the unknown” (Aradau and van Munster 2011: 6).  It is this requirement of knowledge 
that grants the ‘the unknown’ so much power and salience in politics because it is the 
perceived ability of a political authority (i.e. a state) to know the unknowable – and to 
therefore protect society against it – that legitimises its position.  This perspective reflects 
a relatively recent shift towards the politics of risk,83 something Aradau and van Munster 
(2007, 2008, 2011) have written on extensively.  However, despite the importance of risk 
in shaping contemporary security politics, the concept of the unknown must be taken a 
step further and understood as a discursive space.   
                                                 
83 See also Salter (2008); Williams (2008); Rasmussen (2001, 2004); Kessler and Daase (2007) for various 
applications of risk to the War on Terror and 21st century international relations more broadly.  
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In terms of danger and (in)security, the opacity of unknown threats renders knowledge of 
it inaccessible to ordinary individuals.  This inaccessibility grants security actors, such as 
the state, with the privileged position to inscribe certain values and identities (such as 
narcotics and terrorism) with danger, while at the same time granting it the authority to 
subjugate alternative knowledges (Daase and Kessler 2007: 413).84  Knowledge of danger 
becomes the performance of power upon which the state’s authority rests.  However, to 
identify a concept as danger without locating it in a recognisable identity or subject would 
render it unintelligible to the social audience.  Can terrorism really be understood as a 
danger in the absence of terrorists?  Essentially, this framework requires a symbol that 
personifies the danger and renders it intelligible for the social audience.  In Afghanistan, 
the Taliban have become the vehicle for the realisation of (narco)terrorism as these 
dangers have been inscribed on its identity. 
But who, or what, are the Taliban?  In terms of opposing the authority of the state, the 
Taliban primarily form a counterhegemonic identity in Afghanistan (Aggarawal 2016: 
19; see Johnson and Dupee 2012). However, aside from this overly generalised 
understanding, knowledge about the motivations, organisational structure, activities and 
members are heavily contested (see Strick van Linschoten and Kuehn 2018).  Indeed, in 
the extensive literature and political statements about the Taliban, the organisation has 
adopted several different identities reflective of the motivations of the knowledge-
producers themselves.  The best example of this can be observed in the emergence of the 
neo-Taliban, a term symbolising a discontinuity between the Taliban regime ruling most 
of Afghanistan until 2001 and the present-day, amorphous force operating in the country 
(Qazi 2010: 487; Giustozzi 2007; Crews and Tarzi 2008; Tarzi 2008; Peters 2009a; 
UNDOC 2009; Thruelsen 2010).  The emphasis here is placed on depoliticising the 
contemporary Taliban, often highlighting the organisation’s engagement with criminal 
activity, technology, and networked structure (Peters 2009a).  Despite the pervasiveness 
of the neo-Taliban discourse, there is little that unifies this identity, and has instead been 
used to loosely link an array of different knowledges about the organization.  For instance, 
in terms of communication and propaganda, the neo-Taliban label has been used to 
symbolise a new affinity towards technology and internet-based communication 
                                                 
84 This understanding is also reflected in Der Derian’s description of the Nietzschean ‘interpretive realist’ 
security in Der Derian (1993: 94-113). 
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(Aggarwal 2016; Giustozzi 2007).  Another example can be seen in the emergence of 
extensive literature on Taliban links to narcotics trafficking and organised crime in the 
late-2000s (Giustozzi 2007; Peters 2009b; Schmidt 2010; Shanty 2011).  In this case, the 
participation of the Taliban in organised crime and narcotics trafficking is understood to 
signal a depoliticization of the organisation and the emergence of a new financially-
motivated group (Peters 2009b: 104; Schmidt 2010: 62; Rosen and Katzman 2014).  
Indeed, whether the ‘neo-Taliban’ are a continuation of the Taliban of 2001 or an 
assortment of disgruntled farmers, criminal gangs, and insurgents, the ambiguity 
surrounding its identity furthers its role as the personification of danger.   
At the root of this ambiguity are three discursive strategies that have been used by political 
actors to construct the Taliban as the embodiment of the (narco)terror danger: rhetorical 
delegitimation (Chowdhury and Krebs 2010: 131), juxtaposition (Ramsay and Holbrook 
2015), and the logic of equivalence (Herschinger 2011).  Primarily, rhetorical 
delegitimation is used to deprive the counterhegemonic voice of its political agency 
(Chowdhury and Krebs 2010: 131).  Having been in power for five years, and with a 
shared collective memory of their political identity in contemporary society (through 
laws, policies, spectacles, etc.), the Taliban possess a certain political authority in rural 
areas and a degree of credibility within Afghanistan society due to their time in power.  
As Tarzi (2008: 276) highlights, “the use of the label Taliban elicits certain images and 
promotes particular political, cultural, and religious ideologies.  It is a powerful name that 
instills fear and anger in some while uniting others.”  Indeed, with such potentiality to 
‘speak’ to certain identities within society, the Taliban present a clear challenge to the 
authority of the government and therefore require discursive strategies designed to 
delegitimise its message.  The connection between the ‘neo-Taliban’ and the drug trade 
can be viewed as evidence of a rhetorical delegitimation strategy because it equates a 
political/religious movement to common criminality and banditry.  Moreover, the 
presence of many parallel government and legal structures in rural Afghanistan, which 
are operated by the Taliban, has made the need to delegitimise and depoliticise the 
movement all the more pressing (see Johnson 2007; Mahendrarajah 2014).  However, as 
we will see in the following section, this rhetorical delegitimation does not lessen the risk 
of danger, but rather prevents the Taliban from attaining moral equality with the 
government and communication with Afghan society.   
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Juxtaposition is another strategy that exploits the Taliban’s ambiguity.  The identity 
pluralism inscribed on the (neo)Taliban85 grants knowledge producers (i.e. security 
experts) with the freedom to connect the organisation to various images of violence and 
criminality.  In an important study on representations of violence by insurgent actors, 
Ramsay and Holbrook (2015) illustrate how a juxtaposition of “images relating to 
violence next to an image relating to a particular agenda” gives meaning to the violence 
and makes it less generic for the audience (Ramsay and Holbrook 2015: 88).  While this 
refers more to representations of violence constructed by insurgents themselves, the 
framework remains applicable to representations of the Taliban.  On the one hand, the 
militarisation of counternarcotics operations in Afghanistan has situated it within the 
larger War on Terror and counterinsurgency campaign (Felbab-Brown 2010: 2; Bewley-
Taylor 2013: 10).  Images of ISAF soldiers marching through poppy fields, or of Afghan 
National Police cutting down poppy stalks, have linked cultivation of poppies to the 
ongoing conflict and resulting insecurity.  On the other hand, representations of a 
criminalised Taliban in social and political discourse connect the organisation to narcotics 
trafficking and justify the militarised counternarcotics policy.86  The ambiguity associated 
with the Taliban enables this inference without a clear juxtaposition of images (i.e. a 
Taliban fighter holding a bag of raw opium).  Indeed, in conducting primary research for 
this thesis it became clear that images of the Taliban and criminal gangs are often used 
interchangeably in media reports and other visual representations of violent non-state 
actors.  
What juxtaposition and rhetorical delegitimation point to is the use of a chain of 
equivalence in building the discourse of a (narco)terrorist Taliban.  In Chapter III, the 
chain of equivalence was used to explain the emergence of a global discourse on 
(narco)terrorism.  The qualities of narcotics traffickers were equated with terrorist 
violence, the former adopted a militarised identity while the latter shifted away from the 
larger Soviet threat (see Der Derian 2009a; Stampnitzky 2013). The discourse around the 
Taliban operates in a similar fashion, but rather than expanding the values associated with 
                                                 
85 Written in this form to denote the pluralism of the contemporary Taliban identity.  Rather than being 
represented solely as the traditional Taliban or its newer reincarnation, contemporary discourse uses the 
two labels interchangeably. 
86 Among the many security experts and scholars studying the ‘neo-Taliban’, the Afghan government has 




(narco)terrorism more generally, the Taliban are discursively linked to an increasing 
number of dangers.  Indeed, the ambiguity of the Taliban, places importance on security 
actors defining what they are as opposed to specifying what they are not.  Thus, a chain 
of equivalence is used to associate a variety of societal plagues and dangers to the larger 
Taliban threat.  The diversity of the ‘neo-Taliban’ label, for instance, is an attempt to 
connect various dangers together and form an antagonistic frontier between Afghan 
society and the Taliban.  In terms of terrorism, the use of diverse signifiers has been 
present in representations of the Taliban since 9/11.  As Renner and Spencer (2013) point 
out, “as regards the construction of the Taliban following 9/11, we find that the signifier 
‘Taliban’ was articulated into the antagonised chain of signifiers, predominately through 
a close linkage between the signifiers ‘Taliban’ and ‘al Qaeda’, to an extent that both 
became, as President Bush himself put it, ‘virtually indistinguishable’” (Renner and 
Spencer 2013: 485).  The diversity in articulations and representations of the (neo)Taliban 
has therefore expanded its categorisation, moving beyond the classic category of 
insurgency toward the prototype category of (narco)terrorist (Bhatia 2009: 280).87  
Whether this new category is correctly applied to the Taliban is not the point being 
emphasized here; rather, the significance is that with the infiltration of international 
narratives of (in)security into Afghan politics, the (narco)terror danger does not only 
symbolise the use of danger for domestic control, but also reflects the power of global 
discourses in shaping national politics.  The interplay between international and domestic 
politics characteristic of Afghanistan continues in the hegemonic discourse of 
(narco)terrorism.   
Global narratives of (in)security and knowledge producers in the West have played an 
equal role in building the discourse of (narco)terror in Afghanistan and applying it in 
representations of the (neo)Taliban.  In this sense, the Taliban did not create 
narcoterrorism, but instead have become the embodiment of new hegemonic discourses 
of danger disseminated globally.  Within the larger umbrella of US national security, 
narcoterrorism has been a recognised danger since the Cold War (see Miller and Damask 
1996).  Similar to terrorism, initial discussions of narcoterrorism centred around Soviet 
complicity and assertions that the conflation of these two dangers was indicative of an 
                                                 
87 The difference between the classical and prototype category is in their permeability.  The classical 
category refers to an abstract container, whereas the prototype refers to a human produced category 
embodied by a particular example (Bhatia 2009: 280). 
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immoral Leftist ideology (see, for example, Ehrenfeld 1990).  This association largely 
confined narcoterrorism to South America (Colombia in particular), preventing linkages 
to other terrorist groups, specifically those associated with Islamic fundamentalism.  
Critically, there was a shift in this understanding around the time of the September 11th 
attacks, as Al Qaeda and the Taliban became increasingly linked in the discourse.  In 
terms of the narcotics threat, Afghanistan had been on the US’s radar since 2000, as 
government officials were concerned about the dramatic rise in opium production (and 
exports) under the Taliban regime.  In a Senate Committee on Foreign Relations hearing, 
Senator Brownback summed up the US’s position stating, “Afghanistan is still permitting 
the operation of terrorist training camps.  They are still exporting heroin.  They are 
promoting Islamic fundamentalism into Pakistan.  Afghanistan is not just a state of 
concern.  It is a rogue plain and simple” (United States Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations 2000: 1).  While the dangers of narcotics and terrorism have not converged in 
Brownback’s statement, the use of the term ‘rogue’ to describe Afghanistan is indicative 
of global hegemonic understandings of danger at the time, and in particular the United 
States’ approach to global security.  The danger was not that narcotics were being freely 
exported out of Afghanistan, but rather that the Taliban did not possess the same 
understanding of danger as the US and therefore challenged the authority of the 
hegemonic narrative.  As Chandler (2010: 88) illustrates, “the problem of insecurity is 
understood to be one of problematic ‘choices’ made by autonomous subjects.”  The 
‘rogue’ label applied to Afghanistan is a clear indication that the United States viewed it 
as a global danger as it embodied a challenge to the norms and values of the international 
community.   
The use of the rogue state as the antagonistic Other was not anything particularly new, as 
the early Bush presidency continued the Clinton administration’s view that ‘rogue states’ 
constituted a ‘nexus of new threats’, along with international criminals and terrorists (Tsui 
2015: 75).  However, a clear shift occurred in the global discourse following the 9/11 
attacks.  While earlier debates on Afghanistan centred on whether to engage with the 
Taliban diplomatically (see United States Senate 2000), in itself evidence of post-Cold 
War liberal internationalism, immediately following 9/11 the United States adopted far 
more bellicose language in its representation of Afghanistan and the new (narco)terrorist 
threat.  In a United States House of Representatives hearing on October 3, 2001 both 
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committee members and witnesses88 gave statements which linked the Afghan drug trade, 
via the Taliban, to Al Qaeda and the 9/11 attacks.  In an opening statement, subcommittee 
chairman Mark Souder stated: 
In the past 3 weeks [since 9/11], our Nation has been forced to simultaneously 
examine a number of critical issues with new urgency and vigor.  For drug policy, 
September 11th attacks on our country immediately highlighted the dark synergies 
between narcotics trafficking and international terrorism…The Afghan drug trade 
has given direct financial support for the Taliban regime to harbor international 
terrorists and at least indirectly assist Osama Bin Laden and the al Qaeda terrorist 
network to grievously attack the United States of America (United States House of 
Representatives Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human 
Resources 2001: 1) 
Far from being merely the regime of a rogue state, the Taliban were now perceived to be 
directly linked with Al Qaeda, with narcotics acting as the bridge.  This new nexus was 
similarly taken up within the United Nations and in the United Kingdom.  For the latter, 
as early as October 2, 2001 Prime Minister Tony Blair referred to the Taliban as “a regime 
founded on fear and funded on the drug trade” (Perl 2001: 3).  In a report written for the 
United Nations Security Council following Resolution 1333 (an arms embargo against 
the Taliban), the Committee of Experts found that “funds raised from the production and 
trading of opium and heroin are used by the Taliban to buy arms and other war materiel, 
and to finance the training of terrorists and support the operations of these extremists in 
neighbouring countries and beyond” (UN Committee of Experts on Afghanistan 2001: 
paragraph 55).  From this point, narcoterrorism (or the narcotics-terror nexus) re-emerged 
as an existential danger in the security narratives of the United States and United Nations.  
With the War on Terror in its infancy, discursive actors in the United States increasingly 
represented the Taliban as the epitome of this new nexus.  As Shanty notes, “while there 
are various definitions for the term [narcoterrorism], in the post-9/11 world a consensus 
is growing among certain government officials as well as the general public that the term 
narcoterrorism somehow ties the three-decade-old war on drugs to the present-day war 
on terrorism” (Shanty 2011: 17).   
                                                 
88 Among them was Asa Hutchinson, the newly appointed head of the DEA, who would give testimony in 
2002 at a United States Senate hearing called Narco-Terror: The Worldwide Connection between Drugs 
and Terrorism (see Hutchinson 2002).  While this hearing would occur a year after the House of 
Representatives hearing discussed above, both written and given statements provided by Hutchinson clearly 
indicate that the DEA was building a case for narcoterrorism in Afghanistan immediately following 9/11. 
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This shift points to the rise of ‘new’ dangers in global security discourse.  While newness 
is integral to a state’s use of (in)security as a tool of governance, the ‘new’ referred to 
here reflects the post-9/11 global security environment in which rogue members of the 
international community behaving badly were not the main danger, but rather the 
emergence of a previously unknown synergy between two or more dangers.  Immediately 
after 9/11, President Bush introduced this new discourse in a joint session of Congress in 
which he described 9/11 as bringing about a ‘new kind of war’ where law enforcement 
was as important as military action (Bush in United States House of Representatives 
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources 2001: 7).  In 
addition to promoting this notion of a ‘new war’, Bush went on to articulate the link 
between Al Qaeda and the Taliban, incorporating the latter into the existential terrorist 
threat (Renner and Spencer 2013: 485; Stritzel and Chang 2015: 7).  The adoption of the 
‘new’ signifier had profound implications for global security and representations of 
danger around the world.  The ‘war metaphor’ militarised danger and made such a chaotic 
environment more understandable for the social audience (Bewley-Taylor 2014: 1012; 
Stone 2002); however, the primary significance was in how the ‘new’ label was used and 
subsequently applied.   
Bhatia (2005) points out that names and labels, when applied by a discursive authority, 
come to define the essence of an object or identity.  “Once assigned, the power of a name 
is such that the process by which the name was selected generally disappears and a series 
of normative associations, motives and characteristics are attached to the named subject” 
(Bhatia 2005: 7).  The ‘new’ terrorism discourse that emerged at the start of the 21st 
century had the same effect on representations of danger as formerly independent 
concepts were incorporated under the banner of ‘new’ dangers.  Aradau and van Munster 
(2011) point out the duality of danger at the time where, on the one hand, American 
military superiority left it unchallenged in a conventional sense and pushed the country’s 
enemies toward the unconventional (i.e. criminality, narcotics trafficking, terrorism).  On 
the other hand, the unconventional meant that new styles of conjectural reasoning 
emerged where knowledge of the unknowable was based on loose associations (Aradau 
and van Munster 2011: 31).  
From the beginning of the War on Terror, newness defined how the United States 
approached the Taliban and represented the (narco)terror danger.  The exceptionality of 
this new war was illustrated in associations between narcotics trafficking, the Taliban, Al 
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Qaeda and a range of other dangers.  It is unclear whether this language was designed to 
make ‘concept wars’ such as the War on Drugs and War on Terror more palatable for the 
domestic audience, or if it was meant to create a new global (in)security environment.  
However, the significance remains in how the Taliban and (narco)terror continue to be 
represented today.  Indeed, one of the constant themes employed by President Ghani in 
publicised speeches and statements is the notion of the ‘fifth wave’89 of terrorism, in 
which criminality and political violence are “organically related” (Ghani 2016b, 2016c).  
From 2004 until the present day, changes in US representations of danger, specifically 
(narco)terror, were largely driven by an emerging narrative that became known as the 
‘drug-terror’ nexus; a narrative that represented the Taliban and Al Qaeda as directly 
linked and profiting from the narcotics trade in Afghanistan (Bewley-Taylor 2013: 10; 
see O’Connell in Shanty 2011: 53). 
One of the most striking features of this global narrative was the prominence of non-
government speech actors.  From being confined to state actors, representations of danger 
emanate from a range of other ‘speech actors’ who hold discursive authority and form a 
distinct field of security (see Bigo 2002, 2008a).  As Tsui (2015) correctly argues, “these 
discourses are produced and given meaning by socially powerful actors, or ‘world 
making’ elites in Bourdieu’s (1993) terms” (Tsui 2015: 68).  Rather than being the sole 
prerogative of the state, hegemonic representations of danger emanate from a range of 
other security actors.  On the one hand, the state’s position as protector requires that it 
identifies an antagonistic Other and declare it publicly (Bigo & Tsoukala 2008: 3).  On 
the other hand, this authority rests on a range of other discursive actors, who hold 
particular and authoritative knowledge, to authenticate it.  As Reyes (2011) points out, 
“voices of expertise are displayed in discourse to show the audience that experts in a 
specific field are backing the politician’s proposal with their knowledgeable statements” 
(786).  The voice of the sovereign protector is premised on a cohort of non-governmental 
‘experts’ legitimising the policies and representations of the government, while at the 
same time depending on these authentications to maintain their own elite status. 
Regarding (narco)terror post-9/11, and the Taliban specifically, the workings of this 
                                                 
89 The ‘fifth wave’ of political violence mirrors Rapoport’s (2012) ‘wave theory’ of terrorism in which new 
terrorism is understood as a series of eras (waves), each possessing distinct characteristics and motivations.   
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relationship are illustrated in the explosion of academic study, media reports, and policy 
papers produced in the early 2000s. 
Immediately after the 9/11 attacks, the United States government dramatically increased 
funding of terrorism research, ostensibly with the hope of producing new knowledge 
about the ‘new’ danger (Sageman 2014: 566).  However, this increase in funding 
produced a gap in the literature that was subsequently filled by journalists who produced 
“one-dimensional and sensational portraits of alleged terrorists, packaged in the five-
hundred-words-or-less limit of a newspaper article or a television sound bite” (Sageman 
2014: 570).  Sensationalist portraits of Al Qaeda and, to a lesser extent, the Taliban 
globalised the narrative of international terrorism and its devious links to drugs.  In a 
typical example, TIME magazine published an article by Tim McGirk entitled 
“Terrorism’s Harvest” in 2004, which alleged that a principal source of funding for Al 
Qaeda and the Taliban came from the Afghan heroin trade (McGirk 2004).   Basing his 
findings largely on the story of Haji Juma Khan and substantiated with several quotes 
from government officials (both Afghan, American, and from the UN), this article 
illustrates what many contemporary scholars have criticized as subjective and superficial 
knowledge supported by false assumptions (Giustozzi 2007: 2; Kamel 2015: 66-67). 
However, this raises another important point regarding the basis of the expert’s 
credibility.  If earlier literature of narcoterrorism in Afghanistan was based on false 
assumptions, how did this knowledge remain unchallenged?  Moreover, if the linkage 
between the Al Qaeda and narcotics traffickers was exaggerated to fit the more general 
security narrative, how do we account for the dramatic increase in literature confirming 
and analysing this linkage?  Writing in 1996, Miller & Damask exposed the way in which 
narcoterrorism became established.  “Despite the compelling attraction of its constituent 
ideas, ‘narco-terrorism’ is less a useful tool for understanding one of the permutations of 
terrorism than a myth designed to serve policy purposes of the Reagan and the Bush 
administrations.  Nonetheless, it has filtered into the scholarly and popular literature and 
taken on its own reality” (Miller and Damask 1996: 114).  What this quote reveals, and 
indeed the point being made here, is that the narcoterrorism discourse was built on the 
co-constitutive relationship between the sovereign protector (i.e. the state) and security 
experts.  Indeed, we do not have to look much further than the increase in literature 
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focusing on narcoterrorism in the early 2000s to observe this relationship.90  The interplay 
between experts and the state actors can also be observed in earlier writings on 
narcoterrorism, most notably Rachel Ehrenfeld’s (1990) Narco-Terrorism, which 
asserted that Cuba and other communist regimes were responsible for this new danger; 
however, in hindsight this was revealed to be false and based on unsubstantiated, 
ideologically-based assumptions (Miller and Damask 1996: 115).  Another illustrative 
example is The Terror Network written by journalist Claire Sterling in 1981.  While this 
book did not discuss narcoterrorism, it does serve as an example of expert agency in 
building discourses of danger.  For Sterling, the Soviet Union was complicit in unleashing 
the plague of international terrorism on the world and used terrorism to undermine the 
West.  It was later revealed that Sterling had based her arguments on disinformation 
spread by the CIA, also known as ‘blowback’ (Stampnitzky 2013: 119).  However, the 
significance here is in how Sterling’s book was adopted by US government officials both 
in the Executive and Legislative branches (Stampnitzky 2013).  It reveals the role of the 
expert in building the discourse of danger, while also highlighting the supposed 
infallibility of the expert.  While the expert is used to effectively verify the assertions 
made by the state, at the same time the expertise of this actor is held so highly that 
statements are pre-determined fact (Shanty 2011: 56; see Reyes 2011; Qureshi 2017).  As 
a result, dangers such as terrorism and narcotics have become self-perpetuating industries 
in which conducting studies that reify state-based understandings are incentivised 
(Stampnitzky 2013: 10; see also Lustick 2006).  In such an environment, the interplay 
between discursive actors within the field of security (re)shapes the discourse and 
subsequent representations.91   
The discourse of (narco)terrorism in Afghanistan was built largely along these lines, with 
the United States government debating and devising appropriate policy, consulting with 
security experts, and then relying on other prominent voices in academia, media, and 
independent researchers to authenticate this representation.  Mirroring the increase in 
academic studies of crime-terror linkages (also known as the crime-terror nexus), specific 
                                                 
90 see Björnehed (2006); Makarenko (2004); Douglas (2002); Piazza (2012). This also relates to what the 
Case Collective pointed out as the fetishization of ‘mergings’ (nexuses), which lay at the core of new 
research agendas in the mid-2000s (Case 2006). 
91 The size and scope of the discourse on a specific danger firmly establishes it as existential and knowledge 
of it is left unchallenged on the premise that it is common sense (Jackson 2012: 19). 
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studies began to emerge regarding the role of the Taliban in the Afghan drug trade.  
Prominent studies by established experts such as Vanda Felbab-Brown92 (2010, 2013) 
and Gretchen Peters93 (2009ab) confirmed the United States’s assertion that narcotics and 
terrorism were linked and that the Taliban embodied this new danger.  But what did all 
of this mean for the Taliban?  The (narco)terror linkage clearly effected US/NATO 
counterterrorism policy and legitimised counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan.  This 
assertion also had an impact on the Afghan government’s own counternarcotics policies 
as illustrated by David Bewley-Taylor (2014). However, the question remains as to the 
effect this discourse had on public knowledge of the Taliban.  As we will see in the 
following section, the globalisation of this discourse has contributed to the Taliban’s 
global image as an antagonistic Other and problematized any communication with the 
group.  Moreover, when observing representations of the Taliban by the government of 
Afghanistan and relevant political actors, the infiltration of the international discourse 
(i.e. those emanating from the US, the UK and the UN) becomes readily apparent, 
illustrating the ‘trickle down’ effect these representations of danger have in flashpoints 
around the world.   
 
 
Section III: Institutional Control and Representations of 
Danger 
 
Having explored how the discourse of (narco)terrorism came to be applied to the Taliban, 
it is now necessary to address the motivations and objectives enshrined in the 
representation of this danger.  However, these objectives and motivations can seldom be 
generalised and even a brief investigation into this topic reveals a plurality of actors 
involved in the construction of the discourse, each possessing particular methods and 
motives.  In this first section, the discussion largely centres around the institutional 
                                                 
92 Vanda Felbab-Brown is a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institute and has been a prominent voice in 
American policy circles for over a decade.  Her specialisation on terrorism and criminal insurgencies 
contributes to her expert status.   
93 Peters is widely regarded as an established expert on Afghanistan and narco-terror linkages, spending 
over 10 years in the country as a field reporter (Schmidt 2010: 62). 
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objectives of the security experts and relates to a more traditional conception of 
(in)security and the role of the state.  Contrastingly, Section IV will look at the ideational 
objectives of the state as discursive actors use representations of danger to build local 
identities loyal to its vision.  This section will focus on how danger is used to secure both 
the identity of the society as well as its environment.  Ultimately, the hope here is to 
illustrate the ways in which representations of danger are used as a means of control in 
Afghanistan by constituting both the role of the state as the protector and the identity of 
the secured society.  
At the root of all representations of danger is the need to legitimise the state’s position as 
hegemonic.  The existence of the state depends on its ability to secure.  The authority held 
by the state over society, enshrined in the monopoly of violence, is premised on it using 
its knowledge and force to protect its citizens.  There is “no Church without Salvation; 
No security outside the State; [and] no State without security” (Dillon 1996: 14).  This 
brief quote underlines the role of the state and the foundations of its authority over society.  
But security remains an illusion for if there was security in the truest sense of the word – 
what Dillon and others refer to as freedom – then there would be no need of a state to 
provide it.  From this, we can observe the need for a danger to secure against – an identity 
that is menacing and external, but also ephemeral in that it is eventually overcome and 
not a direct challenge to hegemonic authority.   
Contemporary Afghanistan functions largely in accordance with this paradigm as 
representations of danger have been used to build and entrench state-society relations.  
The political context of Afghanistan, defined by a multitude of regional identities and 
local power structures (see Schetter 2013; Mahendrarajah 2014), means that developing 
a strong central authority is deeply challenging and far from the norm.  Moreover, in a 
predominately rural society in which traditions and customs have remained largely 
unchanged for centuries, applying a modern, centralised state-society structure 
contradicts the lifeworld and circumstance for much of the population.  Indeed, one of the 
lasting challenges yet to be overcome in post-2001 Afghanistan is the inherent weakness 
of the state outside of Kabul and major population centres (Barfield 2010).  Within this 
environment representations of danger, specifically (narco)terror, provide a useful 
opportunity to build the state and its relationship with society.   
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It is useful to first reflect on the argument made by Weldes et al. (1999) in Cultures of 
Insecurity.  Rather than understanding security as purely constitutive, we must recognise 
that it is a constructed discourse that is constituted by a variety of endangered objects.  
Indeed, “one way to get at the constructed nature of insecurities is to examine the 
fundamental ways in which insecurities and the objects that suffer from insecurity are 
mutually constituted” (Weldes et al. 1999: 10; see also Campbell 1998: 169-170).  With 
regard to the Taliban and the broader (narco)terror danger, the constructed nature of this 
danger provides a window into the particular object(s) being secured and places the 
secured subject within the hegemonic vision of identity (Stern 2006: 188).  In other words, 
critically analysing representations of the Taliban, and (narco)terror danger, reveals the 
hegemonic identity of the secured society.  For Afghanistan, representing danger is not 
so much about representing an existential menace as it is about identity-building.  
Through framing the violence and presence of the Taliban (as well as other actors vaguely 
associated with (narco)terrorism) as a threat to certain ‘Afghan’ values, the GIRoA uses 
danger in an attempt to constitute the modern Afghan state and society.  Moreover, many 
of the endangered values threatened by this danger reflect not just a modern Afghan state, 
but one that is premised on liberal values and notions of freedom.  One of the strongest 
examples of this came in February 2017 in a speech made by Ashraf Ghani at the Munich 
Security Conference.  In his speech Ghani framed the violence in Afghanistan thus:  
Simply put, the social contract of the 20th century between the state and citizen is the 
target.  Why are they attacking streets?  Because they want to take freedom of 
movement.  Why are they attacking airlines?  Because they want to question our 
freedom to travel[.] Why are all religious space, social spaces, streets attacked?  
Because they are precisely what the contract of the 20th century…so well described 
is the legacy (Ghani 2017a).94    
While this speech was directed primarily at a foreign audience, much of Ghani’s 
statement remains true to the Afghan government’s vision of state-society relations.  The 
fundamental values identified by the GIRoA in inaugural addresses at the Afghan 
parliament as well as other speeches made in regional forums specifies fundamental 
liberal values as emblematic of post-2001 Afghanistan (see Joint Declaration 
International Afghanistan Conference 2011; Ghani 2014, 2015b).   
                                                 
94 Please note that transcriptions of Ghani’s statements often include awkward wording and incorrect 
grammar.  For the most part, this has been left unchanged; however, in some cases minor modifications 
have been applied to improve clarity. 
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Similarly, the above statement alludes to certain values that define the Afghan citizen.  
Reflecting Stern’s (2006) argument that discourses of danger serve to secure the subject 
(i.e. the Self), Ghani is using danger and violence to identify an ideal type.  In another 
speech given by Ghani at RUSI London in 2016 he spoke of the motivations for violence, 
stating “…fundamentally what is under attack is the compact between the citizen and the 
state.  The great achievement of the modern state has been its compact with the citizenry: 
freedom of movement, freedom of assembly, freedom of worship and democracies, and 
those values are precisely what are attacked” (Ghani 2016b).  Similar to the statement 
given in 2017, Ghani is again defining the values emblematic of the modern Afghan state 
and represents the danger as antithetical.  Ghani continues, saying “Fear is what the 
objective is. Inflicting fear, producing fear in a systematic manner, ensuring that we live 
narrow lives that affect the bond of trust between citizen and citizen, and state and state” 
(Ghani 2016b).  What this points to is not solely a definition of the Afghan state, but also 
a definition of the Afghan ideal type.  Fear, as a product of the danger, is preventing 
Afghans from enjoying the freedoms outlined by Ghani.  Regardless of whether an 
Afghan explicitly wants to enjoy these values, non-adherence to them is presented as 
something antithetical to Afghan social identity.  The use of danger in constructing the 
sovereign’s vision of Afghan identity will be returned to in the next section; however, this 
point remains salient for it highlights the agency held by the sovereign in representing 
danger and defining sociopolitical values.  
The Afghan government similarly uses danger to construct the rule of law and its 
authority over defining criminality.  Criminality is one of the more consistent themes in 
representations of terrorism with earlier understandings (i.e. those pre-dating 9/11) based 
largely around terrorism as a criminal act (Ditrych 2014: 96; see Schmid 2004; Horsman 
200895; Stampnitzky 2013).  In terms of perpetrating violence, it is largely the state’s 
prerogative to identify legal, ‘public’ violence and differentiate it from private, 
illegitimate (i.e. illegal) violence (Victoroff 2006: 3).  Considering the relationship 
between the role of the state in representing violence with its own monopoly on violence, 
Victoroff’s argument appears sound, and indeed this position is consistently reflected in 
how the Afghan government identifies Taliban violence as criminal.  Whether violence 
                                                 
95 Referring to the cited Uzbekistan Criminal Code Article 244 which identifies terrorism as criminality, 
along with drug trafficking and organised crime. 
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is used against civilians or government officials, the signifier ‘atrocious crime’ is used by 
discursive actors to delegitimise the act and silence its intended meaning.  In one example, 
following the assassination of the Parwan’s96 Ulema Council Head, the Office of the 
President released a statement linking it to terrorism stating, “Terrorists once again 
committed a ferocious crime. Head of Parwan province Ulema Council Mullah Abdur 
Rahim Shah Hanifi and his students fell prey to a terrorist bomb blast orchestrated by 
terrorists” (Office of President Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2017).  This refers to 
what Lazar & Lazar (2004) have termed ‘criminalisation’, a tactic that is designed to 
silence and depoliticise the perpetrators of violence (see also Bhatia 2009).  Clearly, the 
killing of a high-ranking religious official would not be taken lightly and would have had 
political significance; nevertheless, framing the violence as a criminal act depoliticises 
the action and represents the victims as martyrs.  As Schmid points out, criminal and 
political violence do not exclude each other, and indeed the motivation behind a crime 
may be political (Schmid 2004: 197); however, awareness of this distinction is far from 
widespread, and in this instance, criminality is being used to delegitimise the acts and 
identity of the terrorist perpetrators.  The monopoly over the use of force is vital to the 
foundation of the state, therefore representing the Afghan government as holding 
legitimate authority over the use of violence is paramount.  The fact that this attack took 
place so close to Kabul would have undermined the credibility of the GIRoA as the 
securer; thus, the criminalisation of the act is a discursive strategy to depoliticise the 
violence, while at the same time emphasizing its abhorrent character.     
The use of the Taliban in constructing and representing the Afghan state comes full circle 
in public peace offerings directed at the movement.  Indeed, peace and dialogue with the 
Taliban has been a point of contention in Afghan politics, the clearest indication being in 
the different language used by Hamid Karzai, Ashraf Ghani, and Abdullah Abdullah.97  
Whereas Karzai would consistently refer to the Taliban as ‘brothers’ (see, for example, 
Karzai 2013), Ghani’s peace overtures are less warm and more pragmatic.  Despite the 
differences in language, both Karzai and Ghani adopt a similar approach to the terms of 
                                                 
96 Parwan is a province immediately to the north of the Afghan capital, Kabul.   
97 While Karzai and Ghani have been more open to peace with the Taliban, Abdullah’s language has been 
much more bellicose.  For example, whereas Karzai sometimes refers to the Taliban as ‘brothers’ (see 




a potential peace agreement, all of which to reaffirm the government’s position as 
hegemonic and unchallenged.  In a recent statement made by Ashraf Ghani at the Kabul 
Process Conference,98 the president outlined the government’s pre-conditions: “…they 
can be summarized as acceptance of the Constitution, continuity of the reforms for 
educating and advancing the rights of women, and a renunciation of violence and all 
linkages to terrorist organizations” (Ghani 2017b).  The brief statement is relevant for 
several reasons.  First, acceptance of the Afghan constitution is placed as the primary 
condition for peace with the Taliban.  This demonstrates the government’s authority over 
the Afghan political identity as rejection of the constitution results in exclusion.  This 
statement also identifies the presence of progressive values in defining the modern 
Afghan identity.  Rejection of education and women’s rights is represented as anti-
Afghan and therefore antagonistic.  Lastly, this peace offering is itself a representation of 
the Taliban as danger.  The conditions included in this statement are inscribed on the 
Taliban identity as those preventing peace.  In this way, the government is using the 
Taliban to establish its authority (via the Constitution), to define Afghan values (reforms, 
educating women, etc.) and reaffirm its monopoly on violence via the stipulation that the 
Taliban must renounce violence and links to terrorist groups.   
While representations of the Taliban as the antagonistic Other have been vital to the 
government’s state- and society-building efforts, its authority does not rest on state 
institutions alone.  Rather, representations of danger present the sovereign with the unique 
opportunity to perform power and consistently establish itself as hegemonic.  Security 
and discourses of danger become a technique of power when deployed in a society (see 
Dillon 1996, 2007; Neocleous 2008), for they necessitate the means to secure. While the 
persistence of violent non-state actors in Afghanistan could be considered justification 
for sovereign authority and use of force, representations of (narco)terror are more attuned 
to the use of knowledge and knowing danger as a performance of power.  Indeed, in such 
a volatile political environment as Afghanistan physical performances of power are not 
enough to ensure the hegemony of the state. Instead, danger needs to be represented in a 
way that subjugates alternative representations of the endangered Afghan self.  This 
subjugation of alternative knowledge is achievable through discourses of (in)security, 
                                                 
98 The Kabul Process Conference was an official peace conference held in June 2017 aimed at beginning 
negotiations and, eventually, striking a peace settlement in Afghanistan.  The conference included local 
leaders throughout the country and was designed to present a united front for peace.  
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which “by way of hegemonic closures, fix meanings in particular ways, and…exclude all 
other meaning potentials” (Jackson 2012a: 16).  In terms of (narco)terror, the global 
ambiguity surrounding this danger and lack of a universal definition for terrorism 
provides a lot of space for the state to inscribe authoritative knowledge in the discourse.   
While Hamid Karzai did not use the ambiguity of (narco)terror to establish the knowledge 
of the state, Ashraf Ghani, and to a lesser extent Abdullah, uses insecurity in Afghanistan 
to promote his own extra-ordinary knowledge on the subject.  A clear example of this 
tendency can be observed in Ghani’s characteristically jargon-heavy language in speeches 
on the challenges and threats facing Afghanistan.99  Over his three years in office, Ghani 
has developed a succession of signifiers for the violence and insecurity plaguing 
Afghanistan.  In early 2015, Ghani developed the ‘ecology of terror’, which refers to the 
distinctive lifeworld inhabited by terrorists that is separate from any given state or 
territory (Ghani 2015a).  While the ecology of terror reflects Ghani’s frustration with the 
lack of international cooperation, this knowledge and particular framing serves more as a 
performance of the Afghan government’s authoritative knowledge of the threat they, and 
indeed the rest of the world, are facing.  Similarly, Ghani spoke about the concept of 
hybrid warfare, stating that “[he was] glad to see the concept of hybrid warfare make it 
into Munich Security Conference’s vocabulary.  We have suffered from this practice, so 
I’d like to call attention to one feature that is not part of the vocabulary yet, ‘criminality’” 
(Ghani 2015a).  While the connection between criminality and terrorism is significant, 
the main contribution of this statement is in Ghani’s self-representation as all-knowing 
and on the frontline of global (in)security.  From the early days of the Ghani presidency, 
performance of knowledge has become increasingly frequently in speeches and 
statements.  The latest example of this performance, and indeed one of the defining 
methods for representing the (narco)danger terror is the ‘fifth wave’ of political violence.   
The ’fifth wave’ was coined by Ghani at another Munich Security Conference (2016a) as 
he made remarks on the new challenges facing Afghanistan.  In his statement, Ghani 
situated the fifth wave as part of a longer trajectory of political violence that had 
developed over the previous 140 years.  Political violence evolved as part of “a narrative 
combining epistemology, history, and teleology matched by utilization of information 
                                                 
99 His style of speaking and extensive use of terminology is reflective of his background as an academic 
and status, in elite circles, as an intellectual.   
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technology of the fourth industrial revolution is translated into a distinct ecology, 
morphology, and pathology of violence” (Ghani 2016a).  Interestingly, Ghani’s 
genealogy of political violence mirrors histories of terrorism, beginning with anarchist 
violence in the 19th century, moving to nationalist movements in the early-20th century, 
‘New Left’ terrorism in the 1960s-1970s, and finally with the advent of suicide bombing 
(Ghani 2016a).  The fifth wave being faced now is defined by an assemblage of different 
characteristics, and indeed the defining feature is the ‘organic relationship’ between 
criminality, specifically drugs, and terrorism (Ghani 2017a, 2016b).  This chronology 
correlates with many ‘histories’ of terrorism and reflects what Ondrej Ditrych identifies 
as the terrorism dispositif (Ditrych 2013: 233).  Rather than highlighting the reflexivity 
of terrorism in previous eras, Ghani represents the fifth wave as a new and extraordinary 
danger facing the world today.   
The fifth wave is useful for the Afghan securer in two ways: domestic control and 
adherence to global representations of danger. In terms of performing power and 
securitisation, Ghani has used the fifth wave to connect the disparate dangers driving 
Afghan insecurity.  Primarily, the fifth wave is represented as characteristically complex 
and multidimensional (see Ghani 2016b, 2016d, 2017b).  Terrorism is no longer “a solid 
phenomenon like a column that is to be chiseled away.  It is a moving dynamic 
phenomenon and while we hit it, it needs to be understood as a dynamic changing 
phenomenon…[it] is a fluid situation and a constantly morphing situation” (Ghani 
2017a).100  The supposed dynamism of this new danger leaves it in ambiguity.  There are 
no real signifiers, but rather loose associations (e.g. the criminal economy and terror; 
ecology of terror) backed by clear statements about its potentiality.  Another parallel can 
be drawn here to what Daase and Kessler (2007) highlight as dangers manifesting 
themselves owing to incomplete knowledge.  Similar to how ambiguity drives risk (see 
Beck 2006; Aradau and van Munster 2011), Ghani is authoritatively declaring his 
knowledge of this new phenomenon while at the same time leaving discursive space to 
connect future securitised objects. 
Indeed, one of the strongest linkages representative of the fifth wave is the purported deep 
integration between terrorist groups and the narcotics trade.  Keeping in line with earlier 
                                                 
100 In this statement, Ghani was discussing how the nature of terrorism and global dangers have changed 
since 9/11 and that the “task is not done” in defeating this existential threat. 
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representations of the Taliban as heavily involved in the narcotics trade (Peters 2009b), 
Ghani represents the Taliban and other armed opposition groups as heavily involved in 
the drug world.  “Taliban sponsored terrorism is creating a platform that is bringing 
terrorists and criminals from all over the region to Afghanistan.  Not a single one of the 
20 terrorist networks does not (sic) operate by selling narcotics and other forms of 
criminality” (Ghani 2017b).  Despite facing several independent armed opposition groups 
in Afghanistan, each possessing their own unique political vision and identity, Ghani uses 
the (narco)terror danger to unite and represent them as emblematic of one larger threat.  
In a telling statement, Ghani asks, “The Tehrik-e Taliban [Pakistani Taliban], the Haqqani 
networks, and others are common threats but, what’s the platform?  The criminal 
economy provides the common platform for all these movements.  Narcotics and 
refugees, smuggling are part of the same network” (Ghani 2016a).  The fifth wave 
discourse, therefore, provides the state with the opportunity to associate a variety of other 
recognised dangers with the established threat of terrorism.  Narcotics have served as a 
primary node in this equivalential chain, but other dangers are connected to the fifth wave.  
Corruption, for instance, is linked to terror networks (Ghani 2016c; Bashari 2016), along 
with ‘ungoverned spaces’ on the internet (Ghani 2017a; 2016b).  The main significance 
here is the state’s ability to speak authoritatively about insecurity and to develop new 
signifiers indicative of that knowledge.  The discursive linkages between several different 
dangers is interesting; however, in terms of state-building, the discourse of the fifth wave 
is a clear example of the politics of knowledge on insecurity and how this remains a key 
foundation for political authority.   
A more recent development in the fifth wave discourse is its connection to ‘state capture’.  
One of the great challenges presented by contemporary fifth wave organisations is their 
ability to capture ‘ungoverned spaces’, whether that be on the internet or on the ground 
due to insecurity (Ghani 2016a; 2017a).  “From seeking ungoverned space, the aim of the 
fifth wave is to establish territories of terror” (Ghani 2016a).  This association is 
significant because it securitises a (re)politicisation of the terrorist identity.  Recall that 
the label terrorist has been used predominately to depoliticise the identity of the 
perpetrator (Zulaika & Douglass 1996; Bhatia 2005; Ditrych 2014).  The notion that the 
fifth wave of political violence is driven by a desire to capture territory continues this 
depoliticization but in a way that represents their mimicry of statehood as inherently evil.  
Regarding global representations of (narco)terror as danger, the ‘territories of terror’ label 
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serves as a reincarnation of earlier manifestations of the ‘failed state’ danger (see Tsui 
2015).  However, for Afghanistan this discourse serves another purpose, which is to fully 
delegitimise the insurgency and to establish it as terrorism.  Indeed, one of the Taliban’s 
strongest assets has been the success of their parallel government institutions and legal 
structures (Johnson 2013: 9; Semple 2014; Stritzel & Chang 2015: 8; Johnson 2017).  The 
presence, not to mention success, of these shadow institutions clearly undermines the 
authority and position of the state; therefore, it is vital that attempts at state capture be 
represented as a characteristic of the fifth wave.  Any attempt at reclaiming power in 
Afghanistan by any group or individual outside of the GIRoA is associated with the fifth 
wave of political violence, eroding the distinction between insurgency and 
terrorist/criminal.   
In terms of establishing discursive authority over society, (narco)terror has been used 
extensively to construct a perpetual state of emergency and define a set of desired Afghan 
values.  These uses of danger reflect a desire for internal sovereignty and hegemony over 
society.  However, representations of danger are also used by the state to fix inside/outside 
boundaries through the represented externality of the danger (Campbell 1998: 68).  
Interestingly, externality is a theme used frequently in Taliban representations of the 
GIRoA as danger, demonstrating an adherence to Afghanistan’s characteristic hostility to 
foreign influence and tradition of resisting imperialism (Dorronsoro 2005; Barfield 2010).  
Both hegemonic and counterhegemonic voices represent danger as primarily foreign in 
an attempt to secure their vision of the Afghan identity.101  Moreover, by representing 
danger as foreign, both hegemonic and counterhegemonic actors perform knowledge over 
the limits of Afghan society. 
The most common example of theme is in the notion that terrorism was brought to 
Afghanistan.  In this, presidents Ghani and Karzai were quite vocal and maintained the 
idea that Afghanistan was never a supporter of terrorism.  In one particularly salient 
interview with Al Jazeera, Hamid Karzai declared that the War on Terror was not 
conducted in the right place, stating: 
[…] the war on terror in our view from the first place was not in Afghanistan, it 
wasn’t in Afghan villages, it wasn’t in Afghan homes, it wasn’t in targeting Afghans, 
it should have been taken to the sanctuaries, to the training grounds, the ideological 
                                                 
101 This is a rather important point as the legitimacy of both hegemonic and counterhegemonic forces 
depends on its ability to speak for Afghan society and for the Afghan society to recognise them as sovereign.  
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motivational grounds, which were all outside of Afghanistan, and the Afghan people 
suffered in a war that wasn’t that of Afghan people, for which we are not responsible 
in the first place (Karzai 2013) 
Karzai’s statement does not detract from the ongoing violence in Afghanistan; however, 
in framing Afghanistan as the wrong location for the War on Terror he is asserting that 
Afghans are not terrorists and that those identified as terrorists within Afghanistan are 
actually foreign agents.  Moreover, this statement reifies the cultural trope of the imposed 
war, in which Afghans themselves have not declared the War on Terror but rather are 
victims of an imposed foreign conflict.  This sentiment has also been taken up by Ashraf 
Ghani in several statements on terrorism in Afghanistan and the identity of the 
perpetrators.  At a BRIC Summit in Russia in 2015, Ghani asked the rhetorical question 
‘Who fights in my country?’.  The answer given was “Chinese, [ETIM]102, Chechens, 
Uzbeks from Uzbekistan, Tajiks from Tajikistan even the odd Kirgiz and Kazakh, but the 
greatest one of course is a huge movement from Pakistan.  Then, of course there are all 
the rejects for the Arab world that are sent to us” (Ghani 2016b; ToloNews 2015).  For 
Ghani, terrorism is represented as an import in which he frequently derides regional 
powers for ‘exporting’ terrorist groups to Afghanistan.  The idea that terrorists are 
actively sent to Afghanistan has been common throughout much of the post-9/11 politics 
and remains one of the defining points of Afghan-Pakistan relations.  In a press release 
from June 2017, Ghani stated that “11,000 terrorists had come to Afghanistan in the last 
two years, as ‘Taliban sponsored terrorism is creating a platform that is bringing terrorists 
from all over the region to Afghanistan’” (Government Ministry for Information and 
Communication Afghanistan 2017).  This press release is significant for two reasons.  
First, it provides a good example of the state’s representation of terrorism as a foreign 
danger.  Secondly, the Ghani administration is directly connecting the Taliban to an influx 
of foreign terrorists, further delegitimising the Taliban’s political identity and maintaining 
the view that they do not have Afghan society’s interests at heart.  This notion is 
strengthened further in how the Taliban’s ‘intentions’ are framed.  Speaking at the Kabul 
Process Conference (June 2017), Ghani said of the Taliban, “They will never succeed in 
dividing the sacred geography of our country into pieces.  We are united country and 
united we’ll remain” (Ghani 2017b).  The supposed externality of the danger is 
represented through the Taliban’s inferred intentions to break up the country and divide 
                                                 
102 East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM). 
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it into smaller entities.  The inference that this would destroy Afghanistan’s geographical 
identity, thus undermining claims of sovereignty, is presented as antagonistic to 
Afghanistan and supposes a degree of foreign influence.   
Continuing with this theme, linkages between terrorist Taliban and foreign control is 
frequently used in hegemonic representations of violence.  Indeed, there is an observable 
difference in the tone of language used immediately after an attack or episode of political 
violence when compared to statements made at international conferences.  For instance, 
in October 2016, following a high-profile attack on civilians in Ghor province, the Office 
of the President of Afghanistan issued a press release stating “…President Ghani consoles 
with the bereaved families of the martyrs and vows to avenge the blood of the citizens on 
the terrorists and the ruthless mercenaries of foreigners” (Office of the President of 
Afghanistan 2016c).  This press release serves as an example of how violence is 
represented as evidence of foreign influence, and thus, ‘de-Afghanizes’ the perpetrators.  
Another interesting point is the notion that the perpetrators of violence are “mercenaries 
of foreigners” as this is designed to evoke a sense of dishonour and lack of faith.  Given 
Afghan society’s deeply tribal character, with Pashtunwali still forming the basis of much 
of Afghan culture, evoking a sense of dishonour further externalizes the perpetrators of 
violence and excludes them from society.  With regard to using danger to secure political 
sovereignty, the externalization of terrorists represents an image of sovereignty through 
the trope of the foreign menace.  Essentially, the limits of Afghan sovereignty begin with 
the terrorist group; thus, to be labelled a terrorist is to be externalised from Afghan 
society.   
The idea of terrorism as an external menace is furthered through assertions that 
Afghanistan is a battlefield for ‘proxy wars’.  Both Karzai and Ghani have employed this 
theme in speeches to Afghan parliament and international media (Karzai 2010, 2011; 
Ghani 2015b).  While this is useful in creating a binary distinction between the Afghan 
victim and the foreign aggressor (a topic that will be addressed in the following section), 
the trope of the imposed war remains useful for illustrating the role externality plays in 
representing danger (see Campbell 1998).  Both Ghani and Karzai have refused to label 
the war in Afghanistan as a civil war, pointing out that if it were a civil war there would 
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be no need for foreign troops (Karzai 2012b103; Ghani 2016a, 2016c; 2017a).  In one such 
example, at the 2016 Shanghai Cooperation Organization conference in Tashkent, 
Uzbekistan, Ashraf Ghani spoke about the fifth wave of political violence and argued that 
the conflict in Afghanistan was suffering from a definitional problem, claiming that “the 
war in Afghanistan is not a civil war; forces of terrorism that have converged on our 
country need to be defined correctly” (Ghani 2016c).  This statement leaves the terrorist 
in ambiguous terms and enables the audience to develop their own associations; however, 
maintaining the trope of the imposed war, Ghani is clearly inferring that terrorism has 
converged on Afghanistan and firmly establishes this danger as a foreign menace.  
Similarly, Abdullah Abdullah consistently associates Taliban attacks with foreign 
meddling.  For instance, following a suicide bombing in Kabul in April 2016, Abdullah 
issued a statement stating, “[The Taliban’s] fight is for foreign interests, fomentation of 
extremism and destruction of Afghanistan.  This fight is against all norms and human 
laws” (ToloNews 2016a).  The GIRoA consistently associates the Taliban with external 
influences in an effort to delegitimise the movement and to externalise associated actors 
from Afghan society.   
Within the larger theme of external danger, Pakistan is consistently represented as the 
root of (narco)terror.  Indeed, given the track record of the ISI in supporting armed 
opposition forces such as HiG (Hizb-i Islami Gulbuddin) and the Taliban (see Johnson 
2017), it is little wonder that the current GIRoA represents Pakistan as a main patron of 
terror.  In fact, in most of the sources consulted for the thesis Pakistan was singled out as, 
at the very least, enabling terrorism to continue in Afghanistan.  Government statements 
often use quotes from captured Taliban commanders as evidence of Pakistan’s complicity 
in the continued political violence.  In a statement made at the Heart of Asia-Istanbul 
Process conference in 2016, Ghani spoke about the drivers of instability, arguing, “the 
response of the states has been fragmented and some still provide sanctuary and support 
or tolerate these networks.  As Mr. Kakazada, one of the key figures of the Taliban 
movement recently said, if they did not have sanctuary in Pakistan, they would not last a 
month” (Ghani 2016e).  While somewhat vague, this quote illustrates a larger theme in 
GIRoA representations of the Taliban and (narco)terror danger.  The alleged Pakistani 
                                                 
103 In this particular interview, Karzai was challenging the notion of ‘insurgency terrorism’, arguing that if 
it were an insurgency then there would be no need for US troops to be in Afghanistan.  
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support is used as a performance of sovereignty by the Afghan state.  The inference being 
made here is that the Taliban are the pawns of a menacing neighbour, thus granting the 
government of Afghanistan with increased authority over Afghan society while also 
delegitimising the Taliban’s political motivations as part of a larger Pakistani plot to 
destabilise the country.   
The represented association between the Taliban and the Pakistani government also 
serves to legitimise state-led violence against the Taliban and frames such acts as 
upholding Afghanistan’s sovereignty.  An official statement following the assassination 
of Mullah Mansour104 is particularly illustrative of this framing.  The statement begins by 
decrying Mansour’s refusal to end the war and violence in the country.  The next section 
reads, “While sheltering himself in hideouts outside Afghanistan, he was also involved in 
deception, concealment of facts, maiming and killing innocent Afghans, terrorism, 
intimidation, drug smuggling as well as obstruction of development and progress in 
Afghanistan as he obstinately insisted on continuing the war” (Office of the President of 
Afghanistan 2016a).  This statement is designed to be inclusive and discursively connects 
the Taliban to a range of other external dangers.  The fact that Mansour’s location outside 
of Afghanistan was placed at the centre of this statement demonstrates the objective of 
linking Mansour to the Pakistani government.  Moreover, the fact that Pakistan’s 
protection of Mansour allowed a continuation of “deception…maiming and killing 
innocent Afghans, terrorism, [and] drug smuggling” connects Pakistan to these dangers 




Sovereignty, however, is only part of this process and one of the most striking aspects of 
the Afghan government’s representations of danger is its usage of the same language and 
concepts found in the global hegemonic discourse.  Afghanistan’s own particularity 
becomes emblematic of a larger narrative of global insecurity produced by (narco)terror.  
However, this linkage is obscured by the state’s own role of representing the secured 
                                                 




society.  For instance, Ashraf Ghani asserts his own unique perspective on (narco)terror 
and advances possible solutions, but in reality, these solutions mirror those found in the 
immediate post-9/11 security policy of the United States.  Furthermore, the influence of 
US, UK, and UN narcotics policy shaped Afghanistan’s approach to narcotics and how 
discursive actors have represented this threat (Bewley-Taylor 2014).  How do we account 
for this policy transfer?  If we look at the history of Afghanistan, it is typical of an Afghan 
statesman to exploit international rivalries and to delicately balance the policy of global 
powers with their own domestic needs.  As Barfield (2010) points out, the most successful 
Afghan leaders have struck a balance between international and domestic, whereas those 
who have been deposed often prioritise foreign ideas and influence over the local identity.  
Returning to representations of (narco)terror, this raises the question of whether Ashraf 
Ghani is merely continuing this traditional Afghan foreign policy or if it points to the use 
of Afghanistan by the United States as a representation of (narco)terror.  The discussion 
will now approach this linkage and highlight the connection between global 
representations of (narco)terror and the specific representations advanced by discursive 
actors in Afghanistan.   
At the root of this linkage is the danger of the autonomous actor pointed out by Chandler 
(2010).  The ways in which insecurity have been framed by the US in the post-Cold War 
era have illustrated the perception of a ‘rogue state’ danger - an autonomous state in the 
international society that challenges the hegemonic narrative of (in)security.  Initially, 
Afghanistan fit this narrative very well with an authoritarian, isolationist Taliban regime, 
not to mention their affiliation with Al Qaeda.  However, as the ‘concept wars’ (Bewley-
Taylor 2014: 1012) of terror and drugs became more problematic there was a stark need 
for a physical manifestation of the danger, something that lent objectivity to the discourse.  
Mercille (2011) exposes this usage of Afghanistan, arguing that the War on Terror/Drugs 
is not real and suggests that “it is mostly a rhetorical device used by the US government 
and elites as a pretext for intervention against groups that challenge US hegemony 
abroad” (Mercille 2011: 290).  On the one hand, this justifies the Afghan state’s consistent 
assertion that the war(s) in Afghanistan is an “imposed war”.  The claim that there are no 
terrorists in Afghanistan (Karzai 2013) contributes to the notion of Afghan victimhood.  
However, Afghanistan’s own counternarcotics policy and representations of the ‘fifth 
wave’ reaffirm the validity of the hegemonic narrative and position Afghanistan as the 
‘face’ of global (narco)terror.   
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The clearest indication of this can be observed in the portrayal of (narco)terror as a global, 
networked threat (Ghani 2015a; 2016d; 2016e; 2017a).  One of the strongest 
characteristics used in representations of (narco)terror and the Taliban is its globality.  For 
various reasons, such as performance of sovereignty, this danger takes on a global 
character; however, with regard to the influence of US discourse, the global character 
justifies the hegemonic narrative that this is a universal danger.  Ghani seems to invoke 
this linkage in his assertion that, “Terrorism does not know borders; there cannot be a 
distinction between good and bad terrorists, providing sanctuary or tolerating; Terrorism 
is a threat not only to Afghanistan, but also to the entire global community” (Ghani 
2016d).  While this statement could be understood as directed at Pakistan, the expansion 
of the terrorist threat from domestic, to regional, to international indicates an affirmation 
of the US’s eschatological framing of a civilizational war against terror.   
Similar linkages can also be seen in representations of the narcotic danger.  While the US 
has portrayed illegal narcotics as a global danger for several decades (see Herschinger 
2011, 2015; Crick 2012), this language has recently infiltrated Afghan representations of 
narcotics and its connection to global terrorism.  In one particularly telling statement, 
Hamid Karzai held that:  
Terrorism is a menacing threat that does not just affect Afghanistan and Pakistan, but 
also other countries in our region, notably India, China and Russia.  The narcotics 
trade threatens the wellbeing of our nations.  As the frontline in the fight against 
terrorism and the global narcotics trade, Afghanistan has served as a bulwark to the 
common security of the region (Karzai 2011b)   
The notion depicted here is that (narco)terror is an international danger and one that 
Afghanistan is portrayed as facing directly.  Rather than viewing terrorism or narcotics 
as purely isolated phenomena – in other words, approaching them as separate domestic 
dangers – Karzai is claiming that all countries are facing the same danger as Afghanistan 
and that a common (read international) approach is needed.  There is another interesting 
element of this statement, which is the securitisation of narcotics.  The Karzai 
administration had been defined by some as Pax Narcotica or ‘criminalised peace’, in 
which the central government would ignore local government officials’ involvement in 
the narcotics trade in many areas of Afghanistan (Maas 2011: 2; Bewley-Taylor 2013: 
14).  The linkage between narcotics and terrorism therefore serves to desecuritise the 
narcotics trade in isolation and (re)securitise it as equivalent to terrorism and terrorist 
actors like the Taliban.  Again, the notion here is that Afghanistan is fighting a global 
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danger as opposed to an ‘Afghan’ one; thus, legitimising the position of the GIRoA vis-
à-vis Afghan society and within the international community.   
Afghan representations of (narco)terror are illustrative of the role US security narratives 
have played around the world, but the influence of the US can also be observed in the 
policies and solutions put forth by the Afghan government.  Moreover, we can observe a 
shift in the language used by Karzai and Ghani in their representations of (narco)terror.  
While Karzai’s relationship with the United States can be characterised as rocky at 
times,105 the Ghani administration has been much more cooperative and adherent to 
American aims in the region.  One of the strongest examples of this is Ghani’s appeals to 
regionalism and international cooperation against the (narco)terror threat.  Ghani’s 
distinctively multilateral approach to (narco)terror is symptomatic of UN policy influence 
in the early years of post-9/11 Afghanistan.  The 2003 National Drug Control Strategy 
(NDCS), for instance, included a section dedicated to Afghanistan’s international 
obligations to UN resolutions and narcotics control treaties (Bewley-Taylor 2014: 1015).  
In the updated five-year National Drug Control Strategy (2006) the report begins with a 
quote from the Afghan constitution, stating “The state prevents all types of terrorist 
activities, cultivation and smuggling of narcotic drugs and production and consumption 
of intoxicants” (Ministry of Counter-Narcotics 2006: 3).  While the original strategy 
predates Ghani’s presidency by a decade, it nevertheless laid the groundwork for his 
characteristic multilateralism.  Moreover, it also forms the basis for the Afghan 
government’s usage of (narco)terror as a means to re-establish itself as a member of the 
international community.  For instance, in the 2011 International Afghanistan Conference 
Communique, Article 15 states “recognizing their shared responsibility, Afghanistan and 
the International Community reiterate their determination to counter, in a comprehensive 
manner, including by crop eradication, interdiction and promoting alternative agriculture, 
the menace of illicit drugs including precursors, which causes widespread harm and 
suffering” (International Afghanistan Conference 2011).  In recent times, Ghani has 
portrayed Afghanistan as adhering to its obligations to the international community and 
claimed that Afghanistan’s inability to overcome these dangers is a product of 
                                                 
105 Hamid Karzai would often portray Afghanistan as victims of foreign wars that were problematically 
applied to Afghans.  The high numbers of civilian deaths, culturally insensitive ‘night raids’, as well as 
several other high-profile controversies made the US politically toxic during the latter years of the Karzai 
administration.  This is most observable in Karzai’s refusal to label the Taliban as terrorists, instead opting 
for the term ‘brothers’ (Karzai 2013).   
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disagreement and lack of cooperation (Ghani 2017b).  This perspective is carried forward 
in regional forums, with Ghani consistently appealing to a shared regional commitment 
to fighting narcotics and terrorism.  At the Brussels Conference on Afghanistan (2016), 
Ghani stated, “Our problems remain, and they are networked: criminality and corruption 
are interrelated and it requires a regional focus…What is critical is to generate the 
political will for regional cooperation.  Terrorism does not know borders…terrorism is a 
threat not only to Afghanistan, but also to the entire global community” (Ghani 2016d).  
The assertion being made here is that (narco)terror and its constituent symptoms, 
corruption and criminality, are being faced by all states and that cooperation is the only 
way to overcome this danger.  However, despite this appeal to multilateralism, the 
fundamental challenge of arriving at a common understanding or knowledge of 
(narco)terror remains.   
Indeed, it is in promoting the ‘Afghan’ knowledge of (narco)terror that linkage with the 
US/UN becomes apparent.  Moreover, in a process that mimics the domestic subjugation 
of knowledge (see Jackson 2012a), Afghanistan represents its knowledge of (narco)terror 
as authoritative and uses these representations to subjugate competing knowledges 
emerging from other political actors.  This symbolises a two-pronged strategy in which 
Ghani represents the Afghan government as the authoritative knowledge holder on 
(narco)terror, while at the same time criticizing the lack of a shared understanding of the 
danger.   After introducing the concept of the fifth wave of political violence, Ghani went 
on to state, “Our knowledge and response are both fragmented as we are struggling 
between naming the phenomena, knowing it, and having an action plan on the basis of an 
aligned strategy to disrupt, overcome, and destroy the fifth wave of terrorism” (Ghani 
2016a).  The fifth wave discourse is used to existentialise the hegemonic narrative that 
had been developed previously in the United States.  Moreover, the absence of 
coordination is a criticism of the lack of regional, and indeed global, acceptance of this 
narrative.  Both Karzai and Ghani frequently invoked the role of Afghanistan “as the 
frontline society and polity” fighting (narco)terror in their appeals for international 
cooperation and a common understanding (Karzai 2011b; Ghani 2016e).  This role 
strengthens the government’s claims to hold authoritative knowledge about the danger 
and legitimises the represented characteristics of it.  There is a duality in the Afghan 
government’s deployment of the fifth wave discourse.  On the one hand, it serves to 
strengthen the state’s hold on knowledge of danger in the domestic context.  On the other 
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hand, this discourse is directed outwards toward the international community to 
demonstrate conformity to hegemonic narratives of insecurity and inclusion in the 
international community.  The continuity illustrated in the evolution of political violence 
discursively connects the threat faced by Afghanistan, itself a product US and UN 
representations, to the global narrative of (narco)terror.   
Ultimately, the goal of these representations is the subjugation of parochial interpretations 
of (narco)terror.  The lack of common consensus and policy is represented as an 
impediment to security and, in some cases, support for (narco)terrorists (i.e. Pakistan).  
Paralleling the use of (in)security in domestic society to construct a state of exception 
(see Agamben 1998; Dillon 2007), the Afghan government represents the international 
system as being in an extra-ordinary time, “at a moment when the world order is being 
re-defined” (Ghani 2017a).  The universality of (narco)terror is connected to this 
transformative moment where cooperation amongst states is viewed as vital in “a fight 
for security of the world” (Ghani 2017a).  In an environment where the stakes are so high, 
adhering to the Afghan representation of (narco)terror is depicted as the only means of 
stopping it; thus, Ghani attempts to subjugate alternative knowledge: 
My plea is development of a common understanding.  I am not saying to take a 
national perspective, but take a neutral international perspective because it is 
imperative that we understand the phenomenon.  If we don’t understand the 
phenomenon properly, how can we devise the appropriate means for dealing with 
them? (Ghani 2016b)  
The inference being made here is that parochial understandings of narcotics and terrorism 
are hindering global security and allowing this new danger to continue.  Afghanistan, 
being the frontline state facing this danger, holds authoritative knowledge as to the 
appropriate means of overcoming it.  Thus, adopting a “neutral international perspective” 
is an attempt to subjugate domestic representations of narcotics and danger and promote 
adherence to the global narrative.  In this way Afghanistan serves to replicate the global 






Section IV: Establishing the Endangered Identity 
 
In addition to the many uses of danger as a performance of sovereign authority, 
(narco)terror has also been used within the process of establishing and disciplining 
identity in Afghanistan.  The duality characteristic of representations of danger, as 
constitutive of both political order and social identity, is evidenced by the framing of the 
Taliban as the personification of (narco)terrorism in post-9/11 Afghanistan.  Moreover, it 
is through the securitisation of (narco)terror that the secured objects of Afghan society 
are identified.  Rather than objectively posing a challenge to the authority of the state, or 
a threat to the existence of Afghan society, the Taliban have been used to discursively 
construct contemporary Afghan society via representations of danger.   
Of the many challenges facing the Afghan state, cultivating loyal identities has 
consistently been the most pressing.  A brief survey of the political history of Afghanistan 
alerts us to a tradition of problematic centralised governments as policies and identities 
developed in Kabul are seldom transferred to rural communities (see Barfield 2010; 
Schetter 2013).  Moreover, relying on loose power-sharing agreements with local leaders, 
the central authority remains in a precarious position, requiring the support of local 
strongmen to enforce its will while at the same time recognising the political impediment 
these strongmen pose (Maas 2011: 2; see Barfield 2004).  A further contributing factor is 
the tribal and ethnically-diverse nature of Afghan society, with fractured identities along 
shifting lines.  What this points to is the absence of a universal ‘loyal’ identity in 
Afghanistan akin to the state-based nationalisms found in other parts of the region.  
Instead, the national identity of Afghanistan is constantly changing and dependent upon 
local influences and discursive actors.  This challenge reflects the argument made by 
Campbell that, “the mere existence of an alternative mode of being, the presence of which 
exemplifies that different identities are possible and thus denaturalizes the claim of a 
particular identity to the true identity is sometimes enough to produce the understanding 
of a threat” (Campbell 1998: 3).  For the Afghan state, the diverse and highly localised 
nature of identity in Afghan society presents a challenge to its hegemonic vision and 
therefore constitutes a threat to its authority.     
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Michael Shapiro (2004) writes extensively on the concept of ‘cultural governance’ and 
argues that this form of governance uses expression “to constitute and legitimise practices 
of sovereignty, while restricting or preventing those representations that challenge 
sovereignty” (Campbell 2003: 57).  The diversity of identities in Afghan society result in 
a plurality of representations that challenge the state’s national narrative.  Afghanistan’s 
violent history and the inter-ethnic warfare witnessed during the Afghan Civil War (1992-
1996) has led to a deep sense of alienation among many non-Pashtun identities (Shahrani 
2008: 178).  The Taliban similarly use representations of danger to challenge the state’s 
claims over Afghan identity, often offering a competing representation that utilises Islam 
and Afghanistan’s Islamic identity (see Chapter V).  As a result, the state must 
consistently perform identity as “the symbolic maintenance of the nation-state requires a 
contentious management of historical narratives as well as territorial space” (Shapiro 
2004: 45).  Such a plurality of particular identities within Afghanistan means that 
cultivating a loyal monolithic identity is vital to maintaining the authority of the state.   
Discourses of (in)security are therefore deployed as a means to developing a loyal, pan-
Afghan national identity.  The security-identity-loyalty complex developed by Mark 
Neocleous is particularly useful in understanding the state’s use of danger: 
The mass of heterogeneous interests, desires and identities that make up a society has 
to be condensed into a single national entity, a ‘nationality’, the order and security of 
which has to be constantly reiterated against the dangerous other.  The crudeness and 
simplicity of the images of ideological purity in defining the identity of the imagined 
communities in question only help in driving home the central message: that it is to 
this identity that loyalty would be expected. (Neocleous 2008: 135)  
Regarding sociopolitical relations in Afghanistan, the presence and constant reiteration 
of (narco)terror is designed to cultivate the loyal national identity and therefore mitigate 
the challenges posed by a pluralistic society.  But what elements constitute the ‘loyal’ 
Afghan identity?  While representations of the Taliban are useful in establishing clear 
binary distinctions, relying solely on the purported characteristics of the Taliban to 
construct the Afghan identity is insufficient and leaves the collective identity fractured as 
particular elements of the Taliban’s identity (e.g. opposition education for girls) find 
acceptance in certain groups within Afghan society.  Rather, it is through representations 
of the threat posed by a danger – in other words, the endangered objects – that a national 
identity is developed.  Echoing the works of Campbell (1998), Weldes et al. (1999) and 
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Stern (2006), through critically analysing the state’s representation of (narco)terror in 
Afghanistan we can uncover the constituent elements of the desired Afghan identity.   
 
Islam 
Islam remains the single feature unifying Afghanistan’s diverse society.106  However, 
Islam also poses a challenge for the state as it has been used in the past to delegitimise 
previous governments and their policies.107  In contemporary times, the Taliban’s own 
Islamic identity undermines the state’s deployment of Islam and delegitimises its Islamic 
credentials.  Operating in rural areas, the Taliban’s use of Islam is more attune to the rural 
context, which illustrates the additional challenge of transmitting top-down narratives of 
identity.  Therefore, Islam forms the basis of the GIRoA’s cultural governance strategy 
and it is for this reason that Islam features so frequently in the state’s representations of 
(narco)terror.  However, rather than directly countering the Taliban’s counterhegemonic 
narrative, the government re-interprets the violence committed by the Taliban to represent 
the Afghan Islamic identity as endangered and positions itself as the protector of this 
identity.   
Indeed, the most critical first step in constructing this national narrative is to delegitimise 
the Taliban’s self-proclaimed Islamic identity.  While it may be simple to state that the 
Taliban are not Muslims because of the violence they commit, and indeed this is a 
frequent tactic used in statements issued immediately after an attack or bombing 
(ToloNews 2013; Karzai 2013), the state’s communication strategy is more nuanced, 
often approaching the topic indirectly.  The reason for this lies partly in the Taliban’s 
recognised social identity as mullahs and their renown as just, honest, and pious 
(Mahendrarajah 2014; Raqib and Barreto 2014).  The liberal basis of the post-9/11 
Afghan state establishes distance between a deeply religious society (especially in rural 
                                                 
106 However, this becomes problematic when applied to Hazara.  Despite being Muslim, Hazara are 
predominately Shia and possess observably different physical features to their Tajik and Pashtun 
counterparts.  This has caused widespread discrimination and violence against the Hazara community and 
continues to be a problem in contemporary Afghanistan.  
107 Some prominent examples include the policies of Amanullah (1919-1929), who attempted to modernise 
Afghanistan and reform education, gender relations, and the rights of citizens; and Nur Muhammad Taraki 
(head of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan), who initiated many costly land reforms and other social 
programmes, which were popularly rejected and led to the Soviet-Afghan War.  
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areas) and the modern state.  However, the Taliban’s repeated use of violence presents 
the government with ample discursive space to write Islam out of the Taliban’s identity.   
The opening speech given by Ghani at the June 2017 Kabul Process Conference is 
particularly illustrative of the state’s delegitimization of the Taliban’s Islamic identity: 
These terrorist attacks insult the very concept of justice.  The rebels say they are 
fighting a religious war, but Islam is a religion of peace.  As the Holy Q’uran says, 
‘to kill one Muslim is to kill the whole of humanity.’  And it is Muslims – Afghan 
Muslims – innocent Muslim men, women, and children, who they are killing, by the 
thousand.  Narcotics, terror, extortion; our religion has nothing but contempt for these 
tools of modern day terrorism.  They are terrorists, nothing more. (Ghani 2017b) 
This statement is significant for several reasons.  Primarily, it demonstrates the 
government’s problematization of the (narco)terrorist’s108 religious identity.  The 
‘terrorist’ or ‘rebel’ is left purposely ambiguous as this was given at a peace conference; 
however, the discursive linkage between the ‘rebel’ and the Taliban is made clear through 
references to a religious war.  However, just as significant is the attachment of narcotics 
to the larger identity of the un-Islamic terrorist.  Narcotics (both use and production) is 
forbidden in Islam, but this is seldom used in representations of the danger.  Representing 
narcotics as a tool of terrorism, and more importantly as antithetical to Islam, expands the 
scope of the un-Islamic dangerous Other to incorporate the various linkages identified 
earlier in the fifth wave discourse.  Another point to draw from this statement is the 
government’s performance of speaking authoritatively about what Islam is and what it 
means to be a Muslim.  Citing well-known verses in the Q’uran and using this as evidence 
of the (narco)terrorist’s opposition to Islam is itself a representation of the Afghan state 
as an authority on Islam, thereby framing Afghan society as wholly Muslim.   
The sites of violence are also used to delegitimise the Taliban’s Islamic identity.  If we 
consider terrorism as a communication (Crellinsten 2002; Richardson 2006), it could be 
inferred that the Taliban choose specific targets as part of a wider counterhegemonic 
strategy.  In the state’s representation of the violence, the Taliban’s discursive agency is 
denied as portrayals of the violence usually centre on the (innocent) victims (see Frosh 
and Wolfsfeld 2007).  In a press release following a bombing in May 2017, the Office of 
the President wrote of the terrorists, “respecting no religion or law, terrorists always target 
                                                 
108 I use the Unknown here to signify the deliberate ambiguity of the ‘terrorist’ or ‘rebel’ in this statement.  
While this statement clearly reflects earlier representations of the Taliban, the danger being discussed here 
is the larger unknown assemblage of (narco)terrorist 
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innocent civilians, religious scholars and sacred locations” (Office of the President 
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2017).  Indeed, the attack being referred to was the 
assassination of a member of the Ulema Council for Parwan, but the significance here is 
in how this act of violence is portrayed as common and characteristic of the terrorists’ 
immorality.  Moreover, the statement “respecting no religion or law” is specifically 
designed to delegitimize the Taliban’s reputation as just and pious.   
As a contrast, the GIRoA represents itself as undeniably Muslim and representative of the 
Islamic Afghan nation.  In addition to the strategies outlined above, the GIRoA also 
frequently invokes Islamic imagery and concepts in its communication.  For instance, in 
Ashraf Ghani’s inaugural speech as president he began by saying “now it is time to change 
this Jehad109 to a greater Jehad (Akbar Jehad) for ensuring peace, stability and welfare in 
the country” (Ghani 2014).  The use of jihad is deliberate and coopts counterhegemonic 
usages of jihad as justification for violently opposing the government.  Moreover, Ghani’s 
own vision for Afghanistan is linked to the religious duty of struggle and is designed to 
galvanise society around the state’s vision.  Thus, Ghani is attempting to present the 
government (and himself) as the embodiment of Afghanistan’s Islamic identity, 
subsequently depriving the Taliban of their own corresponding Islamic identity and 
framing any violence or opposition to the state as a threat to Islam.     
The government also uses Islam in performances of sovereignty.  Both territory and 
society are represented as distinctly Muslim and it is the role of the government to expel 
those who challenge the official narrative of Islam.  In an interview with Al Jazeera in 
2013, Hamid Karzai stated, “We don’t want on our soil, an extremist radical 
organization…those who use the name of Islam, misuse the name of Islam to undermine 
Muslims and their livelihoods” (Karzai 2013).  In this statement Karzai is framing the 
insurgency as a threat to Afghan Muslims and therefore a force to be removed from 
society.  The inference here, which is that ‘radical organizations’ misuse Islam, is done 
deliberately to frame counterhegemonic forces as antithetical to Islam, thus 
problematizing their own self-representation.  However, characteristic of statements 
given by the government, the securitised actor is left ambiguous.  Do the Taliban fit the 
label ‘extremist radical organization’?  As government officials frequently point out, there 
                                                 
109 Please note that jehad is a different form of spelling jihad and was found in the original translated 
transcript of Ghani’s address.   
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are “close to 30 groups classified as terrorists by the UN operating or establishing a base 
in Afghanistan” (Ghani 2016e).  On the one hand, this leaves the (narco)terrorist open to 
societal interpretations.  The association may not be universally understood to reflect the 
Taliban, but rather could apply to other local groups and powerholders in Afghanistan.  
On the other hand, the ‘extremist radical organization’ signifier is connected to a 
distinctive use of violence emblematic of the Taliban, indicating the preferred meaning 
of the speaker.  In another example, Karzai stated, “Afghanistan is the first country in the 
world that will stand for Islam and its values and we have proven that and those who use 
the name of Islam to abuse Muslims, to close their schools, to kill their women and 
children are enemies of Islam” (Karzai 2013).  The emphasis placed here on closing 
schools is a reference to the Taliban’s restrictions on education during its time in power 
and frequent attacks on schools and teachers throughout the 2000s.  While not addressing 
the Taliban directly, Karzai is referencing commonly recognised characteristics of the 
Taliban to indirectly connect the organisation to the un-Islamic (narco)terrorist.  
Moreover, stating that such violent actors are considered the ‘enemies of Islam’ 
disassociates these actors with Afghan society and firmly establishes them as external, 
consequently disciplining associated groups and identities within Afghan society.     
Islam is also used as a point of reference in Afghanistan’s international identity.  The 
Taliban frequently assert that the government of Afghanistan are “puppets” of foreigners, 
delegitimising the state’s claims of sovereignty (see Semple 2014).  The dynamics of 
local politics in Afghanistan places a great distance between the central government in 
Kabul and isolated districts away from population centres (Schetter et al. 2007; Schetter 
2013).  As a result, there is a continuity in how the contemporary government attempts to 
balance international policy with their own domestic challenges.  Islam is used to mitigate 
some of these challenges and to invoke a referent object recognised by all of Afghan 
society.  Particularly over the Ghani era, Islam has come to dominate Afghanistan’s 
foreign policy identity and how the government views foreign relations.  In Ghani’s 
inaugural address in 2014, he outlined his foreign policy strategy and the deep linkages 
Afghanistan held with the rest of the Islamic world.  “Islamic countries sphere would also 
be an important one in our foreign policy.  Our vision, thought and actions are all based 
on Islamic values, and the Islamic culture is deeply linked with all aspects of our life.  
Therefore, we still have deep, holistic and fruitful relations with Islamic countries” (Ghani 
2014).  In terms of nation-building, framing Afghanistan’s foreign policy in such terms 
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is designed to cultivate a strong Islamic identity within society.  The fact that this speech 
was directed at a domestic audience is indicative of Ghani’s attempts to cultivate an image 
Afghanistan’s international Islamic identity, of which the GIRoA is the patron.  As the 
state is representative of the society, this statement illustrates the connection between 
state and society premised on Islam.  However, more significantly is the use of this 
discourse to distance the GIRoA from perceived foreign influence.  The claim that “our 
vision, thought and actions are all based on Islamic values” bolsters the Islamic 
credentials of the government and exposes difference between them and foreign 
influences, namely the US.  Further assertions of Afghanistan’s Islamic foreign policy 
can be observed in support given to the Mecca Declaration, a statement issued by religious 
scholars in Saudi Arabia condemning terrorism as un-Islamic (Ghani 2016a).  The 
government uses Islamic foreign policy to form an equivalential chain in which the state 
is Islamic, its friends and allies in the world are Islamic, the Afghan society is Islamic, 
and therefore the challenges faced by Afghanistan and its allies are un-Islamic.  
 
Nation of Victims 
While Islam has been an important strategy in establishing the state as representative of 
the Afghan nation, the most frequent use of danger as identity-building can be observed 
in the deployment of collective trauma and victimhood.  As with Islam, the construction 
of a nation of victims forms a large part of the Taliban’s communication strategy and 
highlights the symbiotic relationship between hegemonic and counterhegemonic 
representations of danger.  While the Taliban witness their share of violence and trauma, 
the state holds considerably more authority and resources in their representation of 
suffering.  As Afghan society is discursively linked to the state, political actors are better 
positioned to utilise violent acts in their construction of the Afghan identity.  Despite the 
continuation of widespread violence and trauma, the government remains positioned to 
‘speak’ for the Afghan national body as the trauma reflects the state’s inability to secure.   
The ‘nation of victims’ discourse is built upon the collective history of foreign influences 
and maladies in Afghanistan.  The Anglo-Afghan wars are commonly held points of 
reference in Afghan culture designed to invoke a sense of historical trauma resulting from 
the Great Game (DuPree 2002; Barfield 2010).  Subsequent invasions by the Soviet 
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Union, and more recently NATO, continues this tradition and further establishes the 
externality of danger.  From these points of reference, the state can ascribe several 
qualities to the Afghan nation and chart its historical progression.  Moreover, by evoking 
a sense of historical resistance to foreign occupiers, and the subsequent sacrifices such 
resistance entails, the GIRoA places itself as the contemporary manifestation of this 
legacy.  The opening statement given by Hamid Karzai in his inaugural speech in 2011 is 
a good example of this:   
Ten years ago when we began this difficult journey, we had inherited a destroyed 
country with no state institutions of national economy or education.  Our strong army 
had been completely dismantled on orders by outsiders [referring to Pakistan] and 
their associates [referring to Taliban]; thousands martyred and millions escaped to 
take refuge outside their homeland; our educated were either killed or forced out of 
their country; our country was turned into a ground for rivalries by our enemies and 
a land of mourning and grieving. (Karzai 2011a)   
This statement invokes a sense of shared trauma by chronicling the many challenges 
facing Afghanistan in November 2001.  The externality of danger is referenced by the 
orders to dismantle the army of Afghanistan.  Moreover, the role of the state as protector 
is made apparent through its conspicuous absence during this time of violence and 
suffering.  Afghanistan’s problematic history of foreign influence is also referenced in 
the line, “our country was turned into a ground for rivalries by our enemies.”  There is a 
strong sense of shared suffering in Afghanistan, which is addressed through references to 
the victims of political violence and the diaspora.  Karzai is using this shared trauma to 
represent the Taliban’s time in power as a danger and delegitimises counterhegemonic 
claims to speak for the ‘true’ Afghanistan.  Karzai continues his speech with the 
statement, “However, despite all the hardships, the Afghans strived strenuously to take 
their destiny in their own hands and to re-build their state institutions” (Karzai 2011a).  
From establishing a point of trauma in the collective memory of Afghanistan, Karzai 
develops a sense of social ownership of the state.  The fact that Afghans strived to rebuild 
their state infers that the endangered society rebuilt Afghanistan and firmly establishes 
the interconnection between political and social identity.  This theme of resilience and 
resistance is continued to this day with political actors frequently citing this as 
characteristic of the true Afghan identity.  Moreover, the position of Afghanistan as the 
‘frontline society’ facing the fifth wave is used as evidence of its resilience (Karzai 2011b; 
Ghani 2016d, 2016e, 2017a).  In short, the suffering experienced by Afghans is not down 
to the weakness or incompetence of the GIRoA, but rather the unjust ambitions of 
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counterhegemonic forces such as the Taliban.  Such suffering continues as a mark of the 
righteous Afghan identity as endangered, but resisting, the unjust foreign danger.     
Victimhood and suffering is exemplified in frequent references to martyrdom in the 
discourse.  On the one hand, martyrdom utilises Islamic notions of suffering and sacrifice, 
which reflects Afghan social identity.  In statements and speeches given following a 
terrorist event, the government often uses Islamic imagery in its representation of the 
victims and the collective suffering of the nation.  In November 2016, following an attack 
in Kabul, the Office of the President released a statement saying, “the enemies of the 
people of Afghanistan martyred a number of our compatriots by carrying out a terrorist 
attack in Kabul City this morning” (Office of the President of Afghanistan 2016d).  The 
Islamic notion of divine sacrifice is used here to sacralise the victims and equate Islamic 
identity to the Afghan nation.  In another statement issued following an earlier attack in 
September 2016, “the President offers his sympathies and condolences to the families of 
those martyred, wishes quick recovery to those wounded, and prays to Almighty Allah to 
grant the highest place in paradise to those martyred today” (Office of the President of 
Afghanistan 2016b).  Again, the use of Islamic notions of divine sacrifice and paradise 
equate victimhood with religious duty and frame the Afghan victim as representative of 
Islam.  This creates a binary distinction between the Afghan/Muslim victim and the 
foreign/non-Muslim Other.  Rather than relying on direct representations of the Taliban’s 
evilness or criminality to construct the Afghan identity, the government approaches the 
Taliban indirectly through representations of the effects of (narco)terror to construct a 
national identity.   
Victims are also discursively incorporated within the Afghan nation through metaphorical 
linkages.  The common use of ‘innocent sons and daughters’ (Office of the President of 
Afghanistan 2016; Ghani 2017) in reference to the victims of terrorism illustrates the 
establishment of a national family (McClintock 1993).  The use of this label has two 
objectives.  First, referring to victims as ‘sons and daughters’ infantilises Afghan society 
and creates a metaphorical linkage between the protecting sovereign (i.e. the Father) and 
the defenseless (i.e. innocent) sons and/or daughters.  If we recall that the discursively 
constituted role of the state is primarily to identify and protect against danger, the use of 
this metaphor establishes the Afghan government (and more specifically the Executive 
Branch) within that role.  Secondly, this metaphor invokes a shared sense of suffering.  
As sons and daughters, the victims are incorporated within the larger Afghan national 
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family, therefore their loss is the nation’s loss.  The fact that so many civilians have been 
killed over the previous four decades of conflict means that most Afghans have first-hand 
experience of loss.  By framing the loss of innocent victims as a loss of a family member, 
the GIRoA connects the effects of (narco)terror to the collective memory of Afghan 
society.   
Emerging from this sense of martyrdom and national family is a binary distinction 
between the Afghan nation as victims and the foreign perpetrator of violence.  The 
distinction is best illustrated in an excerpt from Ashraf Ghani’s speech at the Kabul 
Process conference in 2017: 
Afghans are resilient.  We have all known hunger, we have all seen what terror does 
to our friends and our families.  We have all seen what terror has done to our friends 
and families.  There is not one Afghan family that has not suffered.  But we are a 
nation not just of survivors.  We overcome challenges, together.  We are a country 
with a three-thousand-year history.  There has never been a separatist movement in 
Afghanistan and there never will be. (Ghani 2017b) 
The suffering nation is emphasised through references to commonly held memories in 
Afghan society.  The shared trauma erodes different boundaries within the social sphere 
and replaces them with the common history of violence and war.  As a contrast, the 
reference to separatist movements is designed to externalise insurgent actors who aim to 
establish parallel governments or challenge the state’s notion of the Afghan nation.  While 
the reference is not directly used against the Taliban, and indeed the Taliban’s aims are 
not separatist (Raqib and Barreto 2014), the linkage between a 3,000-year history and 
lack separatist movements firmly establishes counterhegemonic voices as external to 
Afghanistan.  Moreover, if we recall that the distinctive feature of the fifth wave is to 
establish ‘territories of terror’ we can infer that separatism is being used to frame 
(narco)terror as antithetical to Afghanistan.  Thus, a binary distinction is formed between 
the endangered Afghan society and the (narco)terrorist Other. 
 
Conclusion 
The representation of (narco)terror in Afghanistan illustrates the use of danger as a means 
of securing and disciplining the hegemonic Afghan identity.  The international and 
domestic dimensions of this context demonstrate the various contexts in which danger 
has been used.  In terms of state-building, the Afghan government has used (narco)terror 
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in the establishment of the contemporary Afghan state and in ways that fit its specific 
context.  The (re)emergence of (narco)terror immediately after 9/11 demonstrates the 
agency held by the US globally and its authority in constructing and disseminating its 
own representation of danger around the world.  But what is perhaps most striking about 
the use of danger is its potential for immaterial control.  In terms of nation-building, the 
utility of (narco)terror cannot be denied as this cultivates an image of the Afghan self 
replete with cultural references and values.  The ambiguity of the (narco)terrorist allows 
social actors to draw their own interpretations and take part in the application of labels to 
the excluded.  The levels of acceptance or the success of these representations was not 
the focus of this chapter.  Rather, this chapter has sought to illustrate the GIRoA’s 
instrumental use of representations of (narco)terror, and its effects on society, to establish 
its hegemonic position over the endangered Afghan identity.  Indeed, as this chapter has 
revealed, (narco)terror is not an existential threat to the Afghan state or society, but rather 
is maintained as a point of reference upon which discursive actors in the government can 
ascribe the dangers of the antagonistic Other and cultivate the identity of the endangered 






Chapter V – Counterhegemonic Voices: The 
Taliban’s (re)Representations of Danger  
 
If we consider danger to be a discourse that is subject to hegemonic representations, 
ultimately the way we observe and evaluate this phenomenon is one-sided.  Up to this 
point, the discussion on how narcotics and terrorism emerged as contemporary 
representations of danger focused exclusively on changes in the hegemonic discourse 
throughout the 20th century.  The argument was that the concepts of narcotics and 
terrorism are reflections on how a state, or discursive hegemon, views its society, over 
which it has authority.  While a society has agency in influencing the needs and 
necessities of the state, ultimately the role in constructing and disseminating these 
representations of danger rests with hegemonic actor.  But what about those represented 
as danger?  What is their role in sustaining or challenging these representations?  Do they 
truly embody the discursive ‘blank canvas’ upon which the discursive hegemon writes 
danger?  This is a crucial question to investigate as it poses a direct challenge to the 
authority of the state in both an institutional and ideational sense.  Indeed, the ability of 
the represented to engage in discourse and represent itself undermines the very 
foundations of the sovereign’s authority as they challenge the characteristics, values, and 
labels being imposed on them (Campbell 1998: 3).  This chapter addresses the 
counterhegemonic use of danger by critically analysing the discourses and 
(counter)representations emerging from the Taliban.  The very nature of Taliban 
communications mirrors the methods and constructs employed by the GIRoA as they 
deploy their own representations of danger to establish an alternative vision for Afghan 
identity and their authority over the endangered society.  In this symbiotic relationship, 
both the Taliban and the Afghan government use representations of danger (i.e. 
representing the danger of the other) as part of the same strategy of attaining/maintaining 
hegemony over society.  While the content and methods differ greatly, the utilisation of 
representations of danger as a means of control can be observed in both actors, illustrating 
that danger is not a fixed concept but rather an ever-evolving discourse designed to 
constitute society both in terms of social structures and identity.   
Prior to embarking on a critical analysis of the Taliban’s representations of danger, we 
must first investigate the context of counterhegemonic discourse as well as the actors 
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themselves.  The typology of representations and discourses of danger emerging from a 
counterhegemonic position are often dramatically different from their hegemonic 
counterparts both in the methods and modes employed (Nazir 2010).110  This is largely 
due to the fact that counterhegemonic actors are located outside, or on the fringes of, 
legitimate society (i.e. the society discursively constituted by hegemonic actors).  The 
perceived illegitimacy of these actors relegates them to an area external to the 
sociopolitical relationship that defines a society’s interaction and interplay with political 
authority.  Therefore, as society largely accepts hegemonic representations of danger as 
existential, the actors and identities represented as danger must use covert methods of 
communicating and disseminating their counter-representations to the society (Karzai 
2009).  Following from this, we will turn to a brief investigation of the methods used by 
the Taliban in communicating with Afghan, and indeed global, society.  While this section 
will not critically assess the strengths or weaknesses of these methods, a brief 
investigation of the methods used by the Taliban will illustrate that the sovereignty 
claimed by the discursive hegemon is porous at best and reflects the notion that society is 
a field of competing representations. Moreover, the methods used by the Taliban highlight 
the distinctive link between counterhegemonic actors and the social audience at a 
grassroots level.  While counterhegemonic actors are often prevented from using the same 
methods utilised by the discursive hegemon, their status on the periphery of society 
enables them to structure their representations in ways that are accessible and commonly 
known to the social audience (Bhatia 2005; Johnson 2007, 2017; Foxley 2007; ICG 2008; 
Stritzel and Chang 2015; Aggarwal 2016).  This chapter then turns to an extensive 
analysis of the Taliban’s engagement with discourse and representations of danger.  While 
the Taliban’s representations do not mirror the content of hegemonic representations (i.e. 
they seldom call the government of Afghanistan terrorists and/or narcotraffickers), the 
labels and values used by the Taliban often possess the same meanings and inferences 
used in hegemonic representations of the Taliban.  In other words, the preferred meanings 
and corollaries desired by the Taliban mirror those of the Afghan government.  The 
significance of this, and where this discussion ultimately leads us, is that discourses of 
danger form the structure of political authority and are utilised by both hegemonic and 
counterhegemonic actors in attempting to establish dominance over society.  In short, 
                                                 
110 Counterhegemonic representations have been similarly termed as ‘counter-securitization’, a resistance 
against a securitizing move by those who are securitized (see Stritzel & Chang 2015; Charrett 2009).  
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representations of danger are the means by which discursive actors control, border, and 
shape society.   
 
Counterhegemonic Discourse 
Counterhegemonic communication is a challenging endeavour.  The asymmetries of 
power between hegemonic and counterhegemonic actors naturalizes the knowledge and 
language used by the sovereign protector.  As Agamben points out, via Plato, “…the 
axiom that seems to be more important is the sixth one, which is to say, the one that orders 
that he who knows and is intelligent should govern, and that the ignorant should therefore 
follow him” (Plato in Agamben 1998: 26).  Furthermore, as discussed in previous 
chapters, the importance of authoritative knowledge works in tandem with a ‘known’ 
danger, which necessitates the protective role of the state (Neocleous 2008; Dillon 1996, 
2007).  Ultimately, this leads to contemporary understandings of sovereignty in which the 
state holds the material monopoly on violence but also the immaterial monopoly on 
knowledge of violence (i.e. when to use violence and against whom).  Such authority 
greatly hinders the ability of counterhegemonic forces to represent themselves and 
effectively communicate with the social audience.  Moreover, the political and structures 
established through hegemonic discourse largely subjugate alternative knowledge(s) 
emerging from the subordinate and counterhegemonic (Gramsci 1971).     
Continuing from this point, it is relatively simple for the state to delegitimize and exclude 
counterhegemonic actors from the social sphere.  Particularly in reference to terrorism, 
the commonly accepted notion that ‘we don’t negotiate with terrorists’111 renders dialogue 
and negotiation with those represented as danger all but impossible.  This ‘rhetorical 
delegitimation’ commonly represents terrorists as uncivilized, inhuman, and criminal, 
externalizing these actors from society, and most importantly, persuading society to 
maintain this distinction and exclusion (Chowdhury and Krebs 2010: 131).  Therefore, 
counterhegemonic actors face a great challenge in communicating with society and 
representing themselves.  Moreover, in such an asymmetrical relationship the 
                                                 
111 The common use of the pronoun ‘we’ is designed to evoke a sense of ownership and representation of 
the social voice by the discursive hegemon.   
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counterhegemonic is essentially ‘playing catch-up’ as the majority of its own 
representations and communications are dedicated at problematizing hegemonic 
discourse (Foxley 2007: 6; see Stritzel and Chang 2015).  While this may appear to be a 
disadvantage, the excluded status poses significant opportunities for counterhegemonic 
actors to communicate with the social audience.   
The reason for this lies in the fact that ‘official’ modes of representation, such as speeches, 
press releases, policy statements, and other governmental (i.e. official) forms of 
communication, are denied to the Taliban as counterhegemonic actors.  As a result, new 
lines of communication are formed within the public sphere (see Calhoun 1992).  Far 
from being uniformly accepted as authentic or legitimate, these lines of communication 
bypass official channels of representation and approach various sub-identities within the 
social sphere.  Similarly, socially owned networks of communication such as mainstream 
media are also avoided by the Taliban and frequently accused of being controlled by the 
Afghan government (Nathan 2009: 26).  Accusing the media of being beholden to the 
government challenges its partiality and leads citizens to question the accuracy of their 
reports (Medley 2010).  Moreover, by communicating directly to society, and through the 
usage of culturally-relevant referent objects (e.g. religious symbolism, national heroes, 
cultural tropes, etc.), the Taliban have been able to challenge the Afghan government’s 
reputation and “express the discontent of a grieving population” (Raqib and Barreto 2014: 
18; Johnson 2017).  Indeed, this communication strategy is not limited to the Taliban or 
Afghanistan as many have pointed out similar strategies used by narcos112 in Mexico (see 
Cabañas 2014; Campbell 2014; Hernández 2014).  In this way, the counterhegemonic 
voice challenges the state’s delegitimization strategy and authoritative knowledge of 
danger.  As mentioned above, it is not within the purview of this study to determine 
whether or not such a strategy is successful; rather, by looking at the methods and content 
of Taliban representations we can uncover the symbiotic relationship between hegemonic 
and counterhegemonic representations of danger and its implications for social identity.   
Reflective of this strategy, the Taliban’s communication strategy continues to be 
dominated by three core mediums: Shabnamah (night letters), poems/taranas (chants), 
and statements, press releases, articles and statistics published online via their website.  
                                                 
112 The term ‘narcos’ refers to members of the drug cartels operating throughout Latin America. 
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Interestingly, the first two modes of representation reflect this tendency to employ 
culturally sensitive methods in communicating with society, whereas the latter reflects a 
desire to mirror the official discourses and engage with Afghan society on similar terms, 
and using similar language, as the government (Foxley 2007: 1; Mahendrarajah 2014: 92; 
Aggarwal 2016: 5; see Gopal & Osman 2016).  This is a relatively recent development in 
the Taliban’s political and military strategy as before 2008113 the Taliban was largely in 
disarray, with communication characterised as ‘defensive’ and centred around damage 
control (ICG 2008: 8).  Moreover, as Foxley points out, “the Taliban did not show interest 
in centralised mechanisms of modern government and communications with the 
populace…[A]s Taliban capabilities and confidence gradually improved and they were 
able to expand guerilla operations, their efforts to engage with the international media 
and the Afghan populace began to develop” (Foxley 2007: 4-5).114  Between 2008-2009, 
the Taliban attempted a softer line in order to win over local communities, and in the 
context of an upcoming national election (2009) the Taliban emphasized their 
accountability to the Afghan people (Strick van Linschoten and Kuehn 2012a: 284).  We 
will return to this particular message below, however the general significance of these 
three methods is that they reflect the challenges characteristic of counterhegemonic 
communication.  On the one hand, engaging in counternarratives that mirror the methods 
used by the state is understandable as politicized dangers, especially individuals labelled 
as such, must represent themselves in ways that directly engage with the hegemonic 
discourse.  On the other hand, counterhegemonic actors face the further burden of 
attempting to represent themselves as included within the society, a factor greatly 
reflected in the Taliban’s continued use of cultural artefacts and vernacular lines of 
communication: night-letters and poetry.   
Night Letters, or shabnamah, are a particularly important method of social 
communication in Afghanistan.  With a long history of resistance to centralized authority 
(see Barfield 2010), “night letters have been a traditional and common instrument of 
                                                 
113 The precise year of this shift is subject to contention in the literature, with several notable authors such 
as Strick van Linschoten and Kuehn (2012a) arguing that the Taliban’s political stance shifted in 2009, 
whereas others point to a shift as early as 2007, necessitating a ‘resecuritization’ of the Taliban (Stritzel 
and Chang 2015).  As the majority of encountered literature on this subject dates from 2008, it can be 
inferred that the politicization of the ‘neo-Taliban’ began prior to 2009.    
114 Foxley (2007) was referring to refining of content and consolidation of message in Taliban ‘grassroots’ 
communications, as opposed to more official representations found on the internet.   
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Afghan religious figures, jihadists and rebels to encourage people, especially (but not 
exclusively) rural populations to oppose both state authority and regulations” (Johnson 
2007: 318).  A night letter is essentially an anonymous leaflet that is posted in a 
community overnight (as to maintain its anonymity) and left in a highly visible place such 
as a mosque.  Others maintain that these letters are aimed at symbols of authority and 
their very placement on these symbols, such as government buildings, is a challenge to 
the state and a demonstration of the Taliban’s omnipresence (Johnson 2007: 321).  
Whether communication rests on the physical presence of the letter or on the actual 
content, the cultural significance of night letters is what makes it such an effective 
method.  Moreover, the grassroots character of these letters reflects the need for a 
counterhegemonic voice to authoritatively establish itself within society’s collective 
identity.  A relatively recent example of widespread use of night letters, and one which is 
firmly established in the collective conscious of the Afghan people, was during the Soviet 
occupation when letters were frequently used to vilify collaborators as ‘traitors’ and 
encourage public protest against the communist government and Soviet occupiers 
(Johnson 2007: 320).  As the Soviet-Afghan War is widely regarded as a defining moment 
for the modern Afghan nation, and with mujahedeen venerated to this day, the use of 
night letters firmly locates the Taliban within Afghan society and represents them as 
continuing Afghanistan’s long tradition of resistance to foreign powers.  
This method of communication also reflects a keen awareness of the social and 
geographical context of Afghanistan.  Centralized authority in Afghanistan has 
traditionally been a challenge owing to the lack of infrastructure and rugged landscape 
(Barfield 2010: 178; Dupree 2002; Schetter 2013).  With four decades of continuous 
warfare, the technological capacities of rural communities continue to be severely limited.  
For instance, in Uruzgan province in 2004, the authenticity of night letters as a product 
of Uruzgani society was challenged by the government on grounds that there was not a 
photocopier in the entire province at the time (Walsh 2004).  While the authors of the 
night letters remain anonymous, the rural context of Afghanistan is significant as 
technologically advanced methods of communication remain largely inaccessible.  For 
instance, television ownership has rapidly increased since 2007, with a recent study 
placing ownership as high as 61%, compared to only 37% in 2007 (Asia Foundation 
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2016).115  However, this remains a relatively new medium with many studies pointing to 
the government’s ineffectiveness in shaping the hearts and minds of rural Afghans 
(Rahman 2015).  Radio has historically been more widespread in Afghanistan as the 
technology is cheaper and networks are more established.  Indeed, during their years in 
power, the Taliban utilised a robust communications strategy, disseminating state-run 
magazines, regular radio shows, and other print media designed to enhance the public 
image of the regime and spread positive messages to society (Giustozzi 2007: 121; ICG 
2008: 5).  In the contemporary period, the Taliban continue to use radio to disseminate 
messages to Afghan society and abroad via links with Arabic-language and Pakistani 
radio and TV stations (Foxley 2007: 6; Karzai 2009: 78).  However, despite the fact that 
these media offer the Taliban the opportunity to reach large sections of the Afghan 
population, they fall short in representing the omnipresence of the group and its location 
within Afghan society.  Afghan society is still deeply rooted in tribalism with much of 
the population living in rural areas in isolated conditions (Barfield 2010; Rashid 2010), 
leading many to still favour word of mouth over information transmitted through regional 
and national media.116  For the Taliban, this presents an important opportunity to subvert 
the state and mainstream media outlets.   
Night letters are, therefore, an important tactic shaping the realities of much of 
Afghanistan.  Disseminating the letters is low cost, low technology, and represent the 
physical presence of the Taliban in target communities.  The subject of the letters, which 
will be discussed at length below, varies greatly; however, it is the physical presence of 
a letter that makes it such a powerful tool of counter-representation.117  The placement of 
these letters on local mosques and other public forums reflects the imperative for the 
Taliban to (re)establish itself within Afghan society and draw clear linkages between their 
identity and commonly recognised referent objects, such as Islam.  Furthermore, and in 
relation to discursive themes discussed in Chapter IV, this directly challenges the 
government’s representation of itself as the true Muslim and the Taliban as under foreign 
                                                 
115 This percentage reflects the number of households that possess a television nationwide. 
116 However, it must also be pointed out that this is rapidly changing.  For a historical trend see Asia 
Foundation (2014, 2016). 
117 This is referred to by Stritzel and Chang (2015) as ‘counter-securitization’.  
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influence.  The letters represent a traditional method of counter-discourse and challenging 
authority whether it is local, regional, or national (Bhatia 2005: 6).    
However, the anonymity of night letters presents one glaring issue: authorship.  The 
letters have become part of the Taliban’s identity in post-2001 Afghanistan and are 
commonly written in their name; however, the anonymous nature of the letters means that 
anyone, individual or organization, could write a letter in the name of the Taliban, which 
has indeed been the case (Strick van Linschoten and Kuehn 2012a: 289; ICG 2008: 12).  
The ability to generate fear and intimidation in society is one of the motivations behind 
the letters as they are often designed to put pressure of individuals to conform to the 
counterhegemonic vision of ideal society (i.e. not supporting the government, not 
cooperating with foreigners, etc.).  Public displays of violence, a supplementary form of 
communication (Richardson 2006; Ramsay and Holbrook 2015), present a unique 
opportunity for other actors placed on fringes of society (i.e. criminal gangs, drug 
traffickers, etc.) as the Taliban name carries associations with violence and intimidation.  
The commonly recognised association between night letters and the Taliban lends 
credibility to all night letters and allows individuals and groups to exploit this linkage and 
push forward their own agenda.  Moreover, the highly localized nature of the letters 
(Nathan 2009: 38), while beneficial for reaching local communities and challenging the 
state’s representation of danger (Karzai 2009: 77), challenges the ability of the Taliban to 
present a cohesive, unified counterhegemonic discourse that reaches Afghan society at 
regional and national levels. 
Indeed, this is a challenge recognized by the Taliban.  Following their ousting, the Taliban 
as a monolithic organization ceased to exist, with many fighters and local commanders 
returning to their home villages in the countryside (Strick van Linschoten and Kuehn 
2012a: 326; Johnson 2017).  The central leadership of the Taliban fled into Pakistan and 
set up operations in Quetta, subsequently being externalized from Afghan society both 
physically and discursively.  However, as the Taliban regrouped several prominent 
commanders (re-)emerged and began pushing forward their own agendas.  As Nathan 
puts it, “a confused plethora of self-proclaimed spokesmen and commanders continued 
to invoke the regime’s name” (Nathan 2009: 25).  On the ground, this led to contradictions 




An illustrative example of this is the story of Mullah Mansoor Dadullah.  Mansoor 
Dadullah’s older brother, Mullah Dadullah (also known as Dadullah Akhund) was a 
central figure in the Taliban leadership and one of the most active commanders in the 
post-2001 era (Giustozzi 2007: 11).  Mansoor’s fundamentalism and penchant for using 
suicide bombers made him a well-known figure within Afghanistan.  He was also a very 
vocal member of the Taliban leadership, greatly contrasting the reclusive Mullah Omar, 
and between 2005-2007 frequently issued public statements to Afghan society and 
beyond.118  Interestingly, Dadullah emphasized the bias of mainstream media and their 
‘mistreatment’ of the Taliban because of their reluctance (or outright refusal) to air 
Taliban reports (Nathan 2009: 27).  This criticism and distrust of mainstream media 
would eventually lead the Taliban to establish a strong internet presence, which will be 
discussed further below.  Mullah Dadullah was killed in 2007 and his younger brother 
Mansoor took control of his faction.  However, despite these strong credentials Mansoor 
Dadullah became a divisive figure within the Taliban.  As the organization began to adopt 
a softer line in its communications to society and political vision, placing a greater 
emphasis on service provision and accountability to local populations, Mansoor’s 
operations and statements, reminiscent of the ‘old Taliban,’119 “distorted perceptions of 
the Taliban’s broader agenda” (Strick van Linschoten and Kuehn 2012a: 277).  In 2008, 
the Taliban central leadership had had enough and issued a statement stating that,  
Mullah Mansoor Dadullah is not obedient to the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan in 
his actions and has carried out activities against the rule of the Islamic Emirate of 
Afghanistan, so the decision [-making] authorities of the Islamic Emirate of 
Afghanistan have removed Mansoor Dadullah from his post, and he will no longer 
be serving the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan in any way, and no Taliban will obey 
his orders any more. (Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan quoted in ICG 2008: 27)  
What this example points to is the emergence of several different voices attempting to 
speak for the post-2001 Taliban.  Relating back to the challenges characteristic of 
counterhegemonic representation, attempting to mirror a unified discursive actor like the 
state, or even a semi-cohesive field of security experts, is a difficult endeavour given that 
the objective of political representations of danger is to link several different actors (or 
                                                 
118 This caused friction between factions of the Taliban leading to a rivalry with the Osmani faction in the 
mid-2000s.  While infighting is common, the factionalism of the post-2001 Taliban is one of its strongest 
sources of instability and detriment to its communication strategy. 
119 The Taliban of the 1990s, commonly understood in the literature as a contrast to the new or ‘neo-Taliban’ 
of contemporary times.   
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objects) into one larger cohesive narrative.  This tendency is greatly reflected in the 
commonly held understanding of a new, or neo-Taliban.  Whereas the traditional Taliban 
consisted of a hierarchical organization with a central authority, the neo-Taliban (also 
referred to as Taliban 2.0) has been characterized as ‘semi-autonomous’ (UNODC 2009: 
102), ‘opium traffickers and criminal gang members’ (Peters 2009ab), and local ‘thugs’ 
(Abbas 2014: 170).  Essentially, this representation and naturalized understanding of a 
‘new’ Taliban forced the organisation to dedicate their communications to upholding the 
image of a cohesive, unified group.  In terms of communications methods, night letters 
do not adequately address this challenge and have become commonly associated with 
‘fake’ Taliban (Strick van Linschoten and Kuehn 2012a: 289).  But the question of 
effectiveness raises another important issue: agency.  What is the objective of the Taliban 
in their representations?  Is it to create a ‘shadow government’ that mirrors the state 
(Stritzel and Chang 2015: 8; Mahendrarajah 2014)?  Or, is it more to engage with society 
and construct counternarratives and cultural artefacts that challenge the state’s discursive 
authority over identity?  In pursuing the latter, a brief discussion of Taliban poetry is 
required.   
Poetry and taranas (chants, also understood as ballads) form a large section of the 
Taliban’s communication strategy and representations.120  Drawing on a well-established 
tradition of poetry in Afghanistan, the Taliban have effectively utilized this form of 
cultural expression since the beginning of the movement and continue to this day.  As 
Strick van Linschoten and Kuehn (2012b) assert, “Poetry is part of the lifeblood of social 
intercourse, whether among politicians on late-night TV chat shows in Kabul or among 
villagers in some far-flung province” (33).  Indeed, poetry is something that is universally 
referred to in defining the Afghan identity and by utilizing this cultural outlet, the Taliban 
firmly establish themselves and their followers as emblematic of the Afghan identity (see 
Caron 2011).   
Taranas, a vocalized form of poetry, are a powerful means of cultural expression used by 
the Taliban.  Despite the organization’s ban on music during its reign, taranas were 
permitted as they do not include music accompaniment and are often infused with 
                                                 
120 As mentioned above, access to society differs greatly depending on the medium and the target group 
(audience).  While the Taliban have employed a successful media campaign via the internet and DVDs, 
much of their reach remains a product of poetry, taranas, and other traditional forms of cultural expression.  
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religious metaphors and references (ICG 2008).  Both written poems and taranas are 
significant cultural representations for several reasons.  Primarily, they are integral 
features of Afghan social production and commonly accepted forms of representation 
within the culture.  The familiarity and acceptance of this medium means that the 
messages being conveyed by the Taliban will reach social actors and be recognized as 
authentic, whereas other forms of representation, such as statistics and statements, often 
run the risk of delegitimization by either the Afghan government or prominent social 
actors (i.e. established news media).  Poetry also provides the Taliban with the unique 
ability to reach the emotions of individuals and groups within society.  Referring back to 
the role of danger in constituting social identity, emotion is the driving force in 
recognizing something as dangerous; “the concept of threat and danger is established on 
the basis of the human emotion of fear” (Booth and Wheeler 2008: 62).  This is largely 
how propaganda and representations of danger function.  Discursive authorities use 
interpretations to create an emotionally charged atmosphere and limit any critical 
discussion of the danger (Bhatia 2005: 16).  This politicises the understanding of the Self 
to an antagonistic distinction between one’s collective identity and the ‘evil and ugly’ 
Other (Schmitt 1995: 27).  Indeed, this is a well-beaten path in the literature surrounding 
representations of the Taliban and has been discussed at length above; however, in regard 
to the Taliban’s own representations and communication with society, emotion is not 
meant to securitize the state but rather to reintegrate the Taliban into society, thereby 
challenging the hegemonic political and social order.  The taranas are particularly useful 
in this area as the repeated chants utilize Afghan cultural imagery and are replete with 
religious and historic references (ICG 2008: 16; Nathan 2009: 30). Most importantly, 
taranas play on the shared trauma of war and conflict that dominates Afghanistan’s 
collective consciousness.  
Poetic representations, therefore, firmly locate the Taliban within Afghan society and 
package the message in a way that is commonly accepted in rural environments.  Where 
night letters reflect local issues and political discord (Karzai 2009: 77), poems reach a 
much wider audience and reflect identities at regional and national levels.  Ironically, as 
the organization has been known for heavy enforced bans on music, films, television and 
videos, they now embrace new technology and use it extensively in disseminating visual 
and oral representations (Foxley 2007; ICG 2008; Aggarwal 2016).  DVDs, CDs, audio 
cassettes and mobile phone ringtones are popular methods of communication among the 
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Taliban and are readily accessible throughout Afghanistan (Foxley 2007: 5-6; ICG 2008: 
14; Kamel 2015: 74).  Many of the DVDs disseminated by the Taliban feature powerful 
images of suicide bombers, battlefield videos, deserting Afghan National Army soldiers, 
and other images designed to challenge the authority and role of the state (ICG 2008: 18; 
Nathan 2009: 31).  In combination with these visual representations, poetry in the form 
of taranas invoke nationalist feelings and sympathies for the Taliban cause, which is 
convened through a traditional medium (Nathan 2009: 31).  Indeed, the use of taranas in 
combination with images of exceptional violence might seem like an obvious tactic in 
invoking an emotional response, however this also reflects one of the greatest challenges 
facing the Taliban: the need to legitimize and rationalize its violence.  If terrorism is a 
hegemonic representation of violence, cultivating a sense of nationalism and other 
referent objects of identity is vital in countering this representation and re-representing 
the violence (and consequently the movement) as a just, social movement.   
In a context like Afghanistan where violence and injustice are continuously perpetrated 
and experienced by all actors in society, culture and identity are vital in attaining and 
sustaining authority and representing the opposition as danger.  Moreover, the core theme 
of the externality of danger lends further salience to cultural mediums in legitimizing 
one’s own violence as just and, therefore, not dangerous.  Culture becomes an important 
tool in promoting the credibility of counterhegemonic representations of danger.  As 
argued by Shapiro (2004), culture is a primary factor in sustaining legitimate authority 
over a society.  Sovereignty is not merely based on a monopoly on violence or a territorial 
border, but rather on the ability of the sovereign to speak for society and to secure its 
communal identity.  However, despite the importance of this point, cultural governance 
remains somewhat limited in explaining the importance of representations of danger, and 
in particular reference to the Taliban.  Limiting the Taliban to a purely grassroots 
insurgency movement, or worse an apolitical terrorist organization, misses the essence of 
the group and neglects their political motivations (Mahendrarajah 2014: 92).  Instead, we 
must look at the Taliban’s representations as not only violence or cultural production, but 
rather as the mirror opposite to hegemonic discourse: a combination of culture, violence, 
and authority.  This three-pronged strategy is best demonstrated in the Taliban’s online 
presence embodied on their website Al Emarah.  Here the discourse adopts a more official 
character as the Taliban’s political ambitions come to fore.   
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Authority, or sovereignty, is a difficult characteristic to attain for the Taliban.  Hegemonic 
representations of the organization by security actors, the government, and relevant 
experts depoliticize the organization through references to narcotics trafficking, 
criminality as well as the assertion of a networked, non-ideological Taliban 2.0.  The 
supposed apolitical nature of the neo-Taliban, represented through associations with 
criminality, casts suspicion over the authenticity of Taliban communications and leads 
experts to question the credibility of the counterhegemonic voice (Foxley 2007).  As a 
result, and in the context of several different Taliban voices in the late-2000s, the 
organization established the Cultural Commission121 for the Islamic Emirate of 
Afghanistan.  One particular statement issued by the Taliban in April 2008 illustrates this 
point: 
Recently a number of writers, religious scholars and poets have compiled books, 
jihadi CDs and recorded taranas and publicly distributed them.  They referred to 
their personal work in the name of the Islamic Emirate, in particular the Cultural 
Affairs Commission, which they had not informed any authorised official of the 
Islamic Emirate.  The Islamic Emirate hails their efforts, however recommends 
(sic) that those who compile books, jihadi CDs or songs and want them to be 
released in the name of the Islamic Emirate should get the approval of the Islamic 
Emirate Cultural Commission…otherwise they should not use the name of the 
Islamic Emirate for their own gain.  (ICG 2008: 29) 
Indeed, the ease of transferring cultural productions and representations to society as a 
result of technology and a network of semi-autonomous local field commanders allows 
the Taliban to reach all areas of Afghanistan and beyond; however, these communications 
are easily delegitimized through simple questioning of their authenticity and adherence 
to the Taliban ethos.  The establishment of the Commission, therefore, unites the disparate 
Taliban into one discursive actor.  By establishing a logo, identifying official spokesmen, 
and creating an illustrious departmental label meant to perform governance and mimic 
official status, the Taliban have essentially set up a counterhegemonic ‘brand’, reducing 
political antagonisms in society to a simplistic binary.  The similarity with the GIRoA in 
terms of strategy and discourse is striking.  The need to unify disparate voices into a single 
‘official’ discourse reflects the Foucauldian assertion that official discourse trumps all 
other knowledge (Aggarwal 2016).   
                                                 
121 The Cultural Commission has also been referred to as the Commission for Cultural Affairs.   
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The Taliban were one of the first militant groups to have an online presence.  This is 
somewhat ironic given their rejection of technology during their rule.  Nonetheless, the 
Taliban set up their first website (www.taliban.com) in 1998 (Aggarwal 2016: 1).  This 
was subsequently shutdown but rising from the ashes of their defeat emerged their current 
website Al Emarah122 (https://alemarah-english.com/).123  The utility of a robust online 
presence is questionable, however, given the lack of education, technology and electricity 
throughout much of Afghanistan.  Despite a spike in television viewership in recent years, 
the internet is seldom used by Afghans with only 11.2% indicating they had personal 
access to the Internet (Asia Foundation 2016: 135).  Moreover, in areas of Afghanistan 
with a strong Taliban presence, such as Nuristan, internet access is as low as 2.4% (Asia 
Foundation 2016: 135).  What this amounts to is that the Taliban’s internet presence is 
not directed at the rural population of Afghanistan, but rather a range of discursive actors 
such as semi-autonomous commanders, Afghans abroad, donors, journalists, and opinion 
leaders (Aggarwal 2016: 15; Nathan 2009; see also Calvin 2011).  This two-pronged 
approach reflects the motivations of the Taliban in countering hegemonic discourse.  On 
the one hand, the official nature of the Taliban website is part of a larger strategy designed 
at representing the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan (Aggarwal 2016).  
On the other hand, by directing statements toward opinion leaders, the Taliban is hoping 
to challenge hegemonic discourse and displace official representations of danger.   
Indeed, the latter point reflects Dadullah’s earlier criticism of inherent biases in the media 
and their hostility to the Taliban (Nathan 2009: 27).  The purported media bias reflects 
another important theme in counterhegemonic representations: the reluctance of the 
public sphere to adopt their representations.  While such a tendency reflects Frosh and 
Wolfsfeld’s (2007) earlier argument on the role of the media in representing the nation, 
the Taliban decry this bias and portray it as silencing the people.  Moreover, the Taliban 
represents the state as lackeys of foreign powers, such as the United States, and therefore 
all injustices and attacks committed against the Taliban are represented as attacks on the 
                                                 
122 ‘The Emirate’ in Arabic.  The label ‘emirate’ is meant to convey the governmentality and officiality of 
the website and the political nature of the Taliban.  It is also meant to convey that the Taliban are no longer 
merely a grassroots movement of militant students, but rather a government-in-exile.   
123 There are five Taliban websites, each reflecting a particular language (Dari, English, Arabic, Urdu, 
Pashto).  Interestingly, the message and content changes depending on the language.  An excellent book 
exploring the Taliban’s online discourse, and an invaluable secondary source for this project, is Neil 




people.  Al Emarah, as the information outlet for the Taliban, is therefore not seen as 
merely the propaganda department of the Taliban, but rather as the ‘true’ voice and vision 
for the Afghan people.  This point is illustrated by the editor of the Taliban’s monthly 
Urdu-language magazine Shari-at: “The fundamental goal of the monthly ‘Shari-at’ is 
not just providing the truth and presenting the real picture to people, but also stopping 
and starting to remedy the wily enemy’s false propaganda” (Afghan 2012: 2 in Aggarwal 
2016).   
The website is a representation in itself.  Its presence and officiality is meant to signify 
the Taliban’s ‘governmentality’.124  Just as the Afghan government represents itself as 
speaking for the Afghan people, the Taliban adopts the same role as advocated through 
its official communications.  This emphasis on governance and public accountability is 
vital to its counterhegemonic discourse and can be observed elsewhere, particularly with 
the publication of the Layeha in 2006, 2009, and 2010 (Johnson and DuPee 2012; Clark 
2011).  The Layeha is perhaps one of the strongest examples of the Taliban’s 
counterhegemonic discourse in the area of governance.  The literature is somewhat 
divided as to the utility of the Code125 with some scholars emphasizing its importance in 
showing the organizational dynamics and challenges facing the Taliban, while others 
asserting its importance as a propaganda tool (Clark 2011; Johnson 2007).  For the 
purposes of this project, the Layeha acts as a representation of the Taliban’s own 
hegemonic aspirations.  Much of the language observed in the various articles regulating 
the conduct of Taliban fighters and commanders is reflective of the challenges inherent 
of counterhegemonic representations discussed above.  As with most counterhegemonic 
discourses, the Code is not designed primarily to represent the Afghan government as an 
existential danger, but rather to portray the Taliban as the saviours of ‘the people’126 and 
the protectors of a just and secure society.  Essentially, society is already living the danger 
and it is the task of the Taliban to represent itself as the securer, constituting itself as the 
legitimate authority over the ‘true’ Afghan society.  Thus, the Layeha is an attempt at 
                                                 
124 Please note that governmentality is not used here in reference to Foucault’s concept.  Rather, 
governmentality is used to describe the Taliban’s attempts at representing themselves as the hegemonic 
authority via expressions of governance.  
125 Layeha is the Taliban’s Code of Conduct; therefore, it is frequently referred to as ‘the Code’ in the 
literature 
126 A label commonly deployed to signify non-aligned Afghans (i.e. those who do not work for the 
government or fight for the Taliban (Clark 2011).   
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problematizing the GIRoA’s representation of the Taliban while also giving insight into 
how a Taliban-ruled state would be run (Clark 2011).  As we have seen, the Taliban 
readily adopt counterhegemonic representations of danger to constitute themselves as the 
legitimate protectors of Afghan society, while at the same time discursively constructing 
their vision of the ‘true’ Afghan nation.     
 
Painting the Other as Danger: Commonalities in 
Hegemonic and Counterhegemonic Representations of 
Danger 
 
Despite the challenges characteristic of communicating with society as a 
counterhegemonic voice, the Taliban retain a strong capacity in this area.  Their modes 
of representation reflect a keen awareness of Afghan society and the sociopolitical 
context.  Moreover, the various media employed by the Taliban address specific issues 
facing society and their alternative vision.  While the innovative methods used by the 
Taliban are an important consideration, it is the content of these communications that 
most clearly reflects the symbiotic discourses of danger used by hegemonic and 
counterhegemonic actors.   
As mentioned above, the Taliban’s engagement with discourses of danger is quite varied 
and reflects a plurality of actors and mediums.  Language is an important factor guiding 
the nature of communication and the essence of these representations.  For example, the 
Taliban’s online presence is quite varied in terms of message, reflecting the role language 
plays in determining content and the target audience (Aggarwal 2016).  English language 
publications, for instance, are directed at the wider Islamic community outside of 
Afghanistan and generally attempt to problematize global representations of the Taliban 
as danger (Aggarwal 2016: 108; Calvin 2011).  Nevertheless, the Taliban adopt six 
themes in their communication with society, both domestic and international.  The main 
themes are: 1) Values, an understanding of ideal Afghan values that directly contrast those 
of foreigners; 2) History of external dangers, reflecting Afghanistan’s tradition of 
opposing foreign invasions and situating the Taliban within this tradition; 3) Externality 
of danger, referring to the notion that all dangers are the work of external forces; 4) 
Morality, in reference to Islam and the movement’s religious puritanism; 5) 
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Governmentality, referring to the Taliban’s true role as protector and their activities 
directed at ruling over a just society; and 6) Cultural tropes, situating the Taliban within 
traditional Afghan culture and in direct relation to historic figures.  Indeed, many of these 
themes avoid direct reference to the concept of danger itself and are focused on 
establishing the Taliban’s position within Afghan society. Indeed, this point further 
reflects the underlying theme within counterhegemonic representations of danger, namely 
that the danger is already lived and experienced by social actors.  There is a distancing 
between the hegemonic political structure (i.e. the GIRoA) and the suffering of the 
subordinate citizenry.  The content of Taliban representations is not directed at ousting a 
political party or protecting society from an unknown danger, but rather a rupture of the 
dangerous hegemonic political and social structure.   
Values are a common indication of cultural hegemony over society.  As a political 
community as well as the designated audience for political representations, the nation is 
defined by its adherence to certain politicised values.  As such, values hold an important 
position in counterhegemonic discourse as evidenced by the Taliban.  For them, it is not 
the physical presence of a foreign occupation that is dangerous, but rather the effect it has 
on specific Afghan values. Islamic values are therefore needed to defeat the danger of 
foreign culture as it invades Afghan society (Aggarwal 2016: 75-76).  This discourse 
functions on two levels depending on the medium.  In terms of the inherent danger of an 
immoral enemy, the Taliban adopts official language and issues public statements 
denouncing acts of violence perpetrated by ISAF (International Security Assistance 
Force) and their Afghan government counterparts.  On the other hand, regarding desired 
Afghan social values, the Taliban employs more traditional methods of communication, 
specifically in the form of poetry.  Thus, the Taliban present themselves as the 
embodiment of traditional Afghan values and its rural society (Crews and Tarzi 2008: 8).   
The perceived dichotomy between modernism and traditionalism is a prominent theme 
used by the Taliban.  This dichotomy reflects the traditional distinction between the 
modern elites based in Kabul and the more traditional and underdeveloped rural society 
(Barfield 2010: 133).  When addressing social audiences, the Taliban bemoans the 
infiltration of modern technology and material culture into Afghan society and frequently 
deploys metaphors to highlight its antithesis to Afghan culture.  In one poem entitled 
Strange Times, the author writes: 
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They pretend to worship God, but in their hearts they seek to spread the word 
about others; 
I swear by God that they have separated from Allah.  
By worshiping material things, the worshipper himself became lost.  
(Erfaan, Strange Times, in Strick van Linschoten & Kuehn 2012b) 
In this poem, the author is highlighting the perceived antithetical relationship between 
materialism and Islam.  Materialism is represented as a competing deity to Allah and one 
that draws worship from immoral individuals.  This linkage is interesting as it stresses the 
corrupting influence materialism has on society.  To point out that materialism is 
antagonistic to Islam would be a simple representation of immorality; however, what is 
most significant about this excerpt is the subversive tendency highlighted in the opening 
line – they pretend to worship God, but in their hearts they seek to spread the word about 
others.  Once again, the dominant trope of a society already experiencing the danger is at 
the forefront of this poem as evidenced in the corrupting influence of modern materialism.  
The last two lines of this poem further highlight this point:  
I saw the son of a Sheikh and a holy man in the cinema,   
so his sister and mother left out of shame and modesty. 
(Erfaan, Strange Times, in Strick van Linchosten and Kuehn 2012b)   
The juxtaposition of the Sheikh and the holy man with the cinema illustrates the tempting 
nature of modern technology and how it corrupts even the most pious of social figures.  
The mother and sister leaving out of shame is a useful tactic in demonstrating the 
immorality of the cinema.  As women are traditionally confined to the private sphere in 
Afghanistan, they are largely protected from these corrupting influences.  Their rejection 
of the cinema and the two offending actors reflects a pure, traditional Afghan society 
excluding offenders and avoiding corrupting influences.   
In addition to technology and materialism, Afghans linked to non-believers (i.e. 
foreigners) are also represented as corrupt.  The presence of non-believers in Afghan 
society and within the central government is represented as a danger with the capacity to 
corrupt Afghans and lead them to apostatise.  In one such example, a poem written by 
Abdul Halim entitled “Selling the Faith”, the links between wealthy Afghans and 
foreigners are denounced as corrupting and heretical.   
One person is granted wealth and selfishness; 
One is hopeless from poverty. 
Some have sold their faith for money;  
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They accompany the non-believers elsewhere. 
Pious God! 
Eliminate their hypocrisy! 
(Abdul Halim, Selling the Faith, in Strick van Linschoten and Kuehn 2012a)  
This poem is significant for two reasons.  First, wealth is equated to selfishness and 
foreign influence.  The development of a new elite class in Afghanistan following the 
overthrow of the Taliban has resulted in widespread inequality throughout the country.  
Non-believers are seen to have influenced wealthy Afghans to ‘sell their faith for money’, 
furthering the theme discussed above.  Secondly, this poem is directed at the rural 
audience.  The development of a wealthy urban class that is heavily linked to foreign 
actors, or refugees returning from the West, has exacerbated the rural/urban divide.  For 
rural Afghans, poverty is inescapable and they remain pious.  As a contrast, the Taliban 
highlight urban Afghans’ wealth and subsequent selfishness as evidence of the corrupting 
influence of the foreign danger.   
Foreignness and externality are another feature in the Taliban’s representations.  The 
Taliban mirrors the dangers represented by the government and use externality to border 
the ideal society.  For both the Taliban and the government of Afghanistan, danger is not 
endogenous to Afghan society, but instead is seen to derive from foreign influences 
whether that be Western powers, in Taliban communications, or Pakistan and other 
foreign donors, in the government’s discourse.  The parallel between hegemonic and 
counterhegemonic cannot be overlooked here as both actors’ use of external danger serves 
as the lodestone upon which they assert their authority over a secured society.  Moreover, 
the foreignness of danger reflects attempts to discursively constitute a fixed 
understanding of the endangered Afghan identity (see Campbell 1998).   
While this parallel is interesting from an academic perspective, it proves to be a nightmare 
for the Taliban and other counterhegemonic actors.  The subjugation and silencing of 
Taliban knowledge and discourse firmly locates this identity outside, or at best on the 
fringes, of society.  From this initial disadvantage, it becomes a relatively simple task to 
exclude the Taliban and discursively link it to a larger foreign danger or supposed intrigue 
(i.e. Pakistan).127  Similarly, the events that unfolded following the 2001 invasion and the 
                                                 
127 Associating the Taliban with the Pakistani government is one of the key discursive themes used by the 
government of Afghanistan.  See Chapter IV. 
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subsequent collapse of the Taliban provide a portfolio of historical links between the 
Taliban and foreign actors, making externality an easily inferred conclusion in both 
political and social circles (see Rashid 2010; Giustozzi 2007).  The location of Taliban 
leadership in Quetta, Pakistan (known as the Quetta Shura) as well as the infamous 
Kunduz Airlift128 has been detrimental to Taliban assertions of its indigeneity and has fed 
widespread suspicion of heavy ISI involvement in the organization (Semple 2014: 8).  
Indeed, this remains a commonly maintained assertion by government officials in 
Afghanistan and is repeated within Afghan society.  Clearly, the Taliban has their work 
cut out for them.   
As a result, much of the Taliban’s communication with society is premised on challenging 
this link.  While both the government and Taliban heavily rely on externality in their 
representations of danger, the Taliban are at a clear disadvantage.  Therefore, the Taliban 
utilise externality in two ways: first, they use Afghanistan’s history of resisting external 
dangers as a means of locating the organization within Afghan society and collective 
memory; and second, by highlighting the linkages between the shared suffering in Afghan 
society and linking the perceived lack to the government’s cooperation with the 
contemporary foreign danger (i.e. NATO).   
Pakistan’s involvement with the Taliban and mujahedeen factions is quite complicated.  
Throughout the 1980s, Pakistan and the United States spearheaded a campaign to fund 
and arm mujahedeen factions, hand-picked by the Director of the Inter-Services 
Intelligence (ISI), fighting the Soviets (see Rashid 2010; Jalalzai 2005; Giustozzi 2007; 
Shanty 2011; Scott 2011).129  Interestingly, opium played a significant role in this funding 
operation as the Marxist government initially suppressed poppy production in 
Afghanistan, which led to widespread unrest amongst Pashtun tribal groups and rural 
farmers (Shanty 2011: 43).  In order to ensure domestic support for the mujahedeen in 
Afghanistan, Pakistan’s ISI facilitated the trafficking and production of large quantities 
of opium and heroin while the CIA looked the other way (Shanty 2011: 43; Scott 2011: 
121-122).  Following the withdrawal of the Soviet army in early 1989, the ISI continued 
to fund prominent mujahedeen factions in order to maintain a Pakistan-friendly authority 
                                                 
128 The Kunduz Airlift refers to a Pakistani-led airlift of surrounded Taliban fighters in late-2001.  While 
this has not been confirmed by Pakistan, it has been widely reported in the media (see Hersch 2002). 
129 Other countries such as Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and China were involved to varying 
degrees.   
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in Afghanistan (Scott 2011: 120; Rashid 2010).  As Afghanistan descended into chaos 
and anarchy in the 1990s, the ISI continued to back certain factions such as Hizb-i Islami 
Gulbuddin (HiG), led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, in the hopes of backing a winner in the 
civil war (Barfield 2010: 187).  As the war dragged on and Hekmatyar failed to seize 
control of Kabul the ISI began to move away from HiG and lend support to an emerging 
movement in the south: the Taliban.   
Foreign involvement in the seemingly endless conflict is a collective trauma in 
Afghanistan.  Dating back to the First Anglo-Afghan War, Afghanistan has seen a 
succession of invasions and meddling by foreign powers, usually with severe effects on 
society, infrastructure, and quality of life.  Consequently, the commonly held association 
with the ISI is detrimental to the Taliban’s ability to locate itself within Afghan society 
and communicate with the people.  In addition to allegations of funding, some even going 
as far to state that the Taliban are controlled by the ISI (Khaama Press 2016; Bashari 
2016), there are high-profile events that characterise this linkage established in the 
collective memory.  Widespread allegations of support from Pakistan and assertions that 
the Taliban consists of foreign (i.e. Pakistani) fighters have contained Taliban 
representations of danger and communications with society, effectively reducing a large 
portion of their communications to damage control.     
While challenging these allegations of terrorism and foreignness forms a large part of the  
Taliban’s discursive strategy, much of these communications are confined to official 
modes of communication such as statements made by Taliban spokesmen and articles 
posted on Al Emarah.  Other methods and communication channels such as taranas and 
propaganda videos deal with externality as a theme but do not focus on directly refuting 
the claims and representations made by the government.  An article posted on the English 
version of the Taliban’s website is representative of this.  The article, entitled ‘The 
Enemy’s Futile Propaganda’, addresses the Afghan government’s claim that the Taliban 
is directly assisted by Russia, Pakistan, and Iran.  The article begins by stating:  
[t]he enemy has assiduously and repetitively tried to blot the Islamic Emirate’s 
faithful campaign and to this day has kept up its slanders, attributing the 
achievements of the Islamic Emirate to foreign powers, trying to sow dissension 
between the Mujahideen and the people, attempting to justify their barbarity, and 
make excuses to prolong their injustices. 
(Al Emarah 2017f)   
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In another article addressing this issue published five days earlier, the Taliban wrote in 
an article titled ‘Who supports the mujahideen?’:   
Prior to this130 they used to claim that Al Qaeda arms and supports the Taliban and 
before that they claimed that Saudi Arabia and other Arab states support them.  In 
addition, the classification of the Taliban as a Pakistani proxy has been a near 
constant theme in their official and unofficial communications.  Such propaganda by 
the enemy regime is not new.  Ever since the Americans invaded Afghanistan and 
toppled the Taliban government, their handpicked, foreign-serving expatriate regime 
has constantly fabricated such associations based on imaginary ‘alternative facts’ and 
have fed it to our nation.  
(Al Emarah, April 12, 2017e)   
These statements are significant for two reasons.  First, they highlight how both the 
hegemonic and counterhegemonic represent the other as foreign or at the behest of foreign 
powers.  This is a clear reference to Afghanistan’s collective memory of invasion and 
resistance to foreign imperial powers.  However, the greater significance of these 
examples is how they reflect the inability of the Taliban to set the terms of the discourse.  
The Taliban’s vilification of the government as ‘expatriate’ and ‘foreign-serving’ is not 
an original theme, but rather a reaction to hegemonic representations of the organization.  
More generally, this reflects the asymmetry of power relations between the hegemonic 
and counterhegemonic, where the hegemonic actor can authoritatively utter a danger into 
existence whereas the counterhegemonic discourse is limited to counter-representation.   
A similar example can be seen in how the Taliban engages with the terrorist label.  Fully 
conscious of the application of this label when referring to the Taliban, the organization 
responds in one of two ways: either framing their acts of violence in terms of a ‘faithful’ 
struggle or jihad; or, by challenging the use and meaning of the label itself.  In an article 
published online, the Taliban highlighted the many cases of civilian casualties caused by 
coalition forces in Afghanistan.  In a series of rhetorical questions, the Taliban ask:  
“Is it not terrorism that the invaders and their domestic allies’ [sic] target and 
martyr civilians under the name of Taliban in their work places, homes and when 
they are fast asleep?  Or deliberately destroy people’s means of livelihood like 
gardens and fields?  How is it acceptable that the invaders and their allies who 
have come from tens of thousands of kilometer [sic] away to label the indigenous 
people as terrorists and martyr them, while still more, the puppet officials given 
them medals for these murders?   
(Al Emarah 2017d)  
                                                 
130 The statement is referring to accusations made by the US and Afghan governments that Russia was 
supplying the Taliban with weaponry and other logistic support (see Tolo News 2017). 
205 
 
While by no means isolated, this quote is highly significant in understanding how the 
Taliban engage with discourses of danger.  While they are unable to come up with their 
own definition of terrorism, the article successfully questions the label of terrorism as it 
has been used by NATO and the Afghan government.  The association between terrorists 
and women and children problematizes the antagonistic frontier constructed by 
hegemonic forces.  Moreover, the assertion made by the Taliban that the invaders (i.e. 
foreigners) have come thousands of kilometers away to label the indigenous people [i.e. 
Afghan] terrorists is designed to firmly locate those who are killed by hegemonic forces 
(i.e. the Taliban) within the Afghan identity.  Lastly, and perhaps most significant, is the 
inference made here that the label ‘terrorist’ applies to all Afghans and is therefore a 
fabrication; rather, the Taliban counters that those applying the label are in fact the 
terrorists.   
While the Taliban are undoubtedly preoccupied with countering and challenging 
hegemonic representations of danger, these discourses provide the organization with an 
opportunity to establish itself as the voice of the people.  The Taliban uses the continuity 
of foreign dangers collectively memorialized in Afghan culture to establish itself as the 
embodiment of a culture of resistance.  In this way, the represented externality of danger 
provides the Taliban with an opportunity to boost its domestic credentials and connect 
with Afghan society’s collective consciousness.   
The clearest evidence of this can be seen in the Taliban’s use of the label mujahedeen 
when referring to themselves.  By no means accidental, the Taliban have used this label 
to assert their central role in opposing the recognized danger and speaking for the Afghan 
resistance (Semple 2014: 8).  Moreover, the term mujahideen combines two focal points 
of the Afghan identity: Islam and resistance.  The label, therefore, is meant to identify the 
Taliban as a part of a continuous resistance against foreign powers.  The well-established 
memory of resistance during the Soviet-Afghan war allows the Taliban to tap into this 
collective understanding of an external danger and to assert itself as representative of this 
history.   
The language used by the Taliban in their representations of NATO (predominately 
referred to as the Americans) and the Afghan government draws links between the 
contemporary conflict and the earlier Soviet-Afghan war.  As Calvin (2011) points out, 
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“the United States is frequently compared with the Soviet Union, as the IEA131 claims a 
similarly unified opposition against the current occupation as that faced by the Soviets 
over two decades ago” (93).  Despite the many differences existing between the Soviet-
Afghan war and contemporary times, the Taliban promote this linkage in order to 
represent themselves in a way that is understandable for local audiences.  This allows the 
Taliban to “broaden their appeal as well as tying the fight today into a grand historic 
narrative of Afghans’ ‘victories’ over great powers such as the British and later the 
Soviets, which are constant points of reference” (Nathan 2009: 35).   
Afghanistan’s storied history of resisting colonial powers, its renown as the ‘graveyard 
of empires’, has a great hold over society and wider region (Strick van Linschoten and 
Kuehn 2012b: 20).  The Taliban use this historical narrative heavily in their 
communications and self-image.  In several taranas, the Taliban play on the emotions of 
the audience when describing the ‘motherland’ and the pride in protecting the country 
against foreigners, both past and present (Strick van Linschoten and Kuehn 2012b: 37).  
In a particular poem entitled ‘Take Care’, the author writes “Afghans have always been 
independent throughout history; Keep yourself from the slavery of strangers” 
(Kheywawal in Strick van Linschoten & Kuehn 2012b).  The poem frames the many 
social developments taking place in contemporary Afghanistan as un-Islamic and the 
mark of a foreign danger, urging the audience to ‘take care’ and resist.  The parallel drawn 
here with historical anti-imperial struggles is salient and represents the contemporary 
conflict as a continuation of this eternal danger.  The imagery evoked by the word slavery 
is also meant to frame foreign powers, and the government of Afghanistan, as antagonistic 
to Afghans, thus bordering the Taliban’s ideal society and legitimizing the violent 
struggle.   
Externality, therefore, plays a vital role in the Taliban’s representation of danger.  The 
historical narrative sets the context and legitimizes the role of the Taliban in violently 
resisting those linked to the external danger (i.e. the government, Afghans linked with the 
government and/or foreigners, foreigners themselves).  Mirroring the government, the 
Taliban uses the theme of an external danger to unify and border a pluralistic society.  
The ethnic and linguistic diversity of Afghan society, not to mention the deep tribal 
                                                 




loyalties still prevalent among the Pashtuns, is a fundamental challenge to the formation 
and sustainability of a unified nation-state (see Dorronsoro 2005; Giustozzi 2007; 
Schetter et al. 2007; Barfield 2010; Schetter 2013; Kamel 2015).  Moreover, the ethnic-
based factionalism witnessed during the civil war (1992-1996) and commonplace 
atrocities has sowed even greater division in Afghanistan along ethnic lines.  Externality, 
therefore, is vital to the Taliban in unifying communities across Afghanistan to oppose a 
foreign danger. 
Indeed, the presence of this foreign danger is discursively connected to widespread 
suffering among the Afghan population.  Thus, a central theme used by the Taliban 
represent the Afghan identity is victimhood.  In much of their official communications 
the Taliban exaggerate casualty numbers, particularly those of civilians, and, while the 
victims are not always named, they are consistently labelled as local and as ‘martyrs of 
the nation’ (Aggarwal 2016: 95).  The Afghan nation is characterised by its oppressed 
status, endangerment, and is unified in its shared suffering.  Moreover, the Taliban engage 
with the label of ‘terror’ in framing the external danger, consistently referring to the 
occupation as a ‘reign of terror’ (Al Emarah 2017a).  Following the bombing of a hospital 
in Kunduz in November 2016, the Taliban wrote:  
this is not the first time that the Americans and other invading troops in Afghanistan 
have committed such horrendous crimes against humanity.  The miserable and 
Muslim nation of Afghanistan has been burning in flames of weapons and bombs of 
a world power under a pretext in which no Afghan was involved nor it has been 
independently investigated  
(Al Emarah 2016c)   
The characterisation of the Afghan nation as suffering uses danger and resultant violence 
to (re)represent the Taliban’s understanding of Afghan society.  The emphasis placed on 
‘foreign occupiers’ as the source of violence and suffering places the danger firmly within 
the identity of the antagonistic Other and challenges the Afghan government’s 
indigeneity.  The fact that state institutions are scarcely affected by coalition military 
operations means that they do not share the same observable victimhood as ordinary 
civilians.  The innocent victims of the conflict are passively incorporated into the Afghan 
nation, regardless of ethnicity or social identity.  Just as the Afghan government 
externalizes the Taliban via represented associations with Pakistan, the Taliban engage in 
the same process directed at the government, highlighting their complicity in sustaining 
the lived danger and resulting violence.  The message being conveyed is that to rid 
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Afghanistan of the ‘invaders’ or ‘crusaders’ is to rid it of danger.  In this way, the 
counterhegemonic discourse seeks to legitimise a rupture of the hegemonic political and 
social order, which it blames for the infiltration of the foreign danger and the continued 
suffering of the people.    
The external danger is also framed in immaterial terms with much of the Taliban’s 
communications focusing on the societal changes witnessed in the post-2001 era.  While 
these representations are commonly used in poems and other cultural productions, official 
Taliban discourse also engage with this theme through online publications and public 
statements.  One of the dominant themes in this area is that the foreign danger has clouded 
the judgement and morality of Afghans through false information and deceit.  
Interestingly, another parallel can be witnessed here between hegemonic authority over 
knowledge and the Taliban’s counterhegemonic aspirations for this position.  Similar 
methods of knowledge subjugation are attempted by the Taliban in public statements, 
with many echoing the assertion that the Kabul administration has been deceived due to 
their proximity to the external danger.  The poem ‘Take Care’ urges, “O Leader!  Don’t 
cheat your nation, Stay away from deception!” (Kheywawal in Strick van Linschoten and 
Kuehn 2012b).  While it is unclear to whom the poem is referring to, the urging of the 
leader to stay away from the foreign deception and not cheat the nation illustrates the 
Taliban’s emphasis on maintaining a clear inside/outside distinction and total separation 
from foreign influences. 
The external danger is also represented through the presence of ‘Western’ culture in 
Afghanistan.  Since the beginning, the Taliban have represented Islam as threatened by 
the West, requiring steps to be taken to safeguard the Afghan (i.e. Islamic) way of life.  
The eschewing of modern technology during their reign is indicative of this perspective, 
where essentially the clock needed to be turned back in order to preserve a pure (read 
ideal) society.  True, the Taliban have relaxed their prohibition of technology since 2001 
and have adopted a more practical stance to cultural productions.  However, generally 
speaking the group maintains the notion that the presence of objects, identities, and values 
linked to the West is evidence of a wider social disease in the country.  Indeed, in much 
the same way that the government use narcotics to represent a supposed lack in society, 
the Taliban use the infiltration of western culture.    
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One such poem, entitled ‘Standing Confused’ is an excellent example of this.  The poem 
addresses Afghan women and uses women as a vehicle to deride the immorality in 
contemporary society.  The author, Naseri, writes “You are not a traveller in your own 
homeland; You changed your clothes to a Western style” (Naseri in Strick van Linschoten 
and Kuehn 2012b).  The poem is using the idea of a woman acting immodestly - by 
wearing Western clothing - as an allegory for the larger social transformations taking 
place in Afghanistan.  The Taliban is targeting the ‘western’ identity of the Afghan female 
as something that has become detached from the suffering of the Afghan nation and the 
wider struggle.  The danger of Western culture being inferred here is that it separates 
Afghans from the nation, the idea being that you become a ‘traveller in your own 
homeland’.  The poem ends with the author stating that he is crying out of sadness.  Given 
the frequent use of emotion in Afghan poetry, the Taliban are attempting to awaken a 
sense of nationalism and unity among the population, framing the innocence of the past 
as something to be mourned.   
Morality is another central theme in Taliban communications and is a useful vehicle for 
understanding how the organization uses danger to secure social identity.  Central to this 
conception of morality is Islam, understood both as a religion and as a social order.  Part 
of the way in which the Taliban frame the external danger is through the idea of a cosmic 
battle existing between the West (referred to as the Crusaders) and the Islamic ummah 
epitomized by Afghanistan.  Given the plurality of identities existing within Afghan 
society, it is natural that the Taliban would use Islam as a narrative guiding the 
confrontation between internal and external (Johnson 2007: 331; 2017).  The loyalty and 
emotion resulting from the perception of Islam under threat is an attempt to unite Afghan 
society under the religious identity promulgated by the Taliban.  Thus, Islam forms the 
centre of the Taliban’s self-identity and representation of the ideal Afghan society.   
This aspect is often addressed in Taliban communications and has come to dominate their 
official communications.  In an online posting, the Taliban’s motivations were summed 
up as follows: 
The aim of the Islamic Emirate is the independence of Afghanistan and the 
establishment of an Islamic government.  The Islamic Emirate is a joint home 
comprising all ethnicities and segments of the Afghan society.  There is no room for 
linguistic, ethnic and other prejudice.  Commitment to Islamic values and national 
interests, wisdom, sincerity and experiences are standards in which the Islamic 
Emirate believes and based on these standards appoints and denotes individuals in its 
civilian and military organs.  
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(Al Emarah 2016h) 
 Given the themes discussed in this chapter, this quote is particularly salient in 
understanding the Taliban’s vision of statehood and social identity.  Recent scholarship 
on the Taliban has pointed out erroneously that the organization is attempting to build 
Pashtun nationalism (see Tomsen 2013; Kamel 2015); however, the use of Islam as a 
unifying feature threatened by an external danger indicates a preoccupation with building 
a society based on their understanding of Islam.  Interestingly, the Taliban also outline, 
albeit vaguely, the ideal qualities of Afghans.  The ambiguity of the term ‘Islamic values’ 
and ‘national interest’ leaves these signifiers open to values ascribed by the Taliban, and 
through linkages with other concepts and objects deployed in additional communications, 
form the basis of a robust counterhegemonic identity.   
However, education is vital in maintaining this identity and it is here that we witness a 
great clash between the indigenous Taliban and the external danger.  The Taliban have 
had a difficult relationship with education and are most known for the use of violence 
against schools, students, and teachers.  Indeed, it is this reputation that earned the group 
some of their strongest criticism during their reign and is one of the greatest challenges 
they face in asserting their discourses of identity.  Nevertheless, the Taliban engage in a 
(re)representation of education that contrasts the hegemonic norm.  The norm, which is 
state-based education, is seen as dangerous and subversive, leading the Taliban to target 
and destroy education institutions that they identify as teaching Afghans foreign values 
(ICG 2008: 28).  Night letters addressing education are a frequent mode of 
communication, with many echoing the statement that Westerners are using schools, 
specifically those directed at educating women, to spread immorality and corruption (ICG 
2008: 12).  However, in practically the same breath they issue various statements 
absolving themselves from targeting schools.  One Taliban spokesmen stated “the Taliban 
are supporters of education.  And the people who burn schools, they are not the Taliban.  
They are the enemies of Islam, they are the enemies of the Taliban…Burning schools is 
not allowed under Islam” (Dr. Hanif in ICG 2008: 28).  Whether this reflects an 
ineffective organisational structure or an attempt to foster a more peaceful public image, 
the Taliban use education as a vehicle for cultivating their own ideal society and 
maintaining the omnipresence of a foreign danger.   
For the Taliban, the danger is that the next generation will be saturated with Western 
values.  In an online posting dating from 2009, the Taliban wrote:  
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the most dangerous thing confronting the Afghan people, especially in Afghanistan, 
is the change of identity among the Afghan people generally, and the youth in 
particular, toward the path of converting Afghanistan, changing it toward America, 
and its attempt to elevate modern Islam and liberal Islam – which they call ‘Moderate 
Islam’ – over true Islam in Afghanistan  
(Saafi in Aggarwal 2016: 80)   
The existential danger for the counterhegemonic is that the hegemon order will eventually 
deprive them of their own identity (see Gramsci 1971).  Islam is vital to the Taliban’s 
self-image and vision for Afghanistan, therefore an Islam under constant threat of being 
re-imagined is something to be feared and opposed.  Moreover, the notion of a hybrid 
identity promulgated by the Afghan government (i.e. a ‘moderate’ Islam) is delegitimized 
as part of western infiltration.   
Control of Islamic value and identity is particularly important in Taliban discourse.  While 
the Taliban claim to represent a ‘true’ Islam, their values become challenged in the public 
sphere by mullahs and other religious figures. Moreover, in rural Afghan society where 
media representations have a diminished effect on public opinion, much of the public 
discourse is shaped by religious figures and tribal elders.  Therefore, a significant part of 
the Taliban’s discourse, specifically their representation of Islam under threat, is directed 
at mullahs at the community level.  Night letters have been used extensively to vilify 
mullahs with purported links to the Afghan government and other state institutions.  One 
letter reads “those mullahs who perform funerals for those who are killed in the campaign 
– national army, nation and border police and intelligence – will be killed with torture; 
and remember: such a mullah will never be forgiven” (ICG 2008: 12).  This is a 
particularly significant quote because it asserts the Taliban’s control over Islam and 
defining who is a Muslim.  Mullahs who perform funerals for state actors, essentially 
recognising their claim to a Muslim identity, are viewed as traitors to Islam and deserving 
of extraordinary violence (i.e. torture).  Moreover, the Taliban are also indirectly claiming 
that those killed in their operations are not Muslims, reaffirming the larger theme of 
framing danger in binaries of internal/external, Muslim/infidel, Afghan/foreigner.  
Therefore, the Taliban identity is located in a specific cultural context.  Mullahs linked to 
the foreign danger are seen as a modern aberration corrupted by an antagonistic Other.  
As a contrast, “the trope of the talib as a traveller on the margins of society devoted to 
religious pursuits rather than material life” is a prevalent feature in Pashtun literature and 
is represented as the authentic Afghan identity (Aggarwal 2016: 103).     
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This distinctly Afghan identity and understanding of an external danger is enshrined in 
the Taliban’s own represented self-image.  Their online presence is replete with 
biographies and interviews with various Taliban figures, ranging from local commanders 
to the current leader of the group, Sheikh Moulavi Hibatullah Akhunzada.  Following the 
death of Mullah Akhtar Mansoor in 2016, Akhunzada rose to power and in December of 
that year the website Al Emarah (2016f) posted a lengthy biography of him, entitled 
“Introduction of Sheikh Moulavi Hibatullah Akhunzada (may Allah safeguard him), 
Leader of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan”.  This biography is important because it 
incorporates all of the themes used in Taliban discourse in the attempt to construct a clear 
image of an Afghan-Taliban Self resisting a foreign Other.  It situates the Taliban in a 
long tradition of Islamic scholarship and resistance in Afghanistan, referring back to 
historical figures such as Imam Abu Hanifa132 and enduring clichés like ‘Afghanistan, the 
graveyard of empires’.  Moreover, the biography firmly establishes Akhunzada as the 
embodiment of this identity.  For instance, the biography begins by outlining 
Akhunzada’s scholarly background, firmly establishing both himself and his father within 
the larger tradition of talibs and religious education in Afghanistan.  His involvement in 
the mujahideen during the Soviet-Afghan war is also highlighted.  “Sheikh Hibatullah 
Sahib’ a descendent of a learned and pious family, was more enthusiastic than anyone 
else to fight against the Soviet invaders and their internal communist puppets, both on 
ideological as well as Jihadi fronts.  Even during his studies, he had a schedule to spend 
tie on various fronts with Mujahidin” (Al Emarah 2016f).  This quote references the trope 
of the talib warrior-scholar in Afghan history and firmly establishes Hibatullah within the 
collective memory of resistance against foreign dangers, in this case the Soviets.  
Furthermore, the parallel in language used to frame the communist regime in Afghanistan 
and the current government is striking.  Any government or political identity alternative 
to the Taliban is denounced as a ‘puppet’, whether it be the communists during the 1980s 
or the current government, subsequently reasserting the notion that any identity 
contrasting the Taliban cannot be Afghan.   
The biography ends with a mention of Akhunzada’s beliefs in Muslim solidarity and the 
centrality of a Muslim ummah.  The article addresses the tendency to revert back to ethnic 
                                                 
132 Imam Abu Hanifa was a prominent scholar in Sunni Islam and founded the Hanafi school of Islamic 
jurisprudence.  While there are several schools of Islamic jurisprudence, the Hanafi school is the most 
common in South and Central Asia.   
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identities in Afghanistan and places Akhunzada firmly against it.  The article reads, 
“[Akhunzada] is against all ideological, factional and linguistic discriminations among 
Muslims.  He is against all heresy and superstitions in religion.  According to his 
perception, the success of the Muslim masses is in their unity and their internal differences 
and divisions are the main cause of their adversities” (Al Emarah 2016f).  This quote can 
be understood as addressing the internal divisions that plague Afghanistan, maintaining 
the notion that Islam is the unifying identity.  As this version was published in English, 
one could also make the case that it is designed to address the wider Muslim community 
against the Western danger (see Aggarwal 2016; Calvin 2011).  The important point to 
take from this biography is how the Taliban uses the figure of Akhunzada to represent its 
ideal identity, replete with endangered values, cultural tropes, and other signs of 
belonging emblematic of Afghanistan and Afghans.   
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that the Taliban, far from being a loose network of local actors, 
is a counterhegemonic voice that engages with danger and uses it to represent its vision 
of the Afghan identity.  The use of counterhegemonic discourse is designed to rupture the 
hegemonic political and social order and to paint the existing order as the source of 
contemporary dangers.  The various themes and methods deployed in Taliban 
representations mirror those of the government and reaffirm the argument that danger is 
fundamentally deployed to constitute political authority and social identity.  Despite 
differences in the messages, language, and methods of communication, there are some 
resounding similarities in how danger is perceived and represented.  Externality and Islam 
form the basis of the Taliban’s understanding of danger and the endangered.  Similarly, 
as discussed in Chapter IV, the government of Afghanistan uses Islam and externality to 
vilify the Taliban.  Both discursive actors rely on representations of endangered referent 
objects, such as Islam and morality, to justify their discourses of identity and role as the 
legitimate protector of society.  However, where the Taliban differs from the government 
is in their engagement with terrorism and narcotics.  Terrorism and the ‘terrorist’ label 
are questioned in Taliban discourse, with many commentators, poets, and other discursive 
actors highlighting the problematic nature of the label and how it could easily apply to 
state-based violence.  Narcotics, on the other hand, are seldom addressed by the Taliban.  
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Moreover, if narcotics are addressed by the Taliban, they are framed as a means of 
harming the West (Aggarwal 2016: 82).   
How should we interpret this?  Are some dangers solely the property of hegemonic 
representations?  Are narcotics a means of top-down control?  While these questions are 
relevant, they ultimately miss the point of counterhegemonic representations of danger.  
Narcotics could be used by the Taliban, and indeed they have incorporated themes of 
‘addiction’ in past communications (Z.N. 2004 cited in Aggarawl 2016: 82; Scott 2011: 
122); however, narcotics are not the referent object here, but rather it is the idea of social 
immorality, a disease brought forth by Western infiltration.  The point of narcotics and 
what makes it such a pervasive danger is not its material qualities, but rather it is the 
notion of affecting the mentality of the subject – society.  For the Taliban, narcotics 
certainly are considered dangerous, however, the same danger can be found in the 
immaterial realm as ‘Western’ values become incorporated within contemporary Afghan 
society.  The focus of Taliban communication is to eradicate the danger of the Western 
disease from Afghan society, and in doing so, displace the hegemonic order embodied by 






To conclude, this thesis has looked at how, and ultimately why, the GIRoA and the 
Taliban deploy representations of danger in contemporary Afghanistan.  What the above 
discussion has shown is that both hegemonic and counterhegemonic actors (i.e. the 
GIRoA and the Taliban) instrumentalize representations of danger in Afghanistan in an 
attempt to establish their vision of the Afghan identity.  For the GIRoA this has been 
attempted through representations of (narco)terrorism, which is discursively linked to the 
Taliban.  The objectives of these representations are to first portray the Taliban as the 
embodiment of this danger and then to subsequently externalize counterhegemonic 
identities from Afghan society.  Thus, the use of danger by the GIRoA is understood as a 
productive hegemonic strategy designed to establish and maintain its hegemonic position 
in the Afghan sociopolitical sphere.   
Similarly, the Taliban also deploy representations of danger in their communications with 
society, although the findings of the thesis point to a reluctance to engage with discourses 
of (narco)terrorism.  Rather, the Taliban’s use of danger can be understood as a 
counterhegemonic strategy designed to rupture social and political structures reflective 
of the GIRoA’s hegemonic position.  For the Taliban, danger is not emanating from 
outside of the community, but rather from hostile agents within Afghan society who are 
deemed to be the agents of foreign powers.  In this regard, the counterhegemonic strategy 
is to highlight the experienced danger of Afghan society which is emblematic of an unjust, 
immoral hegemonic order (i.e. the GIRoA).  By challenging the legitimacy of the GIRoA, 
the Taliban attempts to displace the government’s dominant position and to problematize 
hegemonic narratives of identity.  The operationalisation of danger by both the GIRoA 
and the Taliban forms the basis of the thesis’ key findings and its original contribution. 
However, this study relied on several key assumptions on the discursive nature of danger 
and its connection to identity. Moreover, the findings outlined above rest on a theoretical 
approach which draws upon Foucauldian notions of power-knowledge and discourse, 
Gramsci’s theorising of cultural hegemony, and critical scholarship within CSS which 
conceptualises the connection between danger and identity.  Thus, in order to provided 
sufficient justification for the findings and contribution of the thesis, the framework and 
relevant literature were discussed at length in Chapters I and II.  
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The empirical analysis of this work began in Chapter III with a study how discourses of 
(narco)terrorism changed over time.  While this chapter should not be understood as an 
original contribution, it was a necessary step in demonstrating the composition and 
preferred meanings of representations of narcotics, terrorism, and narcoterrorism.  
Moreover, by situating developments within these discourses in connection to changes in 
social and political contexts (e.g. the French Revolution, the ‘hippy’ movement, the New 
World Order), this chapter demonstrated the fluidity of discourse and connection to 
contemporary power structures.  The particular identities written onto these danger were 
reflective of contemporary contexts and further revealed the fluidity of the discourse(s).  
Indeed, the findings of this chapter, while not wholly original, confirmed the discursive 
nature of danger and highlighted important continuities existing between global 
hegemonic discourses of (narco)terrorism and representations of danger in the Afghan 
context.   
Chapter IV and V should be understood as the core contribution of the thesis and the 
product of the theoretical discussions outlined in Chapters I and II.  In both chapters, 
Critical Discourse Analysis was applied to hegemonic and counterhegemonic 
representations of danger in order to illustrate the motivations and preferred meanings of 
the representations.  Chapter IV, which focused on GIRoA communications, analysed 
statements, press releases, and speeches made by government officials, with a particular 
focus on presidents Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani.  The findings of this chapter 
revealed the GIRoA’s use of the danger as a means of maintaining institutional control 
over Afghan society via the Hobbesian construct of the state as protector.  It also revealed 
that danger is frequently used to establish and discipline the Afghan identity through 
externalizing alternative identities and constructing the notion of an Afghan nation 
defined by victimhood.   
Similarly, Chapter V analysed counterhegemonic representations of danger emerging 
from the Taliban.  This was a particularly interesting area of research in that it revealed 
the limitations characteristic of counterhegemonic discourse and representations.  Thus, 
the methods of communication and data sets consulted needed to be different from that 
of the GIRoA.  However, these data sets revealed an innovative communication strategy 
used by the Taliban, which reflects the argument of the thesis.  Rather than deploying 
violence as its sole form of communication, the Taliban integrate representations of 
danger into specific cultural forms such as poetry, night letters, and chants.  Research in 
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this area is only in its infancy as studies on the Taliban suffer from a lack of accessibility.  
Moreover, of the literature existing in this area, mostly centre on the methods of 
communication rather than the meaning.  Therefore, this chapter presents a new and 
original contribution to the literature on the Taliban and Afghanistan more generally.   
However, despite the findings of the thesis there were some limitations.  Firstly, due to 
ethical reasons and ongoing instability in Afghanistan, the researcher was unable to 
conduct ethnographic research.  While the focus of the thesis does not require such 
research, it would have improved the quantity and quality of data sets consulted.  
Moreover, the use of visual representations of (narco)terrorism by the GIRoA, 
specifically on billboards scattered throughout the country, would have provided another 
area of analysis that is perhaps more accessible to the population of Afghanistan.  Another 
limitation was found in the language used in this study.  While the researcher possesses a 
basic knowledge of Dari, it was insufficient for conducting an effective analysis of the 
discourse.  As a result, the data sets used were all translated into English from their 
original language.  While this might appear to be an issue, the extensive background 
discussion on Afghanistan, its politics, culture, and the background of the researcher 
provided sufficient contextual knowledge necessary to conduct effective analysis of the 
discourse.  On the other hand, future studies on representations of danger in Afghanistan 
would greatly benefit from ethnographic field research, and ideally in the original 
language, so that the effectiveness of hegemonic and counterhegemonic representations 
can be ascertained.    
To conclude, the instrumentalization of representations of danger by the GIRoA and the 
Taliban present an exciting new window into the contemporary politics of Afghanistan.  
With the security situation worsening for the GIRoA and Afghan society, one might 
wonder whether or not their use of danger has failed.  However, as mentioned throughout 
the thesis, the point of this study was not to determine the success or failure of hegemonic 
and counterhegemonic representations of danger, but rather to illustrate that both groups 
use these representations strategically.  The establishment of the Taliban as a 
counterhegemonic voice raises additional considerations regarding the political nature of 
so-called drug traffickers.  Would drug cartels in Mexico, by definition narcoterrorists 
due to their use of violent spectacles and association with drug trafficking, utilise 
representations of danger in a similar way to the Taliban?  Are narcos interested in 
cultivating a counterhegemonic identity?  Indeed, one of the underlying motivations of 
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the thesis was to establish a research framework for future analysis of representations of 
(narco)terrorism in Mexico and Colombia as such a study would (potentially) reveal a 
counterhegemonic use of danger by drug cartels, subsequently undermining the supposed 
distinction between the apolitical criminal and the hyper-political terrorist.  However, this 
link can only be established through critical engagement with hegemonic and 
counterhegemonic representations of danger reflective of the local context and power 
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